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This thesis examines the role played by the United Nations in the implementation of the August 1962 New York Agreement. The Agreement ended a thirteen year dispute between the Netherlands and Indonesia concerning the future of West New Guinea and its Papuan inhabitants (or Irianese as they were known by Indonesia). Under the terms of the Agreement, the territory's administration was transferred to a temporary UN authority (UNTEA) which remained from 1 October 1962 until 1 May 1963. Following this, control of West New Guinea was handed over to Indonesia which renamed it West Irian (later Irian Jaya, now Papua). In 1968, a small UN team returned, led by Fernando Ortiz Sanz, the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for West Irian (UNRWI). The team's responsibility was to "advise, assist and participate" in Indonesian preparations for an act of Papuan self-determination planned for 1969. This 'Act of Free Choice' (or Pepera as it was known by Indonesia), and the UN's involvement, were central to the Agreement and its fulfillment. Following the Introduction and a short chapter on the background to the dispute, chapters two to four look at the UNTEA administration. Chapter five examines briefly the first years of Indonesian rule in West Irian between 1963 and 1967. The arrival of the UN team in 1968 and Ortiz Sanz's first two tours of the territory are discussed in Chapters Six and Seven. Preparations for the Act in 1969, including the selection of the 1022 Papuan representatives who took part in it, are examined in Chapters Eight and Nine. Chapter Ten looks at the conduct of the Act itself and international reaction culminating in the UNGA vote of November 1969. The thesis ends with a conclusion in Chapter Eleven.

In this work, the writer has provided a detailed analysis of .Anglo-Burmese relations between 1795 and 1826. In Chapter I, Part I, the Burmese incursions of 1787 and 1794 are examined and are shown not to have been hostile. The factors which led the British to despatch an embassy to Burma in 1795 are examined in detail, and the Burmese Court's amenability to contact with foreign powers is high-lighted. In Chapter I, Part II, the state of Anglo-Burmese trade at this time is examined. In Chapter I, Part III, the Symes mission is discussed. His instructions are examined in detail. His threat at Rangoon to leave Burma is shown to have been 11--f an error. A number of issues which cropped up at the capital are examined including the question of the Burmese attitude to the Governor-General's status. The Burmese response to Symes' proposals was friendly, although they refused to abandon their neutrality. In Chapter II, the Cox mission is discussed. His instructions are examined in detail, as also his violations of these instructions. His diary for the period between November 1797 and April 1798 is also examined. The unsuccessful attempts by the Burmese to secure arms are also discussed. In Chapter III, Part I, the events at the Chittagong-Arakan frontier between 1799 and 1800 which, together with the Cox mission and the failure to obtain arms, generated considerable ill-feeling for the British in King Bodawpaya's mind, are examined. Lord Wellesley's policy towards Burma is examined also. The mission sent to Burma in 1802, it is shown, did not succeed in its aim of a subsidiary alliance, but it succeeded in re-establishing cordial relations. The King also promised not to revive the embarrassing demand for the surrender of refugees in Chittagong (made in 1799 and 1802). In Chapter III, Part II, the reasons for the despatch of Lt. Canning to Rangoon are examined. The reasons for the arrival of a French ship at Rangoon are examined, as also the reasons for Canning's departure in November 1803, and the Yewun's conduct on that occasion (which is shown to have been defensible). In Chapter IV, the failure (on two occasions) of British sea captains to respect Burmese territorial integrity, and the Canning mission of 1809 to 1810, are discussed. Certain features of this mission - Canning's intrigue with the Ein-gyi Paya, the questions of the Governor-General's status, the Burmese response to the blockade of Mauritius and Bourbon and the King's apparent desire to gain possession of parts of Bengal - are high-lighted. In Chapter V, the Canning mission of 1811 to 1812, the result of the invasion and temporary conquest of Arakan by Arakanese from Chittagong, is discussed. The Burmese response was initially conciliatory, but subsequently, the King apparently attempted (unsuccessfully) to have Canning sent up to the capital, by force if necessary. A new interpretation of the origins of Chin Pyan's rebellion is suggested in this chapter. Chapter VI examines the Burmese demand for extradition of refugees (revived, in consequence of Chin Pyan's insurrection, for the first time since 1802), the letters of 1817 and 1818, demanding (respectively) the expulsion of refugees and the surrender of parts of Bengal, Burmese expansion into Northeast India and the emergence of new refugee problems, British policy towards Assam, the resulting anti-British feeling at the Burmese capital and the Burmese missions to Vietnam and the Sultan of Kedah, which show that despite worsening relations with the British, the Court's preoccupation, at the time of the outbreak of the Shahpuri crisis was the conquest of Siam. In Chapter VII, VIII and IX, the outbreak of the war from 1824 to 1826, and the political aspect of the war are discussed. The Burmese claim to Shahpuri island, it is shown, was made in good faith, like the British. The Court was prepared to uphold its claim to Shahpuri even at the cost of war, but so were the British. Subsequently, the Court received the wrong impression that the British were willing to give up Shahpuri. It then decided to demand a surrender of refugees and the ruler of Cachar,who would be made tributary ruler of Cachar. There is no satisfactory evidence to show that the Court still intended to fight the British. Initially, British policy aimed mainly at chastising the Burmese, so as to ensure their future good behaviour, and securing a strategically viable frontier. Subsequently, after the war had dragged on for over a year, new demands were made on the Burmese, for a variety of reasons, and in the last stages of the war, it was decided, solely for strategic reasons, to separate Pegu from Ava. This decision was rendered inapplicable by the conclusion of peace.

<p> The issue of southern Thailand becoming the next battleground for international <i> jihadist</i> terrorist organizations&mdash;such as al-Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or Jemaah Islamiyah&mdash;has reemerged as a prominent security concern following the defeats sustained by ISIS in the Middle East and the dispersion of its fighting force. While the prospect was hotly debated a decade ago, the majority of contemporary scholarship contends that <i> jihadism</i> will find little audience with the Malay Muslims in Thailand&rsquo;s Deep South, whose Shafi&rsquo;i population does not espouse the conservative Salafist beliefs underlying global <i>jihad</i>&mdash;a religiously-charged violent campaign against <i>infidels</i> (non-believers), <i> munafik</i> (traitorous Muslims), and bastions of state secularism and Western liberal values. It is furthermore believed that because southern Thailand&rsquo;s armed groups are fighting a nationalist struggle for independence, as opposed to fighting for more ideological reasons, they would not be amenable to <i>jihadist</i> involvement in their conflict. </p><p> Although it is true that Malay-Muslim militants in Thailand have declined offers of foreign fighters from international terrorist organizations, the cooperation between various separatist movements in Mindanao and global <i> jihadist</i> groups reveals that ethno-nationalism and ideological dissonance are insufficient causes for a rejection of <i>jihadism</i>. Rather, I argue that secessionists develop ties with <i>jihadist</i> groups when they are in need of political, financial, or military support they cannot secure from a legal entity, such as a state. This often occurs when one militant faction breaks away from its state-sponsored parent group following the signing of a peace deal it considers unappealing. Insurgent groups in Thailand have been inclined to distance themselves from <i>jihadism</i> because they have already acquired state patronage from Malaysia, and association with terrorist organizations would likely undermine that relationship. Strategic decisions to cooperate with <i>jihadist</i> organizations are thus executed according to a cost-benefit analysis and are not exclusively determined by ideological predilections.</p><p>

<p> The purpose of this study was to investigate the use of the nine-step problem design process (Hung, 2009) to design a problem based learning course. I applied a descriptive case study approach to conduct design and development research (Richey &amp; Klein, 2007). The study was conducted in the Malaysian teacher education setting. In this study, I served both as the researcher and instructional designer of the course. The instructor also involved as co-designer. The student participants were 25 preservice teachers enrolled in a video production course. Various data sources were collected such as a designer log, extant data, surveys, and interviews. The findings indicated that the nine-step problem design process was somewhat suitable in the context of this study due to conditions such as decision-making power, existing materials, lack of knowledge, unclear information of the steps, and time. Therefore, it is recommended that designers have client buy-in when deciding which design model or processes to follow and have some content expertise and experience designing problem based learning. It is also important to have subject matter expert involvement when using the steps to design problem based learning. In regards of participants&rsquo; perceptions, the instructor had positive views toward problem based learning and indicated her intention to use it again in the future. However, the instructor felt that designing problem based learning was a challenging and time-consuming task. Overall, the students found problem based learning to be interesting but challenging in terms of completing the video competition and reflection tasks. For future research, performance data such as students&rsquo; achievement and problem-solving skills should be collected to inform the effectiveness of the problems developed by using the nine-step problem design process.</p><p>

<p> The South China Sea has long been a region of competition and tension. In the Spratly Islands alone, Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam maintain disputing claims to the region&rsquo;s land features and surrounding maritime territories. Some argue that ongoing negotiations between China and the Philippines toward joint explorations of one of these disputed regions could be the key to promoting greater cooperation amongst the other claimants. These arguments, however, do not consider other elements of the international system that drive states to compete. Looking specifically at China, the Philippines, and the United States, this thesis analyzes joint explorations within the framework of motivational realism to understand the interaction of relevant historical elements, state objectives, and state estimations of one another&rsquo;s power, offense-defense balance, and motives&mdash;greedy or security-seeking. The thesis then examines the specific case of joint explorations to understand historical, domestic, and international legal components restricting the pathways within which the two states could reach an agreement. Finally, this thesis concludes that, due to domestic constraints, international legal developments, state objectives, and the way in which China, the Philippines, and the United States assess one another&rsquo;s motives, the South China Sea will likely remain a region of long-term competition and tension.</p><p>

<p> There is a large body of research that suggests the concept of a professional learning community (PLC) can promote improved student learning by increasing collective teacher capacity to meet the diverse learning needs of students (Reeves, 2016; Battersby &amp; Verdi, 2013; Marzano &amp; DuFour, 2011; Fullan 2010, Senge, 2006; Morrissey, 2000; Hord, 1997). Many schools have implemented PLCs around the world. Despite the well-documented benefits of PLCs, there is inconsistency to the extent with which PLCs are implemented within schools and districts. The purpose of this study was to (a) understand how the elementary division at Progressive Academy of Southeast Asia (PASA), an independent private school, has implemented PLCs; (b) learn about promising practices utilized by high performing PLCs to promote teacher collaboration and high productivity; and (c) understand barriers confronted by PLCs during the PLC process. A qualitative research design was used to understand the implementation process through focus group discussions. Focus group discussions were conducted with all grade levels, kindergarten to grade 5 in the elementary division. Ten themes emerged from the study (1) an alignment of belief in the mission and vision and purpose of PLCs by faculty and administration, (2) the elementary school has implemented systems and structures to support the PLC process, (3) there is a collaborative culture for the PLC process, (4) collective responsibility for student learning is still at its infancy stage, (5) PLCs are results oriented and have clearly established SMART goals that align with the elementary school&rsquo;s strategic plan, (6) instructional assistants are a strong system of support for learning for students, (7) trust is a key to high performing PLCs, (8) there is a low level of trust in some PLCs, (9) there is a transient faculty, and (10) there are an overwhelming number of initiatives that require the time of PLCs at the school.</p><p>

<p> The global trade across multiple countries has greatly increased in the last few decades. Nationalist organizations are focusing on global trade (Rhinesmith, Williamson, Ehlen, &amp; Maxwell, 1989). China and Japan are the driving forces in Asian global trade; but countries like Thailand are developing their global economies as well. The volume of western based leadership research benefits global businesses entering the U.S. market place compared to Japanese or Chinese culture. The lack of leadership research on Thailand creates challenges for large corporations wanting to outsource or manufacture in Thailand. Large multinational companies can enter Thailand but understanding how the culture affects all aspect of life there is crucial for success. </p><p> The purpose of this study was to determine the leadership characteristics of successful Thai leaders in their global organizations. This descriptive phenomenological study utilized 15 selected leaders who met the research criteria. The data were collected through semi-structured interviews. The interviews included ten open ended questions that followed the interview protocol. The results found two notable findings. The first is that the Thai leaders were benevolent in their leadership. This included their concern for subordinate&rsquo;s happiness and growth. Adaptability was the other finding. These Thai leaders were very adaptable with their work force having to adapt to the foreign workers, global challenges and changing business environment in Thailand. The study examined these two notable findings to identify what characteristics make a successful Thai leader in global business. Utilizing the data charts and the key findings may assist organizations which want to operate in Thailand.</p><p>

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