Bill C-25, The Truth in Sentencing (TIS) Act legislates the reduction of credit awarded for time served in pre-sentencing custody. The Act is but one initiative that reflects a shift toward punitiveness by the West. In reading the literature, a gap was identified concerning TIS activities in relation to the current Canadian predicament of crime control, and a socio-legal perspective provided a creative means of looking at this gap. The primary data was coded and analyzed using sensitizing categories derived from a leading theoretical framework. This framework posited the existence of conflicting criminologies and resulting strategies together forming the present regime of truth. This thesis concludes that 'truth' in sentencing is premised upon contradictory understandings as defined by the framework, that conflicting rationalities are reproduced within TIS and that although the Act is touted as an administrative reform, it also reasserts sovereign power over issues of crime and its control.

The global economic and financial crisis resulted in worldwide rising government debt levels, especially from 2008 to 2011. This thesis focuses on the sovereign debt crisis in the European Union and illustrates its member countries' debt levels in the period from 2001 to 2011. Two main indicators are considered: accumulated sovereign debt and its share in GDP. The following part outlines main measures taken in order to decrease general debt level in the European Union. Furthermore a selection of various presented proposals is introduced. The last part of the thesis speculatively evaluates all of these instruments and indicates possible imperfections.

This thesis consists of three essays concerned with endogenous fiscal policy and its interaction with political economy constraints. The first essay presented in Chapter 2 examines the cyclical behavior of endogenous government consumption over the business cycle absent a commitment mechanism in a neoclassical economy with Total Factor Productivity (TFP) shocks and investment shocks. Tax rates that finance public consumption are chosen in a time consistent way in a dynamic game between the government and a representative agent that values public goods in his utility. It is found that government consumption set without commitment behaves procyclical in response to the mentioned shocks. The government-consumption-output ratio is mildly procyclical or countercyclical depending on the selected calibration. Particularly, the elasticity of substitution between private and public goods plays an important role. The second essay showed in Chapter 3 extends the model studied in Chapter 2 adding agent heterogeneity in wealth and labor productivity. The aim of this study is to identify how policy outcomes are affected by inequality of households, particularly the median voter's choice of tax rates that finance public goods. For a standard RBC calibration to the U.S. economy the result is a strong procyclical comovement of public consumption with output, and a relatively weak procyclical comovement of the output share of public consumption with output, that becomes stronger with rising inequality. The politico-economic channel induces causality from output to lagged tax rates, therefore after a Hicks neutral productivity shock the median voter tries to delay the increase in the tax rate, such that the increment will take place just after the accumulation of more capital. In the case of equal agents the response is to decrease the tax rate in the first year after the shock. Additionally, the model predicts that the size of government consumption decreases with inequality. The last essay in Chapter 4 presents a stylized model of external sovereign debt that incorporates corruption in the form of rent-seeking groups by which the choice to cooperate or non-cooperate in providing public goods, in extracting rents and in issuing debt, is endogenized. More than one rent-seeking group originates a "tragedy of the commons" over fiscal resources that make the borrower economy to show collective fiscal impatience. External creditors envision that impatience and require higher interest rates for buying bonds, exacerbating the problem of high debt. The high level of interest rates decreases the wealth of the country and endangers its ability to repay the debt. We show that bailout plans, defined as temporary loans with lower than market level interest rates, are not effective in such economies.

Chapters 2-3: A global games approach to sovereign debt crises The first chapters present a model that investigates the risks involved when a fiscal authority attempts to roll-over a stock of debt and there is the potential for coordination failure by investors. A continuum of investors, after receiving signals about the authority's willingness to repay, decides whether to roll-over the stock of debt. If an insufficient proportion of investors participates, the authority defaults. With one fiscal authority, private information results in a deterministic outcome. When a public signal is available, the model behaves in a similar manner to a sunspot model. In line with much of the global games literature, improving public information has an ambiguous effect on welfare. Finally, the model is extended to include a second fiscal authority, which captures a similar sunspot result and illustrates the potential for externalities in fiscal policy. Lower debt in the less indebted authority can push a more indebted authority into crisis. Lower debt makes the healthier authority relatively more attractive, which causes the investors to treat the heavily indebted authority more conservatively. In certain circumstances, this is sufficient to cause a coordination failure. Chapter 4: A debt game with correlated information This chapter models of debt roll-over where a continuum of investors receives correlated signals on whether a debtor is solvent or insolvent. The investors face a collective action problem: a sufficient proportion of investors must agree to participate in the debt roll-over for it to be a success. If an insufficient proportion of investors participates in the deal, the debtor will default. The game has a unique switching strategy, which results in global uncertainty being preserved. The ex ante distribution of play (conditional on the true solvency of the debtor) follows a Vasicek credit distribution. The ex ante probability of a debt crisis is affected by the exogenous model parameters. Of particular interest is the observation that increasing private noise unambiguously reduces the probability of a debt crisis. Unsurprisingly, increasing the fiscal space or return on debt also decreases the probability of a crisis. Chapter 5: Bailouts and politics The final chapter examines the political-economic equilibrium in a two-period model with overlapping generations and a financial sector, which is inspired by the model in Tabellini (1989). The public policy is chosen under majority rule by the agents currently alive. It demonstrates that the bailout policy adopted in the second period has important effects on the bank's financing decisions in the first period. By adopting a riskier financing regime (i.e. higher leverage) in the first period, the older generation can extract consumption from the younger generation in the second period. Sovereign backstops of the financial sector are state-contingent: they can appear costless for long periods of time but eventually result in a socialization of private-sector debt. It is this mechanism that makes implementing capital requirements costly to investors yet beneficial to the younger generation. The model also highlights two important issues: (i) bank capital is endogenous and (ii) proposed resolution mechanisms must be politically credible. It suggests that a major benefit of increasing and narrowing equity-capital requirements or increasing liquidity ratios is that they are implemented ex ante and therefore available either to absorb losses in the event of a crisis or to reduce the possibility of large drops in asset values. Finally, this chapter also provides a structure by which to interpret the stylized facts of Calomiris et al. (2014): that more populist political institutions are associated with more fragile financial systems.

The spreading sovereign debt crisis in the Euro zone has renewed the debate about impact of credit rating agencies on financial markets. This thesis aims to explore the role played by the leading credit rating agencies by analysing the interaction between changes in sovereign ratings announced and the yield spreads of sovereign bonds, especially the short term impact and the potential contagion effect of rating changes on the highly integrated Euro zone financial market. The conducted event study and panel regression indicate that there is a significant impact of rating downgrades and negative rating outlooks on sovereign bond markets. Moreover, we have found significant contagion effect spreading from downgraded countries to non-event Euro zone members, namely not only to sovereign bond markets, but also to stock markets. JEL Classification: C23, E44, G12, G14 Keywords: credit ratings; sovereign yield spreads; rating agencies; contagion Author's email: veronika.vyskocilova@email.cz Supervisor's email: roman.horvath@gmail.com

The spread between interest rate and sovereign bond rate is commonly used in- dicator for country's probability to default. Existing literature proposes many different potential spread determinants but fails to agree on which of them are important. As a result, there is a considerable uncertainty about the cor- rect model explaining the spread. We address this uncertainty by employing Bayesian Model Averaging method (BMA). The BMA technique attempts to consider all the possible combinations of variables and averages them using a model fit measure as weights. For this empirical exercise, we consider 20 different explanatory variables for a panel of 47 countries for the 1980-2010 period. Most of the previously suggested determinants were attributed high inclusion probabilities. Only the "foreign exchange reserves growth" and the "exports growth" scored low by their inclusion probabilities. We also find a role of variables previously not included in the literature's spread determinants - "openness" and "unemployment" which rank high by the inclusion probability. These results are robust to a wide range of both parameter and model priors. JEL Classification C6, C8, C11, C51, E43 Keywords Sovereign Spread Determinants, Model Uncer- tainty, Bayesian Model Averaging Author's e-mail semanv()gmail()com...

In the first chapter the paper is focused on sovereign rating, it describes the history and explains the basic characteristics in the context of its usual usage. In the second chapter the basics behind the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits are explained. Because the main purpose of this paper is to compare sovereign rating and the country risk classification based on the Arrangement, the chapter focuses especially on the Knaepen Package that introduced country risk classification to the Arrangement. In the chapter there is also the introduction to the Malzkuhn-Drysdale Package. In the third and fourth chapter sovereign ratings and county risk classifications are compared on theoretical basis. There were used several different criteria, e.g. methodology of rating/classifying, time necessary for adjustment and criteria for evaluation. The fifth chapter is focused on Basel I-III, the connection between Basel capital adequacy and both credit risk evaluation systems is explained. In the following chapter, the question of guilt of rating agencies and their role in the outbreak of financial crisis is discussed. The last chapter is based on the case study that describes the difference between development of financial crisis in Italy and Greece and its impact on rating grades and country risk classification.

Credit rating agencies judge the creditworthiness of the debtors and debt obligations and the relative probability of their default. Credit rating plays a very important role in the financial markets. It influences the behavior of all participants (investors, debtors and regulators) of the market transactions. The first part of the thesis deals with definition and function of the credit rating. The main controversial points in the activity of the credit rating agencies will be discussed, as well as how the industry is regulated. In the second part it is claimed that the opinions of the credit rating agencies on sovereign bonds (sovereign rating) contribute to the overheating of the economies or to the deeper recession due to procyclicity of the rating. The actual credit rating of the country will be compared with a rating based on a theoretical model designed with publicly available economic data.

Si les fonds souverains ne sont pas nouveaux, leur nombre et leur pouvoir financier n’ont cessé de croître depuis le début des années 2000, suscitant de nombreuses inquiétudes, notamment dans les pays développés. Les fonds souverains sont-ils guidés par les mêmes motivations que les investisseurs institutionnels ? Leur pouvoir financier risque-t-il de déstabiliser les marchés? Ces interrogations ont fait des fonds souverains un thème de recherche à part entière dans lequel s’inscrit ce travail de recherche. Le premier essai de cette thèse contribue à identifier les principaux facteurs susceptibles d’inciter un pays à créer un fonds souverain. En outre, les stratégies d’investissement des fonds souverains suscitent de nombreuses interrogations : poursuivent-ils un objectif de rendement financier ou ont-ils des objectifs plus stratégiques? Le deuxième essai met en évidence la complexité du processus de décision des fonds souverains en testant s’ils préfèrent investir dans des pays qui leurs sont familiers et/ou dans des pays dans lesquels ils ont déjà investi par le passé. Dans le prolongement de cette analyse, le troisième essai s’intéresse plus spécifiquement aux déterminants des prises de participations majoritaires des fonds souverains en se focalisant sur un groupe de fonds particulièrement actifs : les fonds des Pays du Golfe. Plus précisément, cette analyse vise à identifier les facteurs qui influencent la décision de prendre le contrôle dans une entreprise donnée. / If Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) are not new, their number and their financial power have grown sharply since the beginning of the 2000's, which raise concerns, particularly among developed countries. Are SWFs' motives comparable to other institutional investors'? May SWFs investments destabilize financial markets? These concerns have encouraged researchers to investigate the issues raised by SWFs and it has now become a subject of research in its own rights. This thesis is in line with this literature. The first essay of this thesis identifies the main factors driving the decision to establish a fund. Moreover, investment decisions of SWFs are not well understood yet. Are SWFs investments driven by the search for financial profits or do they pursue more strategic objectives? The second essay highlights the complexity of the investment decision-making process of SWFs, testing if they rather invest in countries with which they share common characteristics and/or in countries where they have already invested. In line with this second essay, the third essay analyzes more specifically the determinants of majority acquisitions made by SWFs by focusing on some particularly active funds: Gulf Countries' SWFs. More precisely, this analysis aims at identifying both microeconomic and macroeconomic factors driving the decision to acquire a majority stake in a cross-border firm.

[pt] Neste trabalho, estudamos o forte movimento do risco país em momentos de emissões de dívida externa. Nossos resultados indicam que emissões de curto prazo em momentos de alta assimetria informacional reduzem o risco país em pelo menos 12 pontos-base, enquanto que emissões de longo prazo, nestes momentos, aumentam-no em torno de 90 pontos, movimentos que são mais pronunciados nas taxas de longo prazo da estrutura a termo do spread do que nas de curto prazo. Estes resultados, interpretados à luz de modelos que consideram o trade off entre custo de financiamento e risco de refinanciamento, sugerem que os investidores inferem de uma emissão curta uma maior probabilidade de o governo honrar a dívida e, em contraste, de uma emissão de longo prazo um aumento na probabilidade de moratória. Desta forma, concluímos que a maturidade das emissões de dívida revela informação sobre a qualidade da política econômica futura. / [en] In this work, we study the strong movements in country spreads in moments of sovereign debt issues. Our results point that short term bond issues in moments of high informational asymmetry reduce sovereign spreads in 12 basis-points at least, while long-term ones increase spreads in roughly 90 basis-points, movements that are more pronounced in long- term outstanding bonds than in short ones. These results, interpretated in light of models that consider the trade off between financial cost and refinancing risk, suggest that financial markets infer a higher likelihood of default from long term bond issues and a lower from short term ones. Therefore we conclude that sovereign debt issues reveal information about the future quality of the economic policy.