Thesis (M.S. in Space Systems Operations)--Naval Postgraduate School, Sept. 2004. / Thesis Advisor(s): Chirold Epp. Includes bibliographical references (p. 53-55). Also available online.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / The National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA) and its prime contractors currently use a software tool called RMAT (the Reliability and Maintainability Assessment Tool) for the forecasting of Orbital Replacement Unit (ORU) failure rates and associated maintenance demands for the International Space Station (ISS). This thesis introduces a new model: CMAM (the Comparative Maintenance Analysis Tool), which was developed to replicate some of the basic functionality of RMAT in order to provide a comparative look at RMAT results. The CMAM program, developed in Visual Basic.net and dynamically linked to a Microsoft ACCESS database, focuses on a representative set of critical Orbital Replacement Units (ORUs that represent key items that require both internal and external maintenance in both pressurized and un-pressurized storage) and generated failure rate data for each critical ORU. The results of the CMAM model are then compared with the failure rates generated by RMAT program for the same set of critical ORUs. These two independently developed sets of data are then analyzed against historic failure rates for these ISS parts. / Major, United States Army

The assembly of the International Space Station opened a new era of space exploration. It also created new challenges for the lawyers that had to deal with new issues related to this endeavour. This study will focus on the prospect of commercialisation of the ISS and on the legal problems that could appear with respect to this undertaking. By examining available markets and managing structure of the ISS, this study will reveal the potential and the drawbacks of the international enterprise. Furthermore, the detailed analysis of the Intergovernmental Agreement signed by the State Partners to the ISS will describe the particularities of ISS' legal regime, especially emphasising on the Intellectual Property provisions and other issues not covered by the cross waiver of liability.

Thesis (M.S.)--Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1991. / Vita. Abstract. Bibliography: leaves 124-125. Also available via the Internet.

Thesis (M.S.)--Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1991. / Vita. Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 112-113). Also available via the Internet.

Thesis (M.S. in Astronautical Engineering)--Naval Postgraduate School, Dec. 2004. / Thesis Advisor(s): Eric Christiansen, Terry R. McNelley. Includes bibliographical references (p. 275-276) Also available online.

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Suppose we are confronted with an environment which consists of large common costs and uncertain supplies. Furthermore, suppose the resources in this environment are being supplied by a public enterprise monopoly which is interested in maintaining economic efficiency while recovering costs incurred by the project. Then the above problem becomes one of institutional design. Even if conditions existed in which traditional marginal cost pricing provided the proper signals for efficiency, additional charges will be necessary to recover costs due to the large common costs in this environment. Ideas and suggestions about decentralized methods of covering common costs lead naturally to questions about decentralized methods for solving the public goods provision problem. This paper reports in part on an experimental investigation of four methods for allocating public goods. The two basic processes studied are direct contribution and a public goods auction process. Both of these processes are studied with and without an additional unanimity feature. The results suggest that the auction process outperforms direct contribution. The effect of unanimity is to decrease the efficiency of both processes. Strategic aspects of the voting rule (unanimity) are evident in the results. To assist in the contingency planning for environments with uncertain supplies, different contract forms are considered. In particular, priority and contingent contracting are investigated along with specific mechanisms to allocate such contracts. An experimental environment is developed to investigate the various contract forms and mechanisms. The experiment considers two contract forms (contingent and priority) and four allocation mechanisms (Random, English auction, English auction with queue, and Iterative Groves). The experimental results show that bidding for priority results in higher efficiency than pre-assignments. Furthermore, allowing individuals to signal coalitional bids has a positive effect on efficiency and revenue generated.

Thesis (M.S. in Space Systems Operations)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2005. / Thesis Advisor(s): Daniel Bursch. Includes bibliographical references (p. 37-38). Also available online.

No description available.