Fusionen stellen einen zentralen Baustein der Industrieökonomik dar. In diesem Buch wird der Frage nachgegangen, welchen Einfluss die räumliche Dimension auf eine Fusion ausübt. Dabei wird ein Grundmodell entwickelt und über dieses hinaus eine Vielzahl Erweiterungen präsentiert. Der Leser erhält somit die Möglichkeit ein tiefes Verständnis für Fusionen bei räumlichem Wettbewerb zu erlangen. / The analysis of mergers ia a central element of industrial organization. In this book the influence of spatial competition on mergers is analyzed. A basic model is developed and enhanced to take into account different economic environments. The reader gets the possibility to understand the effects of mergers with spatial competition.

In the past few decades spatial econometric models have become a standard tool in empirical research. Nevertheless applications in binary-choice models remain scarce. This paper makes use of Bayesian Spatial Probit Models to model and estimate spatial interactions in location decisions. For this purpose, we focus on the Austrian retail gasoline market, which is going through a process of remarkable structural changes. A short analysis shows that, during the last decade 10.9% of the stations had left the market and a percentage of 29.6% had either left the market or had changed the brand. This paper aims at investigating this process. A special characteristic of this market is the local competition structure which is characterized by spatial dependencies along local competitors. To capture these spatial dependencies and since the dependent variable is binary in nature (an exit had taken place or not), we apply a Bayesian spatial probit model using MCMC estimation on station level data for the whole Austrian retail gasoline market. Our results suggest, that the decision to leave the market, does not only depend on own characteristics, but also on competitors. In particular, we find the exit decisions to exhibit a negative spatial correlation. Moreover, our model allows to quantify spatial spillover effects of this market. (authors' abstract) / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series

We empirically investigate the importance of centrality (holding a central position in a spatial network) for strategic interaction in pricing for the Austrian retail gasoline market. Results from spatial autoregressive models suggest that the gasoline station located most closely to the market center - defined as the 1-median location - exerts the strongest effect on pricing decisions of other stations. We conclude that centrality influences firms' pricing behavior and further find that the importance of centrality increases with market size.

Traditional economic theory assumes that individuals are self-interested. They only care about their own well-being and disregard the impact of their actions on the others. However, the assumption of selfish individuals is unable to explain a number of important phenomena and puzzles. Individuals frequently engage in actions that are costly to themselves with no<p>apparent reward. Behavioural economics provides plausible explanations for these actions.<p>Individuals can be “boundedly rational" (Simon, 1955, and Kahneman et al. 1982) and/or can be driven by altruistic, equity and reciprocity considerations (see for an overview Fehr<p>and Schmidt, 2006). Over the past decade, researchers have applied behavioural economics<p>models to the study of organisations and how contracts should be designed in the presence<p>of non-standard preferences and asymmetric information or incomplete contracts (see for<p>an overview of the literature Köszegi, 2014).<p>In my current research, I try to be at the forefront of these new behavioural economics<p>applications into traditional industrial organisation and contract theory themes. The usual prescriptions of standard models can be misleading if potential differences in the agents' preferences are overlooked. Behavioural economics can make great progress if it takes into proper accountmarket and organisational features. / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

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Nel primo capitolo si propone una rassegna della letteratura di ambito economico e manageriale in tema di Responsabilità Sociale d’Impresa (RSI). Successivamente, si identificano le peculiarità degli attori operanti nel settore bancario etico. Infine, si comparano i risultati degli studi sul comportamento delle banche etiche con quelli disponibili sulle banche tradizionali. Il secondo capitolo confronta le condizioni di rifinanziamento delle banche sociali con quelle delle banche standard, quando le prime dispongono di informazioni private sulla qualità dei clienti. Ciò comporta il noto problema dell’hold-up, che tuttavia può essere attenuato dai costi delle peculiari attività di selezione e monitoraggio delle banche etiche. Ne risulta che, indipendentemente dalla qualità del cliente, le banche standard potrebbero offrire condizioni di prestito più vantaggiose di quelle delle banche etiche. Il terzo capitolo usa un modello spaziale per descrivere come le banche sociali e standard definiscono i loro tassi di interesse quando competono nel mercato dei depositi e dei prestiti. Come suggerisce l’evidenza empirica, i risparmiatori delle banche sociali sono disposti ad accettare tassi più bassi di quelli del mercato. Pertanto, si determinano le condizioni per cui ciò si verifica e si studia quando questo è compatibile con tassi più bassi anche sui prestiti. / In the first chapter, we begin with a survey on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in economics, management and business literatures. Then we identify the peculiarities of the agents operating in the social banking sector. Thereafter, we compare and contrast the contributions focused on the behavior of social banks with those available on traditional lenders. The second chapter compares the refinancing behavior of social banks with that of standard lenders when the former have inside information on the quality of the borrowers. This entails the renowned hold-up problem which, however, can be mitigated by the costs of the ethical screening and monitoring activities of social banks. As a result, standard banks may offer better loan contracts and attract high quality borrowers. The third chapter proposes a spatial competition model to investigate how standard and social banks set their interest rates when they compete in the deposit and loan markets. As the empirical evidence suggests, social depositors are willing to accept returns lower than the market level. Therefore we determine under which conditions social banks pay deposit rates lower than those of standard banks and when this is compatible with lower rates also on loans.