Approved for public release; distribution in unlimited. / On 1 October 2003 the USAF transferred control of its CONUS-based combat search and rescue(CSAR) assets from Air Combat Command to Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). Transferto AFSOC was CSAR's fourth major reorganization in twenty years, and was the latest in a turbulentprocession of attempts to improve the combat effectiveness of CSAR forces. Despite possessing anabundance of brave, motivated, and extremely capable personnel yearning to accomplish their mission, dysfunctional organizational arrays and nagging organizational constraints have prevented USAF dedicatedCSAR forces from "getting to the fight" for the onset of hostilities in three of this nation's past four majorarmed conflicts. Special operations forces had to fill the void. This analysis evaluates CSAR's positionwithin AFSOC's organizational array to determine if this latest reorganization is likely to produce durableimprovements in CSAR combat effectiveness. My conclusion is that "CSAR friendly" organizational cultureand effective organizational constructs within AFSOC Headquarters, combined with highly receptiveattitudes among CSAR crewmembers, form a historically unique organizational mix that favors the long termsuccess of CSAR forces in AFSOC. To ensure AFSOC's favorable organizational posture is translated toimproved combat capability, leadership must immediately increase CSAR representation on HHQ staffs. / Major, United States Air Force

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / The need for a well thought out, planned, and rehearsed command and control organization to conduct special operations in the US Northern Command Area of Responsibility is vital to success in defending the Homeland. Currently, USNORTHCOM does not have an apportioned or assigned command and control structure for the conduct of special operations. This thesis analyzes three courses of action to fulfill this requirement: use the current USNORTHCOM battle staff command structure including the integration of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters-North; rely on the newly formed US Special Operations Command's Joint Task Force Structures; and establish a Theater Special Operations Command North assigned to USNORTHCOM. Through the conduct of analysis and research this thesis recommends that The Joint Staff direct the reorganization required to establish a Theater Special Operations Command North to exercise command and control of special operations forces conducting operations in the USNORTHCOM AOR. / Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army