Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 97). Also available online.

Thesis (M.S. in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy)--Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2007. / Title from title screen; viewed on July 9, 2007. "5 April 2007." Electronic version of original print document. Includes bibliographical references (p. 83-89).

In this thesis, we examine the current levels of cultural understanding and irregular warfare being taught in U.S. Army conventional military schools. Given engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is our view that the military needs a deeper understanding of the indigenous people due to the extremely close and on-going interaction between American Soldiers and the local populations. Current analysis of the difficulties being reported suggests U.S. Army Soldiers are having trouble combating irregular warfare due to cultural misunderstandings and a lack of counterinsurgency training, thereby reflecting a likely educational gap in the U.S. Army's formal military educational training system. This thesis analyzes the current problems and difficulties Soldiers are reported to be having while attempting to combat irregular forces in non-western environments. We analyze the amount of training U.S. Army Soldiers receive in cultural understanding and irregular warfare in the military schools pipeline and conclude that there is a connection between problems Soldiers currently face and a lack of training for the conduct of operations in foreign countries. We propose a number of solutions to overcome these suspected gaps in education and suggested changes to the Army's professional education curriculum.

The US military has proven its strengths many times over through its ability to dominate opponents on the conventional battlefield. However, when it comes to irregular wars and insurgent conflicts, which are defined by enemies who conduct war from the shadows and refuse to meet on the open field, finding success has been far more difficult. The nature and dynamics of these unconventional wars are dramatically different from the conventional warfare realm, and require innovative approaches and rethinking of many long held conceptions of waging war. Conducting unconventional warfare has been the core mission of US Army Special Forces (USSF) since they were founded in 1952. Throughout a relatively short history, USSF have shown a broad utility in conducting operations with indigenous military, paramilitary, and civilian personnel in "irregular wars" and low intensity conflicts (LICs), and thus Special Forces have been widely regarded as the preeminent experts in this particular field of warfare. Now more than ever, the capabilities of Special Forces are invaluable in supporting US national security strategy, continuing the Global War on Terror (GWOT), and supporting efforts to transform military capabilities for irregular warfare and unconventional conflicts. USSF are now faced with a difficult challenge: high demand and operations tempo require that USSF must find new ways to more effectively and efficiently employ their skills in unconventional environments. In order to enhance the capabilities of USSF in conducting unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency, this thesis proposes that USSF develop a training program that allows recruitment and selection of both indigenous personnel and US foreign-born as auxiliaries and surrogates to USSF operations. Training would take place in the US and would be for the explicit purpose of creating indigenous cadres for assisting Special Forces Operational Detachment Alphas (SFODAs) in developing operational/security forces and intelligence networks at the local level in order to create long-term stability in unconventional conflict areas.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / This thesis presents two prescriptive models for approaching challenges to special operations forces with regard to personnel recovery in an urban environment. It begins by developing a model for overt recovery methods, using McRaven's model of Special Operations as the foundation. This model is then tested against three different case studies from operations in Mogadishu, Somalia in 1993. The original six principles proposed by McRaven are complimented with four newly-prescribed principles that account for the interactions of the isolated personnel. Following this analysis, a nonconventional assisted recovery model is presented for clandestine personnel recovery methods. This model borrows the relative superiority concept from McRaven's theory, but proposes six different principles. This model is evaluated using three case studies from the World War II era through Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. These cases support the idea that while the urban operational environment may vary across time and space, the principles supporting successful personnel recovery operations endure. / Major, United States Army / Major, United States Air Force

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009. / Thesis Advisor(s): Borer, Douglas A. Second Reader: Rothstein, Hy S. "December 2009." Description based on title screen as viewed on January 26, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom, counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, International Security and Assistance Force, U.S. Special Operations Forces. Includes bibliographical references (p. 109-116). Also available in print.

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Maritime Operations. / "Final Report."--Rept. document page. "4 February 2002"--P. ii. Description based on title screen as viewed on Aug. 18, 2003. Includes bibliographical references (p. 23-25). Also available in print.

Thesis (M.A.)--Baylor University, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 105-107)

Thesis (M.M.A.S.)--School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1995. / Subject: An analysis of whether Special Operations Forces should use Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to support intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, communications and re-supply capability deficiencies. Cover page date: June 1995. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / This thesis presents a historical analysis of the evolution of US Army Special Forces operations from 1995 to 2004, focusing specifically on operations conducted in the Balkans (Bosnia and Kosovo), Afghanistan and Iraq, answering the research question: How have the operations conducted by US Army Special Forces evolved from the Balkans in 1995 through Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)? The thesis examines the progression of Special Forces operations during each of the aforementioned campaigns, analyzing their evolution in the areas of intelligence operations, unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, close air support, integration with conventional forces and the institutionalization of lessons learned. The thesis concludes by examining future roles of US Army Special Forces with respect to employment. Tracing the progression of Special Forces employment from the Balkans to OIF is critical to understanding the factors contributing to the success of Special Forces operations in both the decisive operations and stability and support (SASO) phases of OEF and OIF. / Major, United States Army