The aim of this thesis is to create a tool for formal verification of systems specified using textual use- cases. The tool should allow for automated verification of temporal invariants specified in temporal logic (CTL and LTL formulae). The textual specification is transformed to a formal model that is verified using the NuSMV symbolic model-checker. Potential errors are shown to the user in the form of an HTML report. Using this feedback, the user is able to iteratively develop valid textual use-case specifications. The tool's architecture should be focused on reusability of its components and extensibility. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)

In this thesis, we develop and evaluate a formal model and contracting framework for data-centric Web services. The central component of our framework is a formal specification of a common Create-Read-Update-Delete (CRUD) data store. We show how this model can be used in the formal specification and verification of both basic and transactional Web service compositions. We demonstrate through both formal proofs and empirical evaluations that our proposed framework significantly decreases ambiguity about a service, enhances its reuse, and facilitates detection of errors in service-based implementations. Web Services are reusable software components that make use of standardized interfaces to enable loosely-coupled business-to-business and customer-to-business interactions over the Web. In such environments, service consumers depend heavily on the service interface specification to discover, invoke, and synthesize services over the Web. Data-centric Web services are services whose behavior is determined by their interactions with a repository of stored data. A major challenge in this domain is interpreting the data that must be marshaled between consumer and producer systems. While the Web Services Description Language (WSDL) is currently the de facto standard for Web services, it only specifies a service operation in terms of its syntactical inputs and outputs; it does not provide a means for specifying the underlying data model, nor does it specify how a service invocation affects the data. The lack of data specification potentially leads to erroneous use of the service by a consumer. In this work, we propose a formal contract for data-centric Web services. The goal is to formally and unambiguously specify the service behavior in terms of its underlying data model and data interactions. We address the specification of a single service, a flow of services interacting with a single data store, and also the specification of distributed transactions involving multiple Web services interacting with different autonomous data stores. We use the proposed formal contract to decrease ambiguity about a service behavior, to fully verify a composition of services, and to guarantee correctness and data integrity properties within a transactional composition of services. / Ph. D.

Le travail présenté dans cette thèse est une contribution aux méthodes formelles de spécification et de vérification. Les spécifications formelles sont utilisées pour décrire un logiciel, ou plus généralement un système, d'une manière mathématique sans ambiguïté. Des techniques de vérification formelle sont définies sur la base de ces spécifications afin d'assurer l'exactitude d'un système donné. Cependant, les méthodes formelles ne sont souvent pas pratiques et facile à utiliser dans des systèmes réels. L'une des raisons est que de nombreux formalismes de spécification ne sont pas assez riches pour couvrir à la fois les exigences orientées données et orientées comportement. Certains langages de spécification ont été proposés pour couvrir ce genre d'exigences. Le langage Circus se distingue parmi ces langues par une syntaxe et une sémantique riche et complètement intégrées.L'objectif de cette thèse est de fournir un cadre formel pour la spécification et la vérification de systèmes complexes. Les spécifications sont écrites en Circus et la vérification est effectuée soit par des tests ou par des preuves de théorèmes. Des environnements similaires de spécification et de vérification ont déjà été proposés dans la littérature. Une spécificité de notre approche est de combiner des preuves de théorème avec la génération de test. En outre, la plupart des méthodes de génération de tests sont basés sur une caractérisation syntaxique des langages étudiés. Notre environnement est différent car il est basé sur la sémantique dénotationnelle et opérationnelle de Circus. L'assistant de preuves Isabelle/HOL constitue la plateforme formelle au-dessus de laquelle nous avons construit notre environnement de spécification et de vérification.La première contribution principale de notre travail est l'environnement formel de spécification et de preuve Isabelle/Circus, basé sur la sémantique dénotationnelle de Circus. Sur la base d’Isabelle/HOL nous avons fourni une intégration vérifiée d’UTP, la base de la sémantique de Circus. Cette intégration est utilisée pour formaliser la sémantique dénotationnelle du langage Circus. L'environnement Isabelle/Circus associe à cette sémantique des outils de parsing qui aident à écrire des spécifications Circus. Le support de preuve d’Isabelle/HOL peut être utilisé directement pour raisonner sur ces spécifications grâce à la représentation superficielle de la sémantique (shallow embedding). Nous présentons une application de l'environnement à des preuves de raffinement sur des processus Circus (impliquant à la fois des données et des aspects comportementaux).La deuxième contribution est l'environnement de test CirTA construit au-dessus d’Isabelle/Circus. Cet environnement fournit deux tactiques de génération de tests symboliques qui permettent la vérification de deux notions de raffinement: l'inclusion des traces et la réduction de blocages. L'environnement est basé sur une formalisation symbolique de la sémantique opérationnelle de Circus avec Isabelle/Circus. Plusieurs définitions symboliques et tactiques de génération de test sont définies dans le cadre de CirTA. L'infrastructure formelle permet de représenter explicitement les théories de test ainsi que les hypothèses de sélection de test. Des techniques de preuve et de calculs symboliques sont la base des tactiques de génération de test. L'environnement de génération de test a été utilisé dans une étude de cas pour tester un système existant de contrôle de message. Une spécification du système est écrite en Circus, et est utilisé pour générer des tests pour les deux relations de conformité définies pour Circus. Les tests sont ensuite compilés sous forme de méthodes de test JUnit qui sont ensuite exécutées sur une implémentation Java du système étudié. / The work presented in this thesis is a contribution to formal specification and verification methods. Formal specifications are used to describe a software, or more generally a system, in a mathematical unambiguous way. Formal verification techniques are defined on the basis of these specifications to ensure the correctness of the resulting system. However, formal methods are often not convenient and easy to use in real system developments. One of the reasons is that many specification formalisms are not rich enough to cover both data-oriented and behavioral requirements. Some specification languages were proposed to cover this kind of requirements. The Circus language distinguishes itself among these languages by a rich syntax and a fully integrated semantics.The aim of this thesis is to provide a formal environment for specifying and verifying complex systems. Specifications are written in Circus and verification is performed either by testing or by theorem proving. Similar specifications and verification environment have already been proposed. A specificity of our approach is to combine supports for proofs and test generation. Moreover, most test generation methods are based on a syntactic characterization of the studied languages. Our proposed environment is different since it is based on the denotational and operational semantics of Circus. The Isabelle/HOL theorem prover is the formal platform on top of which we built our specification and verification environment.The first main contribution of our work is the Isabelle/Circus specification and proof environment based on the denotational semantics of Circus. On top of Isabelle/HOL we provide a machine-checked shallow embedding of UTP, the semantics basis of Circus. This embedding is used to formalize the denotational semantics of the Circus language. The Isabelle/Circus environment associates to this semantics some parsing facilities that help writing Circus specifications. The proof support of Isabelle/HOL can be used directly to reason on these specifications thanks to the shallow embedding of the semantics. We present an application of the environment to refinement proofs on Circus processes (involving both data and behavioral aspects). The second main contribution is the CirTA testing framework build on top of Isabelle/Circus. The framework provides two symbolic test generation tactics that allow checking two notions of refinement: traces inclusion and deadlocks reduction. The framework is based on a shallow symbolic formalization of the operational semantics of Circus using Isabelle/Circus. Several symbolic definition and test generation tactics are defined in the CirTA framework. The formal infrastructure allows us to represent explicitly test theories as well as test selection hypothesis. Proof techniques and symbolic computations are the basis of test generation tactics. The test generation environment was used for a case study to test an existing message monitoring system. A specification of the system is written in Circus, and used to generate tests following the defined conformance relations. The tests are then compiled in forms of JUnit test methods and executed against a Java implementation of the monitoring system.This thesis is a step towards, on one hand, the development of sophisticated testing tools making use of proof techniques and, on the other hand, the integration of testing and proving within formally verified software developments.

Master of Science / Department of Computing and Information Sciences / John Hatcliff / With the increase in development of safety and security critical systems, it is important to have more sophisticated methods for engineering such systems. It can be difficult to understand and verify critical properties of these systems because of their ever growing size and complexity. Even a small error in a complex system may result in casualty or significant monetary loss. Consequently, there is a rise in the demand for scalable and accurate techniques to enable faster development and verification of high assurance systems. This thesis focuses on discovering dependencies between various parts of a system and leveraging that knowledge to infer information flow properties and to verify security policies specified for the system. The primary contribution of this thesis is a technique to build dependence graphs for languages which feature abstraction and refinement. Inter-procedural slicing and inter-procedural chopping are the techniques used to analyze the properties of the system statically. The approach outlined in this thesis provides a domain-specific language to query the information flow properties and to specify security policies for a critical system. The spec- ified policies can then be verified using existing static analysis techniques. All the above contributions are integrated with a development environment used to develop the critical system. The resulting software development tool helps programmers develop, infer, and verify safety and security systems in a single unified environment.

Many industrial control systems use programmable logic controllers (PLCs) since they provide a highly reliable, off-the-shelf hardware platform. On the programming side, function blocks (FBs) are reusable PLC components that can be composed to implement the required system behaviour. A higher quality system may be realized if the FBs are pre-certified to be compliant with an international standard such as IEC 61131-3. Unfortunately, the set of programming notations defined in IEC 61131-3 lack well-defined formal semantics. As a result, tool vendors and users of PLCs may have inconsistent interpretations of the expected system behaviour. To address this issue, we propose an engineering method for formally verifying the conformance of candidate implementations of FBs (and their compositions) to their high-level, input-output requirements. The proposed method is sufficiently general to handle FBs supplied by IEC 61131-3, and industrial FB applications involving real-time requirements. Our method involves several steps. First, we use tabular expressions to ensure the completeness and disjointness of the requirements for the FB. Second, we formalize the candidate implementation(s) of the FB in question. Third, we state and prove theorems regarding the consistency and correctness of the FB. All three steps are performed using the Prototype Verification Systems (PVS) proof assistant. As a first case study, we apply our approach to the IEC 61131-3 standard to examine the entire library of FBs and their supplied implementations described in structured text (ST) and function block diagrams (FBDs). As a second case study, we apply our approach to two realistic sub-systems taken from the nuclear domain. Applying the proposed method, we identified three kinds of issues: ambiguous behavioural descriptions, missing assumptions, and erroneous implementations. Furthermore, we suggest solutions to these issues. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / A formal verification approach for the function block based control systems

Submitted by JÚLIO HEBER SILVA (julioheber@yahoo.com.br) on 2017-04-11T19:28:47Z No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Nayara de Souza Silva - 2017.pdf: 2066646 bytes, checksum: 95e09b89bf69fe61277b09ce9f1812a6 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Luciana Ferreira (lucgeral@gmail.com) on 2017-04-12T14:32:03Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Nayara de Souza Silva - 2017.pdf: 2066646 bytes, checksum: 95e09b89bf69fe61277b09ce9f1812a6 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-04-12T14:32:03Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Nayara de Souza Silva - 2017.pdf: 2066646 bytes, checksum: 95e09b89bf69fe61277b09ce9f1812a6 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-07 / Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de Goiás - FAPEG / The process of developing computer systems takes into account many stages, in which some are more necessary than others, depending on the purpose of the application. The implementation stage is always necessary, indisputably. Sometimes the requirements analysis and testing phases are neglected. And, generally, the part of formal verification correctness is intended for few applications. The use of model checkers has been exploited in the task of validating a behavioral specification in its appropriate level of abstraction, notably specifications validation of critical systems, especially when they involve the preservation of human life, when the existence of errors entails huge financial loss or when deals with information security. Therefore, it proposes to apply formal verification techniques in the validation of the vehicular safety system Avoiding Doored System, considered as critical, in order to verify if the implemented system faithfully meets the requirements for it proposed. For that, it was used as a tool to verify its correctness the Specification and Verification System - PVS, detailing and documenting all the steps employed in the process of specification and formal verification. K / O processo de desenvolvimento de sistemas computacionais leva em conta muitas etapas, nos quais umas são tidas mais necessárias que outras, dependendo da finalidade da aplica- ção. A etapa de implementação sempre é necessária, indiscutivelmente. Por vezes as fases de análise de requisitos e de testes são negligenciadas. E, geralmente, a parte de verifica- ção formal de corretude é destinada a poucas aplicações. O uso de verificadores de modelos tem sido explorado na tarefa de validar uma especificação comportamental no seu nível adequado de abstração, sobretudo, na validação de especificações de sistemas críticos, principalmente quando estes envolvem a preservação da vida humana, quando a existência de erros acarreta enorme prejuízo financeiro ou quando tratam com a segurança da informa- ção. Diante disso, se propõe aplicar técnicas de verificação formal na validação do sistema de segurança veicular Avoiding Doored System, tido como crítico, com o intuito de atestar se o sistema implementado atende, fielmente, os requisitos para ele propostos. Para tal, foi utilizada como ferramenta para a verificação de sua corretude o Specification and Verification System - PVS, detalhando e documentando todas as etapas empregadas no processo de especificação e verificação formal. Pal

We study the problem of secure key establishment. We critically examine the security models of Bellare and Rogaway (1993) and Canetti and Krawczyk (2001) in the computational complexity approach, as these models are central in the understanding of the provable security paradigm. We show that the partnership definition used in the three-party key distribution (3PKD) protocol of Bellare and Rogaway (1995) is flawed, which invalidates the proof for the 3PKD protocol. We present an improved protocol with a new proof of security. We identify several variants of the key sharing requirement (i.e., two entities who have completed matching sessions, partners, are required to accept the same session key). We then present a brief discussion about the key sharing requirement. We identify several variants of the Bellare and Rogaway (1993) model. We present a comparative study of the relative strengths of security notions between the several variants of the Bellare-Rogaway model and the Canetti-Krawczyk model. In our comparative study, we reveal a drawback in the Bellare, Pointcheval, and Rogaway (2000) model with the protocol of Abdalla and Pointcheval (2005) as a case study. We prove a revised protocol of Boyd (1996) secure in the Bellare-Rogaway model. We then extend the model in order to allow more realistic adversary capabilities by incorporating the notion of resetting the long-term compromised key of some entity. This allows us to detect a known weakness of the protocol that cannot be captured in the original model. We also present an alternative protocol that is efficient in both messages and rounds. We prove the protocol secure in the extended model. We point out previously unknown flaws in several published protocols and a message authenticator of Bellare, Canetti, and Krawczyk (1998) by refuting claimed proofs of security. We also point out corresponding flaws in their existing proofs. We propose fixes to these protocols and their proofs. In some cases, we present new protocols with full proofs of security. We examine the role of session key construction in key establishment protocols, and demonstrate that a small change to the way that session keys are constructed can have significant benefits. Protocols that were proven secure in a restricted Bellare-Rogaway model can then be proven secure in the full model. We present a brief discussion on ways to construct session keys in key establishment protocols and also prove the protocol of Chen and Kudla (2003) secure in a less restrictive Bellare-Rogaway model. To complement the computational complexity approach, we provide a formal specification and machine analysis of the Bellare-Pointcheval-Rogaway model using an automated model checker, Simple Homomorphism Verification Tool (SHVT). We demonstrate that structural flaws in protocols can be revealed using our framework. We reveal previously unknown flaws in the unpublished preproceedings version of the protocol due to Jakobsson and Pointcheval (2001) and several published protocols with only heuristic security arguments. We conclude this thesis with a listing of some open problems that were encountered in the study.