Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1972. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Heidelberg, Universiẗat, Diss., 1998. / Dateien im PDF-Format. - Erscheinungsjahr an der Haupttitelstelle: 1997.

Submitted by Jorge Silva (jorgelmsilva@ufrrj.br) on 2017-02-14T19:15:36Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2016 - Carlos Francisco Fonseca de Azevedo S?.pdf: 719071 bytes, checksum: 8edd903c8fc38fcb40be387e3da1f0b4 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-02-14T19:15:36Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2016 - Carlos Francisco Fonseca de Azevedo S?.pdf: 719071 bytes, checksum: 8edd903c8fc38fcb40be387e3da1f0b4 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-06-27 / CAPES / We present in this research how Albert Speer managed to, through writing his self-biography and his diary in Spandau prison, give meaning to his life trajectory. Within his books, Speer builds and shows an image of himself distant from the great Nazi crimes, as a continuous defense since the Nuremberg Trials. / Buscamos apresentar neste trabalho como Albert Speer procurou, atrav?s da escrita de sua autobiografia e de seu di?rio na cadeia de Spandau, dar sentido a sua trajet?ria de vida. Ao longo destes dois livros Speer tenta construir e apresentar uma imagem de si afastada dos grandes crimes cometidos pelo nazismo, como uma continua??o de sua defesa no Tribunal de Nuremberg

This thesis examines Albert Speer, minister of armaments in Germany during World War II, and the charges against him during the trial of the major war criminals in Nuremberg, Germany, 1945-1946. This thesis portrays Albert Speer as a good man enticed by the power of his position and subsequently playing a role in the crimes of the Third Reich. Primary sources included the Nuremberg Trial proceedings published by the International Military Tribunal and Speer's books, Inside the Third Reich; Spandau: The Secret Diaries; and Infiltration. The thesis has six chapters: preface, biography, the charges against Speer, the verdict, the aftermath concerning his time in Spandau Prison, and a conclusion. Albert Speer accepted his guilt, yet came to resent his imprisonment and questioned the validity of the trial.

The rationale for this study is Albert Speer's unique value as a source of information concerning the Third Reich and Adolf Hitler. Although there is a wealth of information available on Nazi Germany and Hitler, the observations of this intelligent man who was an important official of the regime and a close associate of Hitler himself carry weight that no other report can match. He was a well-educated, intellectual, and articulate man who left behind three comprehensive books and many articles and interviews. In addition to such publications, there are, in the National Archives in Washington, D.C., many records of interviews with Speer conducted by Allied personnel immediately following the war. Those documents have been used extensively in this study.There is no attempt either to indict or to vindicate Speer, as many authors have done, but rather the purpose is to present in narrative form an analytical study of the relationship between the two men. The central focus throughout examines Speer and Hitler in juxtaposition and forms conclusions on the nature of their complex and compelling attachment. In the process, historical events form the backdrop as Speer describes them for us. It is always Speer, not Hitler, with whom the primary interest lies.The question of how anyone of Speer's background and intelligence could have given his life to a regime devoted to gutter politics, conquest of a continent, and genocide always arises in any study of Speer. The strange hold the Nazis exert on the world's imagination seems to ebb and flow, but does not die out, nor does the awful suspicion that something similar could happen again. Speer used his writings to describe the process and warn against its resurrection, especially in light of the tremendous leap in technology we have seen. Do not look for monsters, he counseled, for monsters are easily identified and avoided. Beware the manipulators who orchestrate on a national scale those policies which bring harm to whole populations, men who loudly proclaim their humanness and ordinariness.This inquiry is not an attempt to prove a predetermined hypothesis, since it embodies a historical approach rather than an experimental one. Information is drawn from the books and papers of Speer, as well as official documents, but secondary works to corroborate the basic sources are cited at times. There is still no definitive biography of Speer, although he appears as a central figure in many works. Perhaps one of the reasons for this is that the Speer family has put his personal papers in Heidelberg beyond the reach of anyone until 1999, probably as a result of his negative treatment in various publications.The technical papers from the Ministry of Armaments and War Production are housed in the Bundesarchiv at Koblenz, but were not pertinent to this study. The Institut fur Zeitgeschichte in Munich houses official papers, as does the Berlin Document Center, while the Washington has the transcripts of Library of Congress in Hitler's Table Talks, some parts of which are used in this study. Speer's books and published material give an extensive look at his part in the Third Reich, his relationship with Hitler, and his own feelings and observations concerning both. The International Military Tribunal records from Nuremberg are both extensive and enlightening. One may also view the collection of Heinrich Hoffmann, Hitler's personal photographer, in the Special Collections section at Bracken Library.Chapter I deals with Speer in the pre-war years as he rose to fame and became part of Hitler's inner circle, while Chapter II views the war years through Speer's experiences. In Chapter III the early relationship between Speer and Hitler is developed, and in Chapter IV the war, the collapse of the Third Reich, and the attendant disasters are covered.

Very little historical scholarship specifically analyzes or explores the absence of chemical weapons in World War II. This thesis seeks to fill the gaps in the historical narrative by providing insight into the personal and external factors that influenced Hitler’s chemical weapons policy. This thesis also touches upon the wartime violence perpetrated by both the Axis and the Allies, thereby offering a neutral, unbiased historical account. From 1939-1941, Hitler did not deploy chemical weapons because his blitzkrieg of Europe was progressing successfully – chemical warfare was unnecessary. With the failure of Operation Barbarossa from 1942-1943, Armaments Minister Albert Speer oversaw a massive increase in the production of the lethal nerve agent tabun, indicating Hitler’s desire to deploy chemical gas on the Eastern Front. However, by the request of Soviet Premier Josef Stalin, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill threatened to retaliate against Nazi Germany with chemical strikes on German cities in May 1942. Hitler backed down because of the inadequacy of German air defense and his desire to protect the “Aryan” people – based on his own trauma with gas in World War I. However, in the final years of the war in 1944-1945, the stress of the Allied advance on Berlin caused the deterioration of the German dictator’s mental and physical state. Hitler’s thoughts became suicidal and destructive – the German people deserved extinction for their failure in World War II. Thus, Hitler issued the Nero Decree in March 1945. However, the architect turned Armaments Minister, aware of the war’s foregone conclusion, sought to obstruct Germany’s path to catastrophe. Likewise, Hitler sought to initiate chemical warfare. Again, Speer prevented unnecessary civilian casualties by shutting down chemical production plants. The German dictator did not take matters into his own hands because following the failure of the Ardennes Offensive in January 1945, Hitler also grew increasingly apathetic to governing the Third Reich. By April 1945, with Hitler a ghost of his former self, his subleaders fought for control of Nazi Germany, and their inability to cooperate led to a crisis of leadership. Thus, World War II concluded in Europe without chemical warfare. Ultimately, this thesis promotes an awareness of the legacy of violence ushered in by “modern warfare,” a contemporary issue yet to be adequately addressed.