Th. doct.--Philos.--Pamplona, 1974. / Bibliogr. p. 303-307 et notes bibliogr.

Th. complémentaire--Lettres--Paris, 1969. Titre de soutenance : L'idée d'expression dans la philosophie de Spinoza. / Index.

Diss.--Universität Hannover, 1997. / Bibliogr. p. 81-89. Index.

The central aim of my thesis is to enquire into Spinoza's theory of the structure of the physical universe. It is generally accepted that from a scientific point of view Spinoza regarded the universe as consisting of particles in motion. My major concern is with the nature of these particles and what role they play in his cosmology. My basic method of enquiry is to consider, as far as this is possible, Spinoza's statements about the structure of matter as a scientific theory, a system of physics. Chapter Two is a brief survey of Spinoza's scientific activities, by way of providing background. In Chapter Three I explore the physical theory presented in Part Two of the Principles of Cartesian Philosophy with particular emphasis on the basic premisses of that theory, and the problems arising from those basic premisses. In Chapters Four, Five, and Six, the physical theory of the Ethics is discussed, with particular attention to Spinoza's theory of individuals and his ideas on motion. Chapter Seven is a fairly detailed discussion of the nature of the simplest bodies in Spinoza's system. Chapter Eight is a discussion of Spinoza's concept of the universe as a system composed of particles in motion, with particular emphasis on his ideas on the continuum. My major conclusion is that as far as scientific explanation is concerned, the Spino-zistic physics is very similar to the Cartesian physics as presented in the Principles of Cartesian Philosophy. This conclusion is based on five considerations: (1) the general character of the physics of the Ethics is quite compatible with the Cartesian physics with one apparent exception: I give an explanation of this apparent discrepancy; (2) Spinoza's deep concern with the problems of the continuum can only be explained if the basic premisses of his physics are the same as that of the Cartesian physics; (3) the same applies to his denial of the existence of the vacuum; (4) there is nothing that indicates that Spinoza's scientific method if radically different from that underlying the Principles of Cartesian Philosophy; (5) the one instance of Spinoza's outrightly condemning the Cartesian physics is based on a fundamental metaphysical issue and has no direct bearing on that physics qua physics. The major implication of my conclusion is that many of Spinoza's points of doctrine cannot be fully understood unless they are interpreted in the context of the Cartesian cosmology. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

archives@tulane.edu / In the early 1630s, René Descartes developed a speculative treatise on the functional structures of the human body and brain. His work, The Treatise on Man, constituted the first attempt at a complete human physiology, inspiring a generation of scientists and physicians who developed Descartes’ speculations into a genuine field of scientific inquiry. It is the intent of this discussion to determine how Descartes’ speculations in human physiology influenced the direction of 17th c. European philosophy. The above question is often dismissed by scholars who argue that Descartes abandons scientific pursuits for philosophy, finding that science could not provide the kind of knowledge Descartes craved. In contrast, I argue that the themes that emerge in the Treatise are continually developed by Descartes throughout his philosophic career. This is evident in Meditations on First Philosophy, where Descartes demonstrates a preoccupation with (1) the possible resemblance between sensory ideas and their objects and (2) the independence of our nature as a thinking thing from our nature as a corporeal body, topics of great importance in the Treatise. Descartes’ contemporaries, specifically Spinoza, were influenced by these scientific speculations. In the Ethics, Spinoza identifies Descartes’ account of human nature as the specific view he intends to critique and replace with a novel account of human nature, i.e. the conatus doctrine. While ultimately in disagreement with Descartes, Spinoza freely turns to human physiology to both attack Descartes’ views and construct his own account of human nature. Thus, far from rejecting the place of the human sciences in philosophy, Spinoza embraces it. Finally, as a means of demonstrating the philosophic value of Descartes and Spinoza’s engagement with human physiology, I employ their metaphysical insights in a critique of contemporary scientific research. Specifically, I will evaluate neuroscientific studies on the phantom limb, arguing that, in their explanations, researchers tend to unreflectively employ the metaphysical assumption that neural structures work to support an accurate representation of the body to the subject. While this view may ultimately prove correct, it blinds researchers to alternative explanations / 1 / Daniel J DeFranco

This dissertation offers a novel interpretation of the metaphysical system Spinoza presents in his Ethics by considering it entirely in terms of power, affectivity and part/whole relations. I begin by arguing that the central concern of the Ethics is what I term ‘the problem of passivity’. Namely, if as part of nature, we are necessarily always subject to passive emotions, we could seemingly not become active to the point of adequate conception without ceasing to be a part of Nature. I argue that adequate conception, rather, requires a mereological conception of oneself as part of the whole of Nature. Since such understanding requires a conception of the whole in which these parts inhere, I explicate Spinoza’s conception of substance as that which enjoys an absolute and infinite power of existence. Inasmuch as this power of existence necessarily involves a coextensive power to act, I then argue that for Spinoza the whole of Nature is defined in terms of power. Consequently, the infinite modifications following from eternal substance ought to be considered as powerful parts of this potestative whole. Individual things are, then, to be defined as dispositional structures manifesting their capacities in interdependent relations. The thesis comes to explain this by using the Medieval mereological category of a ‘virtual whole’ (i.e. a unique particular power whose parts are inseparable from it, and only differentiated according to their own capacities). The dissertation concludes with a suggestion for further research on the possibilities that the presented theory of virtual mereology could have in relation to Spinoza’s ethico-political philosophy. / Dissertation / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

<p>This paper deals with the mind-body problem in Spinoza's Ethics and in neuro- or physiological psychology. The thesis is twofold: a) that the psychology offered by Spinoza has much in common with neuropsychology; b) that Spinoza's methodology is in some ways superior to the predominant neuro-scientific one. I also argue, though not conclusively, the superiority of Spinoza's ontology. The discussion is grounded in a comparison of the respective psychologies of emotion.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)

This dissertation extends contemporary views about uncertainty. It does so through a reading of the role of uncertainty in the political thought of two modern philosophers, Baruch Spinoza and David Hume. Despite uncertainty's notable and multi-disciplinary appeal in the academic literature, the frame in which most scholars think about social and political uncertainty is one-sided. On the whole, contemporary scholars consider uncertainty as a problem in need of a remedy. In the social sciences uncertainty is transformed into risk in order to empirically calculate risk probabilities. The hope is that risks (uncertainties) can be controlled, reduced, and in all, mitigated. In this dissertation, I argue for a conceptual rethinking of uncertainty that expands its scope and reach to include a socially and politically beneficent understanding, a constructive form of uncertainty. In particular, I explore the ways social groups experience conditions of uncertainty in different contexts through an examination of what I term future-oriented and epistemic uncertainty in Hume and Spinoza's political thought. Spinoza's arguments for liberal democracy, and Hume's arguments favoring commercial society, are highlighted as instances of constructive uncertainty. The dissertation concludes by applying a general understanding of constructive uncertainty to the ideology of the American Dream in order to illustrate suggestively how a constructive conception of uncertainty might prove useful when critically engaging contemporary matters. / Ph. D.

Dans la lettre 56 Spinoza ne reconnait pas l’autorité des anciens, incitant son interlocuteur à raisonner par soi-même, ne suivant que sa raison. Toutefois, face à cette prise de position radicale, Spinoza cite, fait référence et propose des exemples, dont la plupart sont extraits des historiens latins; il semble prendre au sérieux les mots de Tacite, Quinte-Curce, Salluste, etc. et les récits dont ils sont auteurs, jusqu’au point d’affirmer, dans le TP, que «personne qui connait les Histoires» – soit l’oeuvre de Tacite – «peut ignorer» la justesse de son argumentation. Dans le cadre de cette thèse, je m’interroge sur cette – apparente – contradiction. Á travers un parcours qui s’articule en quatre sections, j’intende démontrer quel est l’usage que Spinoza fait de ses sources et à quelle fonction elles répondent dans l’architecture de sa philosophie politique. Chaque section est consacrée à un aspect de ce rapport: la première, à la formation latine de Spinoza, au contexte culturel où il s’inscrit, et au système de citation à l’âge classique. Dans la deuxième, je montre qu’il y avait une courante politique philo-monarchique, le Tacitisme, dont les écrits étaient composés principalement de citations des historiens latins; Spinoza se confronte avec le Tacitisme, donnant aux mots des anciens – comme j’explique dans la troisième partie – un sens complètement differente. Le rôle des citations ne se réduit pas, néanmoins, à la fonction polémique. En revanche, les citations, les références et les exemples remplissent quatre fonctions: rhétorique, argumentative, polémique et anthropologique, cette dernière indiquant que les mots et les récits des historiens font partie intégrante de sa philosophie politique. Enfin, la quatrième section détermine les rôles que les récits et les histoires jouent dans une philosophie politique qui prétende être, en même temps, scientifique et pragmatique. / In letter 56, Spinoza does not recognize ancient philosophers’ authority and urges Hugo Boxel to follow only his reason in order to acquire knowledge. Notwithstanding this radical stance, Spinoza quotes, makes references and gives examples which are mostly excerpted from Roman historians; he takes Tacitus’, Sallut’s , Quintus Curtius Rufus’ words and histories seriously to the point that he says, in the TP, that “no one that knows Histories” – the Histories by Tacitus – “can ignore” the rightness of his argumentation. In this work, my aim is to address this apparent contradiction. Articulated in four sections, my dissertation shows how Spinoza uses his sources and which role they play in formulating his political philosophy.Each section focuses on a different aspect of this relationship: the first one is devoted to Spinoza’s education, to his cultural background and to Early modern’s forms of quoting. In the second one, I highlight the existence of a monarchist political current, Tacitism, which makes a consistent use of ancient historian’s quotes; Spinoza confronts this tradition, giving to the ancient writers’ words and maximes a completely different sense. Nevertheless, Spinoza quotes not only for a polemical purpose. In contrast, the references and the exemples seem to fulfil four functions: rhetoric, argumentative, polemic and anthropologic. The last one indicates that thr Roman historians’ words and stories are an integral part of Spinoza’s political philosophy. Finally, in section four, I identify the roles that narrations and stories play in a political philosophy whose aim is to be, at the same time, scientific as well as pragmatic.

Texte remanié de : Thèse (doctorat) : Philosophie : Uppsala universitet : 2008. / Bibliographie (p. 259-265).