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With Worlds as Content : An investigation on Possible Worlds Semantics and its ProblemsFäldt, Tove January 2019 (has links)
No description available.
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Metodologiska utmaningar vid jämförande studier: : En fallstudie av Aaron Stalnakers "Overcoming Our Evil: Human Nature and Spiritual Exercises in Xunzi and Augustine"Andersson, Rasmus January 2018 (has links)
This essay examines Aaron Stalnakers,” Overcoming Our Evil: Human Nature and Spiritual Exercises in Xunzi and Augustine”; with respect to how he manages to avoid misinterpretations and anachronism in the face of handling two separate traditions of thought, as is required in comparative studies.
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"De bara ljuger?" : En kritisk analys av Don Fallis och Andreas Stokkes definitioner av lögn. / "It's all a lie?" : A criticism of Don Fallis and Andreas Stokke definitions of lying.Kharchi Hagland, Peter Josef January 2022 (has links)
Don Fallis and Andreas Stokke propose that the classical definition of lying is inadequate due to the insistence on deceptive doxastic goals. Such goals have been proven problematic in the light of baldface lying. Both Fallis and Stokke argue that baldface lying are actual instances of lying and that a valid definition of lying should therefore include these. They suggest that lies be understood in a pragmatic framework and ground their definitions in the linguistic tradition following Paul Grice and Robert Stalnaker, respectively. Lies are to be understood as conscious breaches of pragmatic maxims. In this essay I show that Fallis project fails due to limitations inherent to Grice theory of communication. Andreas Stokke definition, on the other hand, building on the work of Jonathan Cohen and Robert Stalnaker, turns out to be a beautiful explication of the classical definition of lying – that besides managing the extensional problem that baldface lies pose also succeeds in making them intelligible epistemically. However, I argue that his categorical rejection of a necessary deceptive condition is refuted by his own definition and theoretical build up. Contrary to Stokke’s own conviction, I thus maintain that his contribution be understood as a significant vindication of the deceptive theory of lying. Finally, lies told by young children seem to pose as great a problem for non-deceptive theories of lying as baldface lies did for deceptive theories.
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Dupera: att missbruka kommunikationHulterström, Patrik January 2015 (has links)
According to the widespread concept of deception, deception is to intentionally cause someone to acquire or continue to have a false belief. This paper refutes this notion and argues for a definition of deception based on a view that deception is the misuse of communication with the purpose to achieve a further end; an end that, is believed, can’t be reached without the misuse of communication. It is shown that this new definition can handle cases that earlier definitions could not handle without leading to absurd pragmatic consequences. In addition, the proposed definition makes it possible to properly distinguish between deception and attempted deception.
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