This paper focuses on the evolution of “reasonableness” as a unitary standard of judicial review and the role of tribunal expertise in that process. The modern era begins with Nipawin in 1973, a time when judicial review operated with a crude binary system of standards that allowed for either full curial deference (patent unreasonableness) or no deference (correctness). It ends in 2008 with Dunsmuir and the jettisoning of the highest standard of curial deference, the standard of patent unreasonableness. Correctness is now implicitly understood not as a standard but, as the justified absence of the need to extend deference to a tribunal`s decision. Patent unreasonableness and the middle ground standard of reasonableness have ostensibly been "collapsed" into a single more rational, workable, flexible and sophisticated unitary system based on the multi faceted standard of reasonableness. It is argued that the new “standard of review analysis” expressed in Dunsmuir is simply a comprehensive restatement of all the previously articulated diverse and, typically, non-dispositive factors and exceptions. The hallmarks of this new standard are the recognition that, more often than not in administrative law, there is no one right or best answer and that, a reviewing court will respect and affirm a tribunal’s choice if it is within the range of options provided it is well reasoned. This paper also addresses the primarily academic criticism of the Supreme Court over conceptual problems in distinguishing patent unreasonableness from reasonableness, a dispute fuelled by this court’s continued attempts to justify a standard of review that allowed for a tribunal’s right to be wrong. It is argued that patent unreasonableness had become less of a standard of review and more of a simple expression of judicial censure for egregious fault in decision making; a qualifier to a finding of unreasonableness. Arguably that role may have been preserved even with the collapsing of the two standards into one standard in Dunsmuir. While Dunsmuir should have clarified many of the issues the three-way difference of opinion in the Court demonstrates continuing deep rifts that may portend further uncertainty. Uptake by lower courts indicates otherwise. / Thesis (Master, Law) -- Queen's University, 2009-03-17 14:58:15.299

Apesar de o fluxo de comércio afetado por medidas antidumping não chegar nem a 1% do comércio global, aproximadamente 20% das disputas na OMC são sobre antidumping. A OMC é um órgão intergovernamental e seu sistema de solução de controvérsias tem por objetivo analisar se as medidas adotadas por seus Membros estão em conformidade com os compromissos assumidos nos acordos abrangidos. O Acordo Antidumping da OMC (ADA) estabelece os procedimentos investigatórios a serem seguidos por seus Membros para combater o dumping que comprovadamente causa dano à indústria doméstica. O objetivo é evitar que sejam adotadas medidas em circunstâncias descabidas, com o mero intuito protecionista de criar barreiras ao comércio. O dumping é uma prática do setor privado e não dos governos. Portanto, não é o dumping que é questionado perante a OMC, e sim a obediência pela autoridade investigadora dos procedimentos investigatórios estabelecidos no ADA. Tanto os órgãos da Administração Pública como a OMC exercem uma função fundamental para que o devido processo legal seja observado em matéria antidumping. A função legislativa é criar as normas que regularão o procedimento, a função executiva é aplicar/monitorar o procedimento, e a função judiciária é verificar se o procedimento tem sido aplicado corretamente. À luz dessas considerações, a tese a ser defendida é que: (i) diante das limitações trazidas aos painéis e ao Órgão de Apelação pelo Artigo 17.6 do ADA, a função do sistema de solução de controvérsias da OMC e dos judiciários nacionais, em matéria antidumping, muito se assemelham: ambos buscam controlar a discricionariedade da autoridade investigadora; (ii) mais efetivo para os importadores e/ou exportadores que pretendem questionar uma medida antidumping seria buscar inicialmente uma solução mediante recurso ao judiciário do país importador. O recurso ao sistema da OMC, além de depender do interesse do governo e ser oneroso, apresenta dificuldades no momento de implementação das recomendações; (iii) entretanto, tendo em vista o despreparo do Judiciário Brasileiro, sugerimos a criação de cortes especializadas; (iv) o recurso ao Judiciário, mesmo perante cortes especializadas, não resolveria os problemas do processo antidumping apontados ao longo da tese. Para sanar, fazemos algumas outras sugestões de mudanças estruturais para aplicação: (a) no âmbito da OMC, com vistas a delimitar a atuação do Órgão de Apelação e garantir segurança jurídica aos Membros; e (b) no âmbito brasileiro, com vistas a modificar a dinâmica das investigações antidumping conduzidas pela autoridade administrativa e assegurar o cumprimento de sua real finalidade. / Despite the fact that the flow of trade affected by anti-dumping measures does not reach 1% of global trade, approximately 20% of the disputes at the WTO are about these measures. The WTO is an intergovernmental organization and its dispute settlement system has the objective of analyzing if the measures adopted by its Members are in accordance with the commitments accepted in the covered agreements. The WTOs Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA) sets forth the investigation proceedings to be followed by its Members in order to deal with dumping proven to have caused damage to domestic industry. The aim is to avoid that measures are taken under inappropriate circumstances, with the mere protectionist purpose of creating trade barriers. Dumping is a private practice, and not a governmental one. Thus, it is not the practice of dumping itself that is questioned before the WTO, but the obedience by the investigating authority of the proceedings established in the ADA. The Public Administration organs and the WTO are equally responsible by a fundamental role of guaranteeing that the due process of law is respected in the matter of anti-dumping measures. The legislative duty is to create rules that will govern the proceedings, the executive duty is to apply/monitor the proceedings and the judiciary duty is to verify if the proceedings have been applied correctly. In light of these aspects, the thesis to be defended is: (i) considering the limitations to panels and the Appellate Body by Article 17.6 of the ADA, the duties of the WTOs dispute settlement system and the national judiciaries, in terms of anti-dumping, are similar: both try to control the discretion of the investigating authority; (ii) it would be more effective to importers and/or exporters who want to challenge an anti-dumping measure to resort initially to the judiciary system of the importer country. The resort to the WTO system, besides depending on the government`s political interest and being expensive, has difficulties when it comes to implement the recommendations; (iii) in spite of that, considering the lack of preparation of the Brazilian Judiciary, it is suggested the creation of specialized courts; (iv) the resort to the Judiciary, even before specialized courts, would not solve the problems of the anti-dumping process pointed out throughout this thesis. To tackle these problems, we make some other suggestions of structural nature: (a) in what concerns the WTO, aiming at limiting the Appellate Body`s role and guaranteeing legal security to its Members; (b) in what concerns Brazil, aiming at changing the dynamics of the anti-dumping investigations conducted by the administrative authority and securing the fulfillment of its real purpose.

Apesar de o fluxo de comércio afetado por medidas antidumping não chegar nem a 1% do comércio global, aproximadamente 20% das disputas na OMC são sobre antidumping. A OMC é um órgão intergovernamental e seu sistema de solução de controvérsias tem por objetivo analisar se as medidas adotadas por seus Membros estão em conformidade com os compromissos assumidos nos acordos abrangidos. O Acordo Antidumping da OMC (ADA) estabelece os procedimentos investigatórios a serem seguidos por seus Membros para combater o dumping que comprovadamente causa dano à indústria doméstica. O objetivo é evitar que sejam adotadas medidas em circunstâncias descabidas, com o mero intuito protecionista de criar barreiras ao comércio. O dumping é uma prática do setor privado e não dos governos. Portanto, não é o dumping que é questionado perante a OMC, e sim a obediência pela autoridade investigadora dos procedimentos investigatórios estabelecidos no ADA. Tanto os órgãos da Administração Pública como a OMC exercem uma função fundamental para que o devido processo legal seja observado em matéria antidumping. A função legislativa é criar as normas que regularão o procedimento, a função executiva é aplicar/monitorar o procedimento, e a função judiciária é verificar se o procedimento tem sido aplicado corretamente. À luz dessas considerações, a tese a ser defendida é que: (i) diante das limitações trazidas aos painéis e ao Órgão de Apelação pelo Artigo 17.6 do ADA, a função do sistema de solução de controvérsias da OMC e dos judiciários nacionais, em matéria antidumping, muito se assemelham: ambos buscam controlar a discricionariedade da autoridade investigadora; (ii) mais efetivo para os importadores e/ou exportadores que pretendem questionar uma medida antidumping seria buscar inicialmente uma solução mediante recurso ao judiciário do país importador. O recurso ao sistema da OMC, além de depender do interesse do governo e ser oneroso, apresenta dificuldades no momento de implementação das recomendações; (iii) entretanto, tendo em vista o despreparo do Judiciário Brasileiro, sugerimos a criação de cortes especializadas; (iv) o recurso ao Judiciário, mesmo perante cortes especializadas, não resolveria os problemas do processo antidumping apontados ao longo da tese. Para sanar, fazemos algumas outras sugestões de mudanças estruturais para aplicação: (a) no âmbito da OMC, com vistas a delimitar a atuação do Órgão de Apelação e garantir segurança jurídica aos Membros; e (b) no âmbito brasileiro, com vistas a modificar a dinâmica das investigações antidumping conduzidas pela autoridade administrativa e assegurar o cumprimento de sua real finalidade. / Despite the fact that the flow of trade affected by anti-dumping measures does not reach 1% of global trade, approximately 20% of the disputes at the WTO are about these measures. The WTO is an intergovernmental organization and its dispute settlement system has the objective of analyzing if the measures adopted by its Members are in accordance with the commitments accepted in the covered agreements. The WTOs Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA) sets forth the investigation proceedings to be followed by its Members in order to deal with dumping proven to have caused damage to domestic industry. The aim is to avoid that measures are taken under inappropriate circumstances, with the mere protectionist purpose of creating trade barriers. Dumping is a private practice, and not a governmental one. Thus, it is not the practice of dumping itself that is questioned before the WTO, but the obedience by the investigating authority of the proceedings established in the ADA. The Public Administration organs and the WTO are equally responsible by a fundamental role of guaranteeing that the due process of law is respected in the matter of anti-dumping measures. The legislative duty is to create rules that will govern the proceedings, the executive duty is to apply/monitor the proceedings and the judiciary duty is to verify if the proceedings have been applied correctly. In light of these aspects, the thesis to be defended is: (i) considering the limitations to panels and the Appellate Body by Article 17.6 of the ADA, the duties of the WTOs dispute settlement system and the national judiciaries, in terms of anti-dumping, are similar: both try to control the discretion of the investigating authority; (ii) it would be more effective to importers and/or exporters who want to challenge an anti-dumping measure to resort initially to the judiciary system of the importer country. The resort to the WTO system, besides depending on the government`s political interest and being expensive, has difficulties when it comes to implement the recommendations; (iii) in spite of that, considering the lack of preparation of the Brazilian Judiciary, it is suggested the creation of specialized courts; (iv) the resort to the Judiciary, even before specialized courts, would not solve the problems of the anti-dumping process pointed out throughout this thesis. To tackle these problems, we make some other suggestions of structural nature: (a) in what concerns the WTO, aiming at limiting the Appellate Body`s role and guaranteeing legal security to its Members; (b) in what concerns Brazil, aiming at changing the dynamics of the anti-dumping investigations conducted by the administrative authority and securing the fulfillment of its real purpose.

The needs of the free trade regime and governments' legitimate regulatory aims in the area of public health protection conflict. Government health measures create barriers to free trade and are thus disciplined by the trade regime. This conflict is addressed in the rules of the World Trade Organization, in the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. This Agreement uses science to mediate the conflict. The reason for the reliance on science is the view that it provides a neutral, universally-valid discipline and that thus the results of testing health measures for scientific validity would be acceptable to both parties in a dispute. This uncritical approach towards science is called into question. An analysis of the relevant science-based disciplines of the SPS Agreement and their interpretation in WTO dispute settlement shows the flaws in this system. A re-evaluation of the WTO rules governing health regulation is called for. / Law / LL.M.

The needs of the free trade regime and governments' legitimate regulatory aims in the area of public health protection conflict. Government health measures create barriers to free trade and are thus disciplined by the trade regime. This conflict is addressed in the rules of the World Trade Organization, in the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. This Agreement uses science to mediate the conflict. The reason for the reliance on science is the view that it provides a neutral, universally-valid discipline and that thus the results of testing health measures for scientific validity would be acceptable to both parties in a dispute. This uncritical approach towards science is called into question. An analysis of the relevant science-based disciplines of the SPS Agreement and their interpretation in WTO dispute settlement shows the flaws in this system. A re-evaluation of the WTO rules governing health regulation is called for. / Law / LL.M.