Depuis longtemps, le rôle joué par les commissions permanentes dans le déroulement du travail parlementaire est considéré comme étant représentatif des équilibres institutionnels entre le Parlement et le Gouvernement. Les dispositifs imaginés en 2008 renforçant dans leurs prérogatives les commissions permanentes ont vocation à rééquilibrer ces rapports. Renouant avec le rôle tout à fait central que les commissions avaient perdu en 1958, le travail effectué au sein de ces instances renseigne sur l’essence même de la fonction parlementaire.Héritée du parlementarisme moderne, la summa divisio classiquement admise opposant la législation au contrôle constitue un cadre résolument inadapté à la présentation du travail parlementaire tel qu’il prend forme sous la Cinquième République, singulièrement au sein des commissions permanentes. Le constituant cristallise au sein de ces instances un mouvement jusqu’alors sous-jacent : la fusion des fonctions parlementaires classiques. En effet, si l’exercice du droit d’amendement participe sans conteste à l’exercice de la fonction législative, il n’en constitue pas moins un instrument aux mains des parlementaires leur permettant de contrôler le Gouvernement. À cet instrument classique, s’ajoutent peu à peu nombre de mécanismes hybrides participant tantôt à l’exercice de la première fonction, tantôt à celui de la seconde, tels que le contrôle de la qualité de la loi et des études d’impact des projets de loi, ou le contrôle exercé par les parlementaires sur la politique européenne, etc. Ces nouvelles méthodes de travail sont autant de prérogatives inédites que les parlementaires sont désormais en mesure d’exercer.Arène politique par excellence, le Parlement n’en est pas moins un lieu privilégié de recherche du compromis, particulièrement dans ses instances que sont les commissions permanentes. Par-delà leur diversité, la thèse s’attache à prouver que les commissions permanentes exercent, dans la totalité des activités qu’elles réalisent, la même fonction : la concertation. / For a long time now, standing committees have been playing, in the conduct of parliamentary work, a major part, which serves as a gauge of the institutional balance between Parliament and the Government.In that respect, the constitutional provisions devised in 2008 strengthen standing committees' prerogatives, as a means to stability in these relations.A reenactment of standing committees’ role untill 1958, the work carried out nowadays within these bodies tells us about the very essence of the parliamentary function.Inherited from modern parliamentarism, the authorized summa divisio in literature, opposing legislation to control, constitutes an inadequate framework for a comprehensive understandingof parliamentary work under the Fifth Republic, especially in the standing committees.The constituting power gave a decisive impetus for an incipient movement within these instances towards, in our opinion, the fusion of traditional parliamentary functions. Indeed, although the exercise of the right of amendment amounts to legislative activity, it is nonetheless a singular instrument of scrutiny in the hands of members of Parliament. In addition to this classical tool, a number of hybrid mechanisms is gradually being added, such as quality control of the law, that of impact studies of bills, parliamentary scrutiny of European policy, etc.Those new methods result from unprecedented prerogatives that the members of parliament are now entitled to use.Although Parliament is the ultimate political arena, it is meanwhile a privileged place for the search of compromise, mainly within the standing committees. This thesis tries to prove that, beyond their diversity, standing committees fulfill a specific function in all the activities they carry out: concertation.

The EU integration process has led to severe changes in policy-making. On the one hand, authority shifted from the national level to the EU. On the other hand, national level executives have gained power relative to the national legislatures. However, since the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, scholars argue for a comeback of national legislatures. In Germany, parliamentary standing committees have gained considerable power throughout these developments. Nonetheless, their traditional role as policy shaper is contested among scholars. Thus, clarification of their role is needed. While, previous analysis has mainly focused on the Bundestag as a unitary actor. This thesis investigates the role of two standing committees of the Bundestag – Ausschuss für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung and Ausschuss für Gesundheit – in the EU policy-making process across two different competence areas emerging due to the Lisbon Treaty. To answer the research questions, semi-structured interviews with committee members have been conducted. The results of the study show a diverging picture. The members of the Ausschuss für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung are considerably constrained in their ability to act as a policy shaper. The members of the Ausschuss für Gesundheit can secure their policy-shaping powers to a great extent. The former committee lacks these qualities concerning the shift of an increasing amount of policy authority in agriculture to the EU, the restricted use and abilities of the Early Warning Mechanism and the constrained ability to influence the minister’s position in the Council. The members of the latter are more successful in securing policy authority in public health at the national level by making use of the EWM. Nonetheless, the restricted ability to influence the minister’s position in the Council is present, too. We can conclude that the Ausschuss für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung has inherited the role of a scrutiniser and executer meanwhile the Ausschuss für Gesundheit can be described as policy shaper.