"The prevailing realities of 'severely depressed' African economies make it difficult for children to enjoy the socio-economic rights guaranteed under the Children's Charter. This study takes the view that the responsibility of parents and the obligations of the state towards children's socio-economic rights must be mutually supportive. It therefore proposes the need for balancing parental responsibility and state obligations in the struggle to ensure that the socio-economic rights of children across the continent are met, albeit, under difficult economic circumstances. ... The study is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 has highlighted the structure of the entire discourse. Chapter 2 deals with the general perspectives of the socio-economic rights of children within the broad context of international human rights law. An overview of the normative and procedural framework of the Convention on the Rights of the Child is given. The chapter also examines the normative and procedural framework available for the protection of the child at the African regional level, the starting point of which is the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and eventually narrowed down to the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. Chapter 3 addresses the concept of parental responsibility. In particular, Africa's notion of parental responsibility is critically analyzed as a factor that makes a crucial difference to the interpretations of the underlying assumptions in the Children's Charter that the socio-economic rights of children could be met through the African communal and extended family network. Chapter 4 deals with states obligations in respect of the socio-economic rights of children. The South African jurisprudence on the rights of the child is also discussed in this chapter. The chapter also highlights the interplay between parental responsibility and state obligations in fulfilling the socio-economic rights of children. Chapter 5 consists of conclusions of the essay." -- Chapter 1. / Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa))--University of Pretoria, 2003. / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/academic_pro/llm1/dissertations.html / Centre for Human Rights / LLM

Orientador: Élcio Trujillo / Banca: Euclides Celso Berardo / Banca: Luiz Antonio Soares Hentz / Resumo: O presente trabalho tem por objetivo discutir os motivos pelos quais o Estado deve arcar com os prejuízos causados pelo erro judiciário na sentença penal absolutória, já que, a depender da fundamentação dessa decisão judicial, a vítima ficará impossibilitada de pleitear do próprio agente do crime o ressarcimento dos danos causados pelo fato criminoso. Argumenta-se que, se por um lado o processo é instrumento de consecução e aplicação da justiça, não se pode olvidar que a solução dos conflitos intersubjetivos de interesses foram entregues a órgãos integrantes do Estado, personificados nos juízes. Desse modo, a decisão acerca do mérito do processo reside na convicção do julgador. Entretanto, ao contrário do que se pensava, esta não é formada simplesmente por aspectos próprios da pessoa do julgador, mas deriva do somatório das condutas verificadas no decorrer do processo, seja por atividade instrutória própria do juiz, seja pela intervenção das partes da relação jurídica processual. Por isso se afirma que não deve o julgador, jamais, se afastar dos elementos de convicção contidos nos autos. Essa afirmação se justifica, na medida em que o ordenamento jurídico brasileiro adotou a regra do livre convencimento motivado. De fato, existe um princípio implícito na relação jurídica processual, consistente num dever de conduta ética das partes. Contudo, e a despeito da existência do citado princípio, é plenamente possível que as partes venham a se utilizar de condutas que induzam o magistrado a erro, levando, inclusive, à absolvição do réu, quando, no caso, a condenação se impunha. Desse modo, a depender do fundamento da absolvição, nem mesmo poderá ser proposta a ação de reparação civil pelo fato criminoso, restando a vítima, assim, sensivelmente prejudicada. Como o... (Resumo completo, clicar acesso eletrônico abaixo) / Abstract: This paper is due to discuss why State should assume the responsibility for the losses caused by a false judgment that led to an acquittal, since, depending on the motivation of the sentence, the victim could be unable to suit the criminal for the reparable injuries related to the crime. It is pleaded that, although a law suit is an instrument used to pursue justice, it must not be forgotten that the pacification of the conflicts of interest were ceded to state officers, the judges. So, the decision on the merits lies on the beliefs of the judge. However, in spite of what was considered true, these beliefs are not composed only by personal aspects regarding to the judge, but they arise from a sum of conducts that occur during the proceedings, by the diligence of the judge or by the activity of the parties. That is why it is said that the judge should never disregard the indicia produced during a lawsuit: because, in Brazil, the rule called "free but justified persuasion" is valid. In fact, there is an unwritten principle that guides the relation between the parties - the obligation to behave ethically. However, and despite the existence of the aforementioned principle, it is absolutely possible that the parties behave in such a way that leads the judge to a mistake, which can even cause an erroneous acquittal. In this case, depending on the motivation of the sentence, the reparation suit would not even be possible. The victim would bare, therefore, his losses. As the law in vigor does not bring a solution to this problem, the present paper analyzes a way to guarantee to the victim the right to a reparation lawsuit - otherwise, he would suffer two injuries: the crime itself and the conduct of the parties that guided the judge to an erroneous acquittal. / Mestre

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:24:13Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2008-05-30Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T20:51:44Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 barbosa_alj_me_fran.pdf: 1094004 bytes, checksum: 08acc7fd3aafae589a4d2b3bcd6f16e4 (MD5) / O presente trabalho tem por objetivo discutir os motivos pelos quais o Estado deve arcar com os prejuízos causados pelo erro judiciário na sentença penal absolutória, já que, a depender da fundamentação dessa decisão judicial, a vítima ficará impossibilitada de pleitear do próprio agente do crime o ressarcimento dos danos causados pelo fato criminoso. Argumenta-se que, se por um lado o processo é instrumento de consecução e aplicação da justiça, não se pode olvidar que a solução dos conflitos intersubjetivos de interesses foram entregues a órgãos integrantes do Estado, personificados nos juízes. Desse modo, a decisão acerca do mérito do processo reside na convicção do julgador. Entretanto, ao contrário do que se pensava, esta não é formada simplesmente por aspectos próprios da pessoa do julgador, mas deriva do somatório das condutas verificadas no decorrer do processo, seja por atividade instrutória própria do juiz, seja pela intervenção das partes da relação jurídica processual. Por isso se afirma que não deve o julgador, jamais, se afastar dos elementos de convicção contidos nos autos. Essa afirmação se justifica, na medida em que o ordenamento jurídico brasileiro adotou a regra do livre convencimento motivado. De fato, existe um princípio implícito na relação jurídica processual, consistente num dever de conduta ética das partes. Contudo, e a despeito da existência do citado princípio, é plenamente possível que as partes venham a se utilizar de condutas que induzam o magistrado a erro, levando, inclusive, à absolvição do réu, quando, no caso, a condenação se impunha. Desse modo, a depender do fundamento da absolvição, nem mesmo poderá ser proposta a ação de reparação civil pelo fato criminoso, restando a vítima, assim, sensivelmente prejudicada. Como o... / This paper is due to discuss why State should assume the responsibility for the losses caused by a false judgment that led to an acquittal, since, depending on the motivation of the sentence, the victim could be unable to suit the criminal for the reparable injuries related to the crime. It is pleaded that, although a law suit is an instrument used to pursue justice, it must not be forgotten that the pacification of the conflicts of interest were ceded to state officers, the judges. So, the decision on the merits lies on the beliefs of the judge. However, in spite of what was considered true, these beliefs are not composed only by personal aspects regarding to the judge, but they arise from a sum of conducts that occur during the proceedings, by the diligence of the judge or by the activity of the parties. That is why it is said that the judge should never disregard the indicia produced during a lawsuit: because, in Brazil, the rule called “free but justified persuasion” is valid. In fact, there is an unwritten principle that guides the relation between the parties – the obligation to behave ethically. However, and despite the existence of the aforementioned principle, it is absolutely possible that the parties behave in such a way that leads the judge to a mistake, which can even cause an erroneous acquittal. In this case, depending on the motivation of the sentence, the reparation suit would not even be possible. The victim would bare, therefore, his losses. As the law in vigor does not bring a solution to this problem, the present paper analyzes a way to guarantee to the victim the right to a reparation lawsuit – otherwise, he would suffer two injuries: the crime itself and the conduct of the parties that guided the judge to an erroneous acquittal.