Chung Chi-man. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 91-94). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.ii / 摘要 --- p.iii / Acknowledgement --- p.iv / Table of Contents --- p.v / Chapter Chapter 1 --- Introduction / Chapter 1.1 --- Agency Theory --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Separation of Large and Small Shareholders --- p.2 / Chapter 1.3 --- The Role of Auditing in Corporate Governance --- p.5 / Chapter Chapter 2 --- The Framework of Corporate Governance and External Auditing in Hong Kong / Chapter 2.1 --- Corporate Governance in Hong Kong --- p.9 / Chapter 2.2 --- External Auditing in Hong Kong --- p.12 / Chapter Chapter 3 --- Construction of the Data / Chapter 3.1 --- Assembly of the Primary Data --- p.14 / Chapter 3.2 --- Traces of the Identities of the Ultimate Owners --- p.17 / Chapter 3.3 --- Construction of the Industry-Adjusted Audit Rate Data and Some Descriptive Statistics --- p.19 / Chapter Chapter 4 --- Ownership and Control Patterns / Chapter 4.1 --- An Improved Research Methodology --- p.24 / Chapter 4.2 --- Discussions of Ownership and Control Patterns --- p.26 / Chapter 4.3 --- Ownership and Control by Owner Types --- p.30 / Chapter Chapter 5 --- Examples of Typical Ownership Patterns / Chapter 5.1 --- The Li Ka-Shing Business Group --- p.35 / Chapter 5.2 --- The Swire Group --- p.40 / Chapter 5.3 --- The Kuok Khoon-Ean Business Group --- p.41 / Chapter Chapter 6 --- Regression Analyses / Chapter 6.1 --- The Variables --- p.43 / Chapter 6.2 --- Regression Results and Discussions --- p.46 / Chapter 6.3 --- A Restricted Model --- p.52 / Chapter Chapter 7 --- Some Concluding Remarks --- p.55 / Tables / Table 1 Description Statistics of the Unadjusted Auditing Rate Data --- p.57 / Table 2 Separation of Ownership and Control Rights --- p.58 / "Table 3 Control of Publicly Traded Companies, by Owner Types" --- p.59 / Table 4 Description of Regression Variables --- p.60 / Table 5 Regression Results on the Relationship between Industry- Adjusted Auditing Rates and the Largest Shareholders' Ownership and Control (Full Sample) --- p.63 / Table 6 Regression Results on the Relationship between Industry- Adjusted Auditing fee and the Largest Shareholders' Ownership and Control (Family-controlled or Corporate-Entity-controlled Firms Only) --- p.66 / Figures / Figure 1 The Structure of Hang Seng Composite Index --- p.68 / Figure 2 The Relationship between Different Types of Large Shareholders --- p.69 / "Figure 3a The Li, Ka-Shing Group" --- p.70 / Figure 3b Details of the Calculations of the Concentrated Ownership and Control Stakes --- p.71 / Figure 4 The Connections of the Chinese Government and a Diverse Corporation (Swire Group) --- p.72 / "Figure 5 The Kuok, Khoon-Ean Group (An Example of Flat Structure)" --- p.73 / Appendices / Figure A1 HSBC Holdings PLC --- p.74 / Figure A2 The Bank of East Asia --- p.75 / Figure A3 JCG Holdings Limited --- p.76 / Figure A4 Moulin International Holdings limited --- p.77 / Figure A5 Yue Yuen Industrial (Holdings) Limited --- p.78 / Figure A6 Orient Overseas (International) Limited --- p.79 / Figure A7 Sun Man Tai Holdings Company Limited --- p.80 / "Figure A8 The Lee, Shan-Kee Group" --- p.81 / Figure A9 China National Aviation Company Limited --- p.82 / Figure A10 ICBC (Asia) Limited --- p.83 / Figure A11 MTR Corporation --- p.84 / "Figure A12 The Liu, Lit-Man Group" --- p.85 / Table A1 Summary Description of the Data --- p.86 / Bibliography --- p.91

published_or_final_version / Business / Master / Master of Philosophy

published_or_final_version / Business Administration / Master / Master of Business Administration

Yuen, San Wing. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 58-61). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2 --- Literature review and hypothesis development --- p.5 / Chapter 2.1 --- Going private --- p.5 / Chapter 2.2 --- Tunneling and the expropriation of minority shareholders --- p.9 / Chapter 2.3 --- Our hypotheses --- p.12 / Chapter 3 --- Samples --- p.15 / Chapter 3.1 --- Sample construction --- p.15 / Chapter 3.2 --- Sample description --- p.16 / Chapter 3.3 --- Corporate governance and financial variables --- p.18 / Chapter 3.4 --- Related party transactions --- p.21 / Chapter 4 --- Empirical analysis --- p.23 / Chapter 4.1 --- Event study results --- p.23 / Chapter 4.2 --- Negative premium --- p.34 / Chapter 4.3 --- Insider trading --- p.37 / Chapter 4.4 --- The decision to go private --- p.39 / Chapter 4.4.1 --- Sample matching --- p.39 / Chapter 4.4.2 --- Comparison between going private companies and public companies --- p.41 / Chapter 4.5 --- Logit regression analysis on going private decision --- p.43 / Chapter 4.6 --- The value effect of the bidding firms --- p.46 / Chapter 5 --- Conclusion --- p.49 / Chapter A --- Privatized companies included in the sample with announcement dates --- p.51 / Chapter B --- Methodology of event study --- p.53 / Chapter C --- Bidder companies --- p.55 / Chapter D --- A list of definition of variables --- p.56 / Reference --- p.58