Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Erlangen.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Erlangen.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Erlangen.

No description available.

The shareholders in general meeting and board of directors are the main governing organs of a company. Control of the general meeting theoretically ensures control of the composition of the board of directors who are usually empowered by the articles to manage the day-to-day administration of the company. The company acts by shareholders and directors voting and passing resolutions in general meeting and board meetings respectively. Controlling sufficient votes to pass resolutions in general and board meetings is therefore the essence of corporate control. A shareholder's right to vote in general meeting is a proprietary legal right, severable from the other incidents of share ownership. By aggregating voting rights, or limiting the scope of the voting rights of some shareholders, or restricting ownership of voting rights to certain specified persons, voting control in the general meeting may be acquired. / LL.M / Private Law

Accountants agree that nonqualified stock options are compensatory. However, only a limited amount of remuneration cost is recognized on the date that such options are granted; frequently, there is no recognition. Hence, the income numbers reported by grantor firms may be over-stated owing to such lack of recognition. In this regard, the objective of this study is to estimate the value of compensation implied in grants of stock options, and to present evidence pertaining to the materiality of the impact these estimates have on income from continuing operations of selected firms. The Black and Scholes option pricing model was selected to estimate the value of a stock option. This formula provides a probabilistic point estimate of the market value of a call option. A restrictive set of assumptions underlie the derivation of this formula, but empirical studies indicate that alterations of the model to accommodate violations of these assumptions fail to impart greater predictive ability. The standard Black and Scholes formula was used to estimate the compensation implied in grants of stock options during 1978 for a non-random sample of 171 firms. These estimates were adjusted for amounts related to such grants that had already been recorded. Since most firms granted options having exercise prices equal to the market prices of the optioned shares, such adjustments were infrequent. The resulting incremental compensation estimate was divided by income from continuing operations, giving an option compensation index for each enterprise in the sample. Assuming 10 percent, 5 percent, and 3 percent materiality thresholds, income from continuing operations is materially reduced for 16 percent, 31 percent, and 47 percent of the sampled firms, respectively. A statistical analysis suggests systematic association between the magnitude of the compensation index and the classification of the industry in which the enterprise operates. Other statistical tests indicate that estimates of compensation implied in grants of stock options are material for large firms in the manufacturing and retail sectors, and for small firms in the manufacturing, retail, and banking-finance sectors. These statistical results must be interpreted circumspectly owing to the non-random sample. Nevertheless, this evidence supports a re-examination of the accounting methods for stock options.

Zugleich: Diss. Mainz, 2008. / Literaturverz.

The shareholders in general meeting and board of directors are the main governing organs of a company. Control of the general meeting theoretically ensures control of the composition of the board of directors who are usually empowered by the articles to manage the day-to-day administration of the company. The company acts by shareholders and directors voting and passing resolutions in general meeting and board meetings respectively. Controlling sufficient votes to pass resolutions in general and board meetings is therefore the essence of corporate control. A shareholder's right to vote in general meeting is a proprietary legal right, severable from the other incidents of share ownership. By aggregating voting rights, or limiting the scope of the voting rights of some shareholders, or restricting ownership of voting rights to certain specified persons, voting control in the general meeting may be acquired. / LL.M / Private Law