Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2004. / Supervisor: D. Eric Hirst. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of British Columbia, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 124-130).

Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 2005. / Title proper from title frame. Also available in printed format.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2006. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

LL.M. (Commercial Law) / In order to promote sound corporate conduct, it is essential that shareholders actively participate in the governance of the company. The primary mechanism to achieve this lies in the shareholder’s right to vote at meetings. However, an analysis of the nature of shares, and the history surrounding the introduction and development of uncertificated shares in particular, reveals a structure that often interposes multiple nominees between the issuing company and the underlying investor. Such a structure has the potential to dispossess the underlying investor of his rights, which may have concomitant negative effects on the corporate governance of the company. A comparative study of the legal framework for uncertificated shares in the United States, the United Kingdom and South Africa reveals varying degrees of protection for the underlying investor. Unfortunately, none of these countries has resolved the problem completely, and it is suggested that a move to a direct, transparent holding model, where the underlying investor, rather than an intermediary, is recorded in a company’s share register, is a better solution.

Working capital management assists a firm in achieving improved liquidity through management of the components of receivables, inventory and payables. Previous studies have established that working capital has a strong positive correlation to profitability. These studies have also shown that the components of receivables and inventory have a positive correlation to profitability, while payables have an inverse relationship. The inverse correlation of payables in relation to profitability is contrary to the theory that advocates extending payables’ payment terms as a means of managing working capital and improving liquidity. This study attempted to ascertain whether, by applying a style-based test, to an extensive database of Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) listed South African companies, there is evidence to support a positive relationship between returns to investors and payables days. The study further applied the style-based test to the relationship between returns to investors and the management of payables in the form of change in payables days. Further data stratification was applied to industries that are more significantly invested in payables as well as to companies of increasing or decreasing momentum to differentiate the payables strategy of an increasingly profitable company versus an increasingly unprofitable company. The results of the study indicated that for those companies in industries that have significant investment in payables, management of their payables will achieve superior returns. The study also revealed that this relationship is significant for companies in the top 40% momentum return and that higher change in payables could be applied as a means of obtaining a competitive edge. / Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2014. / zkgibs2015 / Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) / MBA / Unrestricted

Thesis (M.M.) (Strategic marketing)). University of the Witwatersrand, Wits Business School, 2013. / Stakeholder theory has increasingly become an area of academic and management research. Every organisation has different stakeholders, upon which organisational outcomes are dependent on managerial decision making regarding the multiple relationships that exist, the various options and resources available to them, and the influence that corporate reputation has on the managers’ response to any given stakeholder claim. The purpose of this research is to offer a greater understanding of how executive managers of an emerging market company strategically identify and manage their stakeholders and consequently, the reputation of the firm. Various streams of literature were supported by the findings of the research conducted. This included the descriptive, instrumental, and normative aspects of managers’ behaviours and traits; stakeholder coalitions; and reciprocity. Areas of conflicting evidence stemming from the research included the classification of stakeholders through primary and secondary groups; stakeholder attributes of power and urgency; and “dangerous stakeholders” within stakeholder salience. There is a gap in the literature involving the effect of corporate reputation with regards to management salience and prioritising stakeholder demands. Sixteen semi-structured in-depth interviews were executed in a leading South African paint manufacturing company that forms part of a large global organisation. The respondents consisted of eight executive managers of the company, each from a different functional area, and eight stakeholders of the company comprising employees, suppliers, and customers. As a leading company within their industry, they frequently experience claims of various natures which the directors deal with on a regular basis, many of which have the potential to harm the corporate reputation. Real life cases are transcribed and reflected upon within this research report. The research findings show that the company’s corporate reputation has a direct influence on how managers prioritize and attend to stakeholder claims, mainly based on legitimacy as a core attribute. Furthermore, that managers identify their stakeholders differently to what the literature proposes, and that there are more learnings to be taken from reciprocity in stakeholder relationships.

No description available.

This dissertation seeks to investigate empirically the determinants and implications of large block shareholdings. Specifically, it attempts to answer the following questions : (1) Why do some firms have blocks and others not ? (2) What are the valuation consequences of large block creations ? (3) What are the cross-sectional relationships between the market response and characteristics of the firm and of the blockholder ? and, finally, (4) What are the time series (and control-firm-adjusted) changes in firm performance measures and operating variables attributable to large shareholder monitoring ? The above questions are addressed by recognizing, firstly, that the incidence of large block shareholdings is rational only when the gains from a blockholding exceed the costs of foregone diversification-of-portfolio opportunities. The potential sources of gains to the blockholder are identified as resulting from firm-value-increasing reductions in the agency costs of free cash flow and other non-free-cash-flow-related equity agency costs, equity-value-increasing potential for wealth transfers from bondholders, firm-value-increasing expectation of synergy gains in the case of corporate blockholdings, as well as equity-value-reducing gains such as the potential for insider trading, and the expectation of a greenmail premium. It is hypothesized that the net valuation impact of these gains to the blockholder is positive. Event study results support this hypothesis. Cross-sectional regression results suggest that announcement period abnormal returns are reliably explained by the potential for wealth transfers from bondholders, as proxied by the level of discretionary assets in the firm. Further, consistent with theory, announcement excess returns are positively related to the size of the blockholding and the identity of the blockholder. There is no evidence that blockholders play a valuable role in limiting managerial discretion over free cash flow. Firm-specific risk also appears to have no valuation impact; this suggests that the potential benefits from blockholder monitoring may be offset by the potential costs resulting from insider trading. Finally, a pre- and post-block matched-pair comparison of key performance measures and operating variables between the sets of sample firms and control firms provides weak support for the monitoring role of the large block shareholder. A time-series tracing of blockholder affiliation with the target firms reveals that in only a small fraction of firms does the blockholder obtain a seat on the target firm’s board of directors - a virtual requirement for effective monitoring to occur. Overall, these findings do not support theoretical arguments that envisage blockholder monitoring as a long-term incentive-alignment mechanism between managers and shareholders. / Ph. D.

Every stockholder of a corporation has certain rights incident to his status as a stockholder. Such rights are not particularly the rights of a minority stockholder. That is to say, a stockholder merely because he is a stockholder, has certain privileges because of his holding of stock which he can assert no matter who controls the corporation. These privileges, strictly speaking, are not rights peculiar to minority stockholders; they belong to all stockholders. It was unnecessary to discuss every conceivable right which a stockholder may possess because he owns a share of stock. Many rights are provided for in the articles of association and by-laws. We will review here the important rights which are frequently breached to the detriment of a minority stockholder. The important rights of stockholders are: (1) Right to be present at meetings, (2) Right to transfer stock, (3) right to participate in profits, (4) right to subscribe to increase in stock, (5) right to share in assets upon dissolution, and (6) the right of inspection. Listed above are only those rights which a minority stockholder has in common with all stockholders, of which he as an individual stockholder might be deprived, and which he can enforce for his own personal benefit. Next, there are the rights which all minority stockholders have, which protect them against the domination of the majority. These rights enable a minority stockholder in certain circumstances to complain of the action of the majority, that is, the action of the corporation. For the action of the majority is the action of the corporation. It may be said in general that the courts sometimes hesitate to interfere with the management of a corporation. If it were otherwise, the dockets of the courts would be crowded with the complaints of disgruntled stockholders. There are three main classes of cases where minority stockholders may obtain relief from the acts of the majority, namely, where such acts are illegal, where they are outside the corporate powers, and where they are fraudulent or oppressive. A few instances of fraudulent action is (1) voting excessive salaries, (2) obtaining inequitable contract, (3) fraudulently favoring competitor, (4) refusal to declare dividends, (5) wrongful transfer or entire assets, (6) watered stock, (7) fraudulent reorganization, and (8) fraudulent dissolution. / M.S.