Thesis (Ph. D.)--Florida State University, 2004. / Advisor: Dr. Richard M. Morton, Florida State University, College of Business, Dept. of Accounting. Title and description from dissertation home page (viewed Sept. 23, 2004). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Syracuse University, 2007. / "Publication number: AAT 3295518."

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2006. / Title from first page of PDF file (viewed October 10, 2006). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 174-178).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2000. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 265-302).

M.Com. (Financial Management) / The idea that strategies should be judged by the economic value which is created in terms of them is well accepted in the business community. Based on surveys of practice there is, however, great uncertainty regarding the way in which strategies and subsequent company performance should be evaluated. The best measure of corporate success is therefore a vexed issue. Accounting numbers and ratios are generally perceived to be poor measures of changes in economic value. The problem can be said not to lie with accounting, but in its inappropriate use. Accounting measures are constrained by accrual accounting conventions and financial reporting objectives; they are not designed to measure changes in a finn's economic value. Some of the limitations are the fact that earnings can be computed in different ways (depending on management's choice of accounting policy), earnings do not reflect differences in risk and it ignores working capital and fixed capital investments. These shortcomings imply that traditional accounting measures (like earnings and earnings per share) are not reliably linked to increasing the value of the company's stock price. When a business wants to determine the economic value of an investment, it discounts the investment's forecast cash flow by the company's cost of capital. This technique, known as discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis, is widely used in capital budgeting and lease versus buy decisions. Until recently, managers have generally been reluctant to extend the approach beyond piecemeal applications to an entire business plan. The shareholder value approach applies the DCF analysis to the business as a whole - treating it as a portfolio of cash-generating strategies...

Recent media reports surrounding the 2010 Soccer World Cup infrastructure, and the fines imposed by the Competition Commission drew the public’s attention to the impact that regulatory fines have on the returns earned by shareholders in these convicted companies. The purpose of the research was to establish if any significant impact on shareholder returns can be identified as a result of regulatory fines. By using event study methodology, the researcher aimed to establish if an impact can be identified at the various stages of the regulatory process. Statistical tests were conducted via the implementation of Monte Carlo Simulations at the various stages of the process, to ensure that the findings were significant. The studies revealed that shareholder returns were neutrally affected at the initiation and payment stages of the process, but that the returns were positively affected at the conviction stage. A style analysis (longitudinal study) was undertaken to determine if a portfolio consisting of stocks of convicted companies would out-perform the market over certain determined timeframes. As a baseline test, a portfolio was constructed of stocks of companies which have never been fined. The results revealed that both portfolios out-performed the market (ALL160) over a 24-year period, but that the portfolio consisting of convicted companies did not out-perform the portfolio of companies which have never been fined. / Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2014 / zkgibs2015 / Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) / MBA / Unrestricted

The issue leading to this study is the purported lack of short-term consideration of climate change materiality on investment portfolios. The on-going research argument deliberates the roles and motives of institutional investors in considering environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues, including climate change, in investment decisions. The purpose of this study was therefore to explore the underlying motives of South African institutional investors for the incorporation of climate change in their short-term investment decision-making. The study was conducted through a qualitative, exploratory enquiry, whereby seven semi-structured interviews were conducted with institutions in the South African asset management industry. Participants’ views were analysed and indicated the following themes: The state of climate change awareness and the incorporation of ESG and climate change in investment decision-making; tactical valuation of assets using ESG/climate change screening and methods of monitoring ESG/climate change practices; and motives, incentives and constraints of responsible investment (RI) practices to incorporate climate change. These are supported by business conditions that enable consideration of climate change in investment analysis. Industry practitioners can lead by implementing RI to include climate change in order to attract potential clients to their portfolios. / Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2014. / zkgibs2015 / Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) / Unrestricted

Freedom is universally valued and fundamentally affects social life. In this thesis, I examine how freedom affects an important dimension of business: long-term commitment (LTC). The LTC of corporations is vital for economic growth because economic development is reliant on entrepreneurs continuously investing in physical and social capital. Corporate opportunism will never lead to long-term economic growth. Specifically, this study examines the effects of political freedom (PF) and economic freedom (EF) on two LTC-related variables: investment and the commitment to maintaining a loyal shareholder base, both of which are essential topics in the business literature. This study consists of two essays. The first essay investigates the effects of a country's political versus economic freedom on corporate investment based on a sample of 19,605 companies operating in 49 countries for the timespan covering 1995 to 2015. First-differencing (FD) regressions show that PF and EF are positively associated with corporate investment, but PF's effect is larger. I also find that the effect of EF is conditional on the development of PF but not vice versa. Further, the effect of PF does not seem to be due to concurrent changes in uncontrolled factors: major changes in PF have larger effects than minor changes, and I do not observe a reversion in the effect of PF. Lastly, I find that an improvement in PF is associated with a larger growth in investment among firms with state ownership or political connections, suggesting a larger distorting effect of low PF on these firms' investment decisions. Overall, the findings shed new light on the economic reforms designed by policymakers: economic reforms, no matter how easy they seem, may not work well without political reforms. The second essay examines the impacts of a country's political compared with economic freedom on corporations' commitment to maintaining a loyal shareholder base. With a sample of 45 countries spanning 12 years, the FD result shows that PF and EF are positively associated with corporations' commitment to shareholder loyalty (CSL). More importantly, PF has a greater effect than EF. It is also determined that the impact of EF is dependent on the advancement of PF, but the reverse is not true. Furthermore, the impact of PF is not caused by concurrent changes in uncontrolled factors: major changes in PF are more impactful than minor changes, while a reversion in the impact of PF is not observed. Finally, I find that an enhancement to PF is correlated with a more significant increase in CSL among firms with state ownership or political connections than in firms without. This implies that low PF has a greater distorting effect on the CSL of such firms. In general, these results indicate that while it is comparatively easier for policymakers to enact economic reforms, their effectiveness may be reduced in the absence of concurrent political reforms.

Corporate governance issues have become increasingly important to financial managers and shareholders. Firms that are plagued by poor performance, incompetent managers, or excess agency costs have become the subject of a dramatic increase in shareholder activism. Dissident shareholders, who are unable to launch costly takeover bids or proxy contests, have initiated a process of governance reform through the use of shareholder sponsored proposals. Shareholder proposals are a direct attempt to reverse operating or voting policies, such as a proposal to repeal a classified board. Managers announce shareholder proposals in a proxy statement and typically include a vote recommendation against the proposal. In the first essay, I find an unfavorable stock price reaction to the announcement of a shareholder proposal. In some cases, however, management supports the proposal and negotiates an agreement with the proposing shareholder. Stock prices react favorably to a settlement announcement. If managers are willing to negotiate with shareholders, they are perceived to be acting in the best interest of shareholders. If managers are unwilling, shareholders believe a severe agency problem exists. In the second essay, the effect that ownership structure has on voting outcomes of shareholder proposals is examined. I find a direct relationship between the percentage of votes cast in favor of the proposal and levels of institutional ownership. There is an inverse relationship between the percentage of votes and managerial ownership and firm size. Large firms with powerful owner-managers present the greatest obstacle to the success of shareholder proposals. The repeal of shareholder rights plans is one of the most frequently used shareholder proposals. By adopting the rights plan, managers increase the probability of defeating a takeover, but increase their power in negotiating with a potential acquiring firm. In the third essay, I find that firms who combine a rights plan with high debt levels construct a powerful defense against a hostile takeover. Shareholders target these high debt firms and design proposals to repeal the rights plan.

Most initial public offerings (IPOs) feature share lockup agreements, which prohibit insiders from selling their shares for a specified period of time following the IPO. However, some IPO firms agree to have a much longer lockup period than other IPO firms, and some are willing to lockup a much larger proportion of shares. Thus, the primary research question for this study is: "What are the reasons for the divergence of the lockup agreements?" The two main hypotheses that this dissertation investigates are the signaling hypothesis based on information asymmetry, and the commitment hypothesis based on agency theory. This study uses methods that have not been applied by previous studies in the literature relating to IPO lockups. First, I directly use IPO firms operating performance as a proxy for firm quality. The results show neither a negative nor a strong positive relationship between lockup length and firm operating performance. Thus, based on operating performance, the evidence does not support the agency hypothesis while showing weak support for the signaling hypothesis. I then examine the long-run returns for IPO firms with different lockup lengths. I find that firms with short lockup lengths have much better long-run returns than firms with long lockup lengths. Therefore, the results reject the signaling hypothesis while supporting the agency hypothesis. This dissertation further contributes to the IPO long-run underperformance literature by showing that firms with a high agency problem have much worse long-run returns than those with a low agency problem. Finally, I investigate the short-term stock returns around lockup expiry. Generally, I find that firms with short lockup periods experience better stock returns around lockup expiry than firms with long lockup periods, though the returns are not significantly different from one another. Overall, I conclude that the results reject the signaling hypothesis while partially supporting the agency hypothesis. In addition, I show that firms with high agency problems have much worse stock returns than those with low agency problems around lockup expiry, even though the agency variable is not significant in the regression analysis.