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Anlegerschutz durch Schriftform und Dokumentation bei Wertpapierdienstleistungen /Rothenhöfer, Kay. January 2007 (has links)
Zugl.: Hamburg, Universiẗat, Diss., 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 377-396).
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Die Gesellschafterfähigkeit von Gesamthandsgemeinschaften /Paul, Thomas. January 1900 (has links) (PDF)
Univ., Diss.--Saarbrücken, 2004. / Literaturverz. S. 373 - 385.
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Local futures traders and behavioural biases evidence from Australia /Grant, Joel. January 2007 (has links)
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Wollongong, 2007. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references: leaf 168-189.
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Three essays on China's industrial reforms in the 1990s /Ye, Jun. January 2004 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2004. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.
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Wege zur virtuellen Haupt- und Gesellschafterversammlung : eine vergleichende Untersuchung über die Einbeziehung elektronischer Medien in die Hauptversammlung einer Aktiengesellschaft und die Gesellschafterversammlung einer GmbH /Wolf, Andreas, January 2004 (has links)
Thesis (doctoral)--Universiẗat Saarbrücken, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 303-320).
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SEC interventions and the frequency and usefulness of non-GAAP financial measuresTavares Marques, Ana Cristina de Oliveira, January 1900 (has links) (PDF)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2005. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.
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Die Geschäftsordnung für die Organe der Aktiengesellschaft /Isenberg, Gunnar, January 2005 (has links)
Thesis (doctoral)--Universiẗat Köln, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [249]-269).
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Pflichten der Kapitalanlagegesellschaft und der Depotbank gegenüber dem Anleger und die Rechte des Anlegers bei Pflichtverletzungen /Reiss, Malte. January 2006 (has links)
Thesis (doctoral)--Techn. Universiẗat, Darmstadt, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [406]-412) and index.
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Statutêre beskerming van die voordeeltrekkende aandeelhouer in die Suid-Afrikaanse maatskappyereg / Statutory protection of the beneficial shareholder in terms of South African company lawDe Bruyn, Frederik Anton 11 1900 (has links)
Text in Afrikaans / The Companies Act, 1973 ("the Act") contains no specific provision dealing
with the relationship between a nominee shareholder and its principal, the
beneficial shareholder. The Act merely contains a variety of references to this
unique relationship without specifying the content thereof or elaborating on
the rights of the beneficial shareholder. It is clear from the Act that no legal
connection exists between the company and the beneficial shareholder and a
company is only obliged to recognise its registered members.
It has become apparent that beneficial shareholders need more protection than
is currently afforded to them in terms of our common law. Currently beneficial
shareholders have a common law right to claim return of their shares from any
person (even bona fide third parties) in the event of the misappropriation of
such shares by their nominee shareholders. Beneficial shareholders are
unprotected if their nominee shareholders were to act contrary to their
instructions, for example by not voting at the general meeting in accordance
with the instructions of the beneficial shareholders. Having regard to the fact
that the relationship between the beneficial shareholder and the nominee
shareholder is based on agency or trusteeship, the beneficial shareholder will
be entitle to compel its nominee to transfer the shares to another person. This
may, however, have stamp duty implications and if the nominee refuses to give its cooperation in respect of such transfer, costly legal action may be the
only solution for the beneficial shareholder.
In deciding which section of the Act should be adapted to include the rights of
beneficial shareholders, the following sections have been considered: Section 266 (statutory derivative action), section 252 (statutory remedy in the event of
prejudice), section 440K (compulsory acquisition of securities of minorities)
and section 344(h) (liquidation on grounds of equity). The only one of these
sections which provides the court with a wide enough discretion to afford the
required protection is section 252.
An important point in this regard is that section 252 cannot effectively be
extended to beneficial shareholders unless they also acquire the right to have
access to the same company information as the members of the company
would receive. In an attempt to create a balance between the needs to greater
protection of beneficial shareholders and the avoidance of unnecessary
cumbersome administrative obligations on companies, it is suggested that a
register of beneficial shareholders be created and that companies be obliged to
inform all beneficial shareholders appearing on such register of the same
company information as is provided to registered members.
The Act must make it clear that :
• a beneficial shareholder can only be recorded in the register with the
assistance of its nominee shareholder;
• the relevant nominee shareholder must satisfy the company secretary that
the person which is recorded in the register is in fact its principal;
• the only two instances where the company secretary will be entitled to
remove the beneficial shareholder is in the first instance where the
beneficia] shareholder consents to such removal and secondly where the
shares held by the registered member is transferred. The latter ground will
avoid continued provision of company information to persons not
involved with the company.
No duty will be placed on companies to ensure that the names and addresses
of beneficial shareholders are correct. This will be the responsibility of
beneficial shareholders.
The improved flow of company information will facilitate the improved
awareness by beneficial shareholders of relevant events and together with the
appropriate extension of section 252, will go a long way in improving the much
needed protection of beneficial shareholders. / Mercantile Law / LL.M. (Handelsreg)
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A influência do porte empresarial no retorno das ações negociadas na Bovespa: proposição de um modelo quantitativo / The influence of size-effect in Brazilian stock returns: a quantitative model proposalFelipe Turbuk Garran 06 December 2012 (has links)
Este estudo analisa a influência do porte empresarial no retorno das ações do mercado brasileiro, lidando com a sobreposição aparentemente existente entre porte da empresa e liquidez das ações e buscando elucidar qual variável é dominante na determinação de retornos acionários. Para tanto, utiliza-se uma análise de dados em painel como ferramenta econométrica para a obtenção de resultados significativos. Os modelos tradicionais de precificação de ativos, notadamente o CAPM, partem de algumas premissas que possuem pouca aderência à realidade dos mercados acionários. Há evidências de que, no Brasil, o CAPM tem sido ineficaz em explicar os retornos do mercado acionário. Por essa razão, algumas variáveis são comumente adicionadas ao modelo original, sendo que o porte empresarial se encontra no topo da lista. Contudo, a legitimidade do porte empresarial reduzido como fator de risco a ser remunerado ao acionista não é consensual em mercados mais maduros como o americano tampouco no mercado brasileiro. O estudo leva em conta um intervalo de tempo de 16 anos (de 1995 até 2011) e analisa a influência dessas variáveis no retorno das ações com diferentes defasagens de tempo entre as variáveis (de 1 a 5 anos). O trabalho conclui que há uma significativa influência do porte empresarial nos retornos das ações. A relação estatística é negativa, isto é, empresas de menor porte tendem a ter custo de capital próprio mais alto. Esse resultado está alinhado com a pesquisa internacional sobre o assunto. O modelo quantitativo sugere que a cada variação de uma unidade logarítmica no porte há uma variação de 4,03% no retorno esperado da ação. Em relação à liquidez não foi encontrada, de forma consistente, relação estatística de que essa variável afeta o retorno das ações quando controlada pelo porte empresarial no mercado brasileiro. / This study analyses the influence of company size in stock returns in Brazilian market, dealing with the apparent superposition between company size and stock liquidity and searching to elucidate which variable is dominant in determining stock returns. With that purpose, panel data analysis has been used as econometric technic, searching to obtain significant results. Traditional pricing models, mainly CAPM, are based on certain premises which have little in common with the stock markets. There is evidence that, in Brazil, CAPM has been unable to explain stock returns properly. For this reason, some variable are commonly added to the original model and the company size is at the top of the list. However, the legitimacy of the size effect as a risk factor to be paid off to the stockholder is neither consensual in more mature markets, as the American one, nor in the Brazilian market. The study takes into account a time span of 16 years (from 1995 to 2011) and analyses the influence of these variables in stock returns with different delays among variables (from 1 to 5 years). The work concludes that there is a significant size effect in stock returns. The statistical relation is negative, that is, smaller companies tend to have higher cost of equity. This result is aligned with the international research on the subject. The quantitative model suggest that for a logarithmic unit variation in company size there is a 4,03% additional cost of equity. Concerning liquidity, it has not been found, consistently, statistical relation that this variable affects stock returns when controlled by company in Brazilian market.
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