Most of investment funds has the advantage of shares liquidity. For that reason, managers of some types of funds may find it difficult to maintain the position of their portfolios and provide higher returns to their investors quota. Some evidences on edge funds suggest that quota performance is positively affected by establishing larger time intervals before investors realize the rescue of their applications, called as lockup periods. Therefore, by selecting from a sample of 165,386 observations from 2009 to 2014 formed by the monthly net returns of 4,667 hedge funds that resemble the investment strategies of hedge funds in the United States, this research aimed to analyze whether lockup periods influence Brazilian multimarket funds quotes. By using econometric models, we tested this policy imposition under three forms allied to other variables in literature such as fund age, size of fund liquid equity, management fees and performance fees on investment funds in quotas. It was possible to predict the share performance in hedge funds in the period selected for this study. Results suggest the existence of lookup award in the Brazilian scene only when this variable is estimated by a dummy or values range, which indicates that using this policy may help Brazilian multimarket fund managers to keep their investment portfolios and provide greater profitability to quotas. This fact corroborates some previous studies in USA hedge funds context. Furthermore, finding lockup award for the category of hedge funds brought implications for the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), for Agency theory and also to the field of Behavior Finances. For EMH the evidences suggest the existence of market inefficiencies in Brazilian context, in the semi-strong form propagated by this theory. For Agency Theory, this study provides evidence that conflicts of interest between shareholders and hedge fund managers can be mitigated by imposing periods of lockup. To Behavior Finances the results stimulate the investigation of present bias, by demonstrating the possibility of existing investors considered as sophisticated in this category of investment funds. Concerning to control variables we found the influence on the share profitability in hedge funds for characteristics related to fund age, fund size of the equity and management fees. This study shows that lockup periods can contribute in obtaining better indicators of profitability in the financial market. / A maioria dos fundos de investimento apresenta como vantagem a liquidez das cotas. Por essa razão, gestores de algumas modalidades de fundos podem encontrar dificuldades em manter a posição de suas carteiras e proporcionar maior rentabilidade às cotas de seus investidores. Evidências no âmbito dos hedge funds sugerem que o desempenho das cotas é afetado de forma positiva pelo estabelecimento de um maior intervalo de tempo para que os investidores realizem o resgate de suas aplicações, denominado como períodos de lockup. Nessa linha, por meio da seleção de uma amostra de 165.386 observações no período de 2009 a 2014, formada pela rentabilidade líquida mensal de 4.667 fundos multimercados, que se assemelham às estratégias de investimento dos hedge funds nos Estados Unidos, o objetivo desta pesquisa consistiu em analisar se períodos de lockup influenciam a rentabilidade das cotas de fundos multimercados brasileiros. Com o auxílio de modelos econométricos, testou-se a imposição dessa política, estimada sob três formas distintas, aliada a outras variáveis previstas na literatura, tais como idade do fundo, tamanho do patrimônio líquido do fundo, taxa de administração, taxa de performance e fundos de investimento em cotas. Foi possível predizer o desempenho das cotas de fundos multimercados no período selecionado para esta pesquisa. Os resultados obtidos sugerem a existência do prêmio de lockup no cenário brasileiro, somente quando essa variável é estimada por meio de uma dummy ou em faixas de valores, indicando que a utilização dessa política pode auxiliar os gestores de fundos multimercados brasileiros a manterem suas carteiras de investimento e proporcionar maior rentabilidade às cotas, fato que corrobora alguns estudos anteriores no contexto dos hedge funds nos Estados Unidos. Ademais, a constatação do prêmio de lockup para a categoria de fundos multimercados trouxe implicações para a Teoria de Hipótese de Mercado Eficiente (HME), Teoria de Agência e ainda, para o campo das Finanças Comportamentais. Para a HME, as evidências sugerem a existência de ineficiências de mercado no âmbito brasileiro, na forma semiforte propagada por essa teoria. Para a Teoria de Agência, esta pesquisa forneceu indícios de que os conflitos de interesses entre cotistas e gestores de fundos multimercados podem ser mitigados mediante a imposição de períodos de lockup. Já para o campo das Finanças Comportamentais, os resultados encontrados estimulam a investigação do viés do presente, ao demonstrar a possibilidade de existirem investidores tidos como sofisticados nessa categoria de fundos de investimento. Com relação às variáveis de controle empregadas, constatou-se influência sobre a rentabilidade das cotas de fundos multimercados para as características relacionadas à idade do fundo, tamanho do patrimônio líquido do fundo e taxa de administração. Este estudo evidencia que a imposição de períodos de lockup pode contribuir para a obtenção de melhores indicadores de rentabilidade no mercado financeiro. / Mestre em Ciências Contábeis

This paper examines the lockup expiration date event for technology firms post Global Financial Crisis to investigate the existence of abnormal returns around this date and determine the explanatory power that insider trading and the increase in available shares have on the abnormal return. Contributions to literature include using an updated sampling, targeting the technology industry, and constructing unique variables such as the dollar value of insider trades around the lockup expiration date. There exists statistically significant three-day cumulative abnormal returns of -1.33%. Firms with higher percentages of insiders who sell their positions tend to experience a further decrease in cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). The supply effect of these shares being opened to the market is not significant at the 95% confidence level. Thus, insider trading rather than increased supply accounts for variations in the abnormal returns across technology firms.

Using a sample of 279 buyout backed firms, I examined the effect of lockup agreements on the firm’s stock returns. I found there to be a negative .8 percent cumulative abnormal return for the three-day period surrounding lockup expiration. Consistent with my hypothesis the CAR for the three-day period surrounding lockup expiration was less negative for buyout backed IPOs compared to venture capital backed IPOs. In addition, I found there to be an abnormal 24.24 percent increase in trading volume for the three days surrounding lockup expiration.

Most initial public offerings (IPOs) feature share lockup agreements, which prohibit insiders from selling their shares for a specified period of time following the IPO. However, some IPO firms agree to have a much longer lockup period than other IPO firms, and some are willing to lockup a much larger proportion of shares. Thus, the primary research question for this study is: "What are the reasons for the divergence of the lockup agreements?" The two main hypotheses that this dissertation investigates are the signaling hypothesis based on information asymmetry, and the commitment hypothesis based on agency theory. This study uses methods that have not been applied by previous studies in the literature relating to IPO lockups. First, I directly use IPO firms operating performance as a proxy for firm quality. The results show neither a negative nor a strong positive relationship between lockup length and firm operating performance. Thus, based on operating performance, the evidence does not support the agency hypothesis while showing weak support for the signaling hypothesis. I then examine the long-run returns for IPO firms with different lockup lengths. I find that firms with short lockup lengths have much better long-run returns than firms with long lockup lengths. Therefore, the results reject the signaling hypothesis while supporting the agency hypothesis. This dissertation further contributes to the IPO long-run underperformance literature by showing that firms with a high agency problem have much worse long-run returns than those with a low agency problem. Finally, I investigate the short-term stock returns around lockup expiry. Generally, I find that firms with short lockup periods experience better stock returns around lockup expiry than firms with long lockup periods, though the returns are not significantly different from one another. Overall, I conclude that the results reject the signaling hypothesis while partially supporting the agency hypothesis. In addition, I show that firms with high agency problems have much worse stock returns than those with low agency problems around lockup expiry, even though the agency variable is not significant in the regression analysis.

In this study, we conducted an event study of 100 Brazilian IPO’s from 2004 to 2010 to detect if there was any significant abnormal returns after the expiration of the IPO lockup period, during which pre-IPO shareholders are prevented from selling their shares. We found no significant abnormal returns for all companies during all event dates examined, though we did detect significant negative abnormal returns around lockup for high- volatility firms. We also find that after the lockup expiration, there is a higher frequency of days with a higher-than-average trading volume.

We examine 102 share lockup agreements following IPOs on the Swedish stock market and whether any abnormal returns exist in the days surrounding the expiration of lockup agreements. We also test three potential explanatory variables based on previous research, the length of the lockup agreement, the type of pre-IPO ownership for the firm (if it is backed by private equity or not), and if the lockup has multiple expiration dates (staggered lockup) or only one. Our results are unable to prove that there are abnormal returns surrounding the expiration lockups, and our variables fail to provide any explanation for the cumulative abnormal return (CAR). One variable that could prove interesting in future research is the change of free float, which we add in a robustness test and find a significant increase in explanatory power.

In the first essay, I create a hedge fund informed trading measure (ITM) that separates information related trades from liquidity driven trades. The results indicate that ITM predicts future stock returns at the trade level, thus is associated with information. By aggregating the most informed trades at the stock level, I find that stocks heavily purchased by informed hedge funds earn a significant alpha. The results indicate that the ITM performs better than some previously documented measures and is robust to two different versions of the measure. The second essay exploits the expiring nature of hedge fund lockups to create a new, within-fund proxy of funding liquidity risk. When funds have lower funding liquidity risk, risk-adjusted performance improves and exposure to tail risk increases. We use fund fixed-effect, a placebo approach, and a regression discontinuity design to establish a link between funding liquidity risk and the ability of funds to capitalize on risky mispricing. The third essay explores hedge fund managers ability to identify and trade on stock mispricing opportunity. We refer to the amount of capital that are is locked up and refrained from redemption as the stable capital, and study how it affects stock mispricing. We find that when funds have more lockup capital, they are more likely to take mispricing risks. Taking all funds together, more stable capital in the industry is driving the reduction or even correction of market-wide stock mispricing. Underpriced stocks benefit more than overpriced stock from hedge funds stable capital.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T18:39:42Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Camila Rocha Tafarello Securato.pdf: 4595294 bytes, checksum: 38e330e48c945f07be8b4d41b0cec9cf (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-10-17 / Since the creation, in 2000, of Bovespa s Novo Mercado and its access levels, most existing shareholders in an Initial Public Offer (IPO) are subject to a lockup period in which they cannot sell their shares for a pre specified time immediately after the IPO (typically 180 days). This thesis investigate whether the shares of companies listed on the Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo (BM&FBovespa) present abnormal return due to the expiration of an IPO lockup, in the period from 2000 to 2010. By the method of event study, we examine 77 share lockup agreements that prevent existing shareholders from selling their shares. When lockups expire, we find a statistically prominent cumulative abnormal return around the event window when the firm in the sample is financed by private equities and also for the firms in the sample that operates in the infrastructure sector / Desde a criação do Novo Mercado da Bovespa e de seus níveis de acesso em 2000, a maioria das Ofertas Públicas Inicias de Ações passou a estabelecer acordos específicos de lockup que impedem os acionistas controladores e administradores das empresas emissoras de vender e/ou ofertar suas ações ou derivativos dessas ações por um período predeterminado imediatamente após a oferta (geralmente 180 dias). O objetivo desta dissertação foi investigar se as ações das companhias listadas na Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo (BM&FBovespa) apresentam retorno anormal em virtude do vencimento do período de lockup de um IPO, no período de 2000 a 2010. Pelo método do estudo de eventos, examinaram-¬‐se 77 acordos de lockup que vedam os acionistas existentes de vender suas ações. Ao vencimento dos lockups, verificou-¬‐se a existência de retornos anormais acumulados negativos estatisticamente significantes em torno da janela do evento para as empresas da amostra que tinham como acionistas fundos de private equity e também para as empresas da amostra que atuam no setor de infraestrutura

Cette thèse est composée de trois essais qui étudient le déroulement des introductions en bourse. Dans le premier essai, nous examinons l’effet de la séparation propriété-contrôle sur la performance des offres publiques initiales (IPO) à long terme en France. En utilisant un échantillon de 351 entreprises françaises introduites en bourse sur la période 1997-2011, nous constatons que la séparation entre les droits de vote et les droits de propriété des actionnaires majoritaires est négativement associée à la performance à long terme des introductions en bourse. Cette constatation indique que les IPO ayant une structure de propriété dispersée sont moins performantes que les autres entreprises au cours de la période allant de 1 à 5 ans suivant l'offre initiale. Cette séparation incite les actionnaires dominants à retirer des avantages privés de contrôle au détriment des actionnaires minoritaires.Dans le deuxième essai, nous examinons le rôle des clauses de lock-up sur la précision des prévisions de résultat publiées dans le prospectus d'introduction en bourse. En utilisant un échantillon de 303 prévisions des entreprises françaises introduites en bourse entre 1997 et 2013, nous apportons la preuve que les introductions en bourse ayant plus d'actions à détenir, ainsi que celles qui choisissent des périodes de lock-up plus longues, sont plus susceptibles de divulguer des prévisions de résultats conservatrices et précises. Ces résultats sont robustes à un certain nombre de tests de sensibilité.Dans le troisième essai, nous étudions l'impact de la localisation géographique sur la sous-évaluation à court terme des introductions en bourse françaises. Les résultats montrent que les entreprises situées à proximité du centre financier parisien sont moins sous-estimées que les entreprises distantes. Ces résultats fournissent un support empirique à l'argument selon lequel l'incertitude sur la valeur des IPO augmente proportionnellement à la distance de Paris. En d'autres termes, la proximité géographique améliore la qualité des informations collectées sur les entreprises, ce qui réduit leurs coûts d'introduction en bourse et diminue le niveau des rendements initiaux. / This dissertation consists of three essays. In the first essay, we investigate whether the control-ownership divergence can explain IPO long-run performance in France. Using data from a sample of 351 French IPOs during 1997-2011, we find that the separation between ownership and control rights of the largest shareholder is negatively associated with long-term performance of French IPOs. This finding indicates that IPOs with disproportional ownership structure underperform other firms in the one- to five-year period following the initial offering. Such separation induces controlling shareholders to extract private benefits of control to the detriment of minority shareholders.In the second essay, we examine the effect of lockup agreements on management earnings forecasts in initial public offering (IPO) prospectuses. Using a sample of 303 forecasts of French firms that went public over the period 1997–2013, we find that IPOs with lockup clauses are more likely to disclose conservative profit forecasts. Moreover, we provide evidence that IPOs with more shares to lock up, as well as those selecting longer lockup periods, have more accurate management earnings forecasts. These results are robust to a number of sensitivity tests.In the third essay, we examine the impact of geographic location on the short–run underpricing of French initial public offerings (IPOs). The results show that firms located in close proximity to the financial centre, Paris, are less underpriced than distant ones. These findings provide empirical support to the argument that uncertainty about IPO value increases with distance from Paris. In other words, geographic proximity improves the quality of collected information on IPO firms, which lowers their costs of going public and decreases the level of initial returns.

企業上市的目的有很多種，我們認為一家公司若是為了替未來的投資機會融資而上市，其長期報酬應顯著較其他非為了投資機會籌資的公司為佳。結果我們發現，在一般認為可作為「籌資」的代理變數─「賣新股」的公司中，這些公司的長期負報酬程度比其他公司更嚴重。在發行股票種類的選擇上，選擇賣老股的公司相較之下有上市前公司獲利較佳、成立時間更久的特性；另一方面，訂較長閉鎖期的公司長期報酬也顯著比較差，這些公司募資的規模則較小、並且通常無創投參與。我們認為有兩種可能：(1) 以股票發行種類為上市目的的代理變數可能不盡理想；(2) 上市的成本超過欲上市籌資的公司經理人所估計。導致這些公司長期負報酬更加的嚴重。 / There are many reasons why companies go public. We suppose that companies going public to finance future investment should have better long-term performance than others. As a result, we find strong evidence that the long-term underperformance among primary-share only offering companies which are considered having motivation to finance future investment, are more severe than other companies. In the determinants of choosing which type of shares offering, a company which is old or have better return of equity before listing would have higher probability offering secondary shares. On the other hand, companies setting longer lockup period perform worse. These companies are usually small and have no venture capital backed. We propose two possible explanations to these situations: one is that using type of shares offering as a proxy of motivation of a firm going public is inappropriate; the other is that the cost of a firm going public is beyond a manager’s estimation, resulting the more poor long-term performance of these companies.