Guan Zhong's ancestral home "Ying Shang" was within Zheng's boundary. When Guan Zhong was young, he witnessed how Zheng Zhuang Gong built and ruled his hegemony. Therefore, the success of Zheng became the best blueprint for him to manage Qi. Guan Zhong emphasized on economic reform and strengthened commercial development. Furthermore, Qi's military reform also imitated Zheng by large increase in infantry. In less than five years, Guan Zhong helped Qi to become a "Ba". / The main reason for the rapid rise of Zheng in just a hundred years attributes mainly to Zheng Huan Gong's overcoming class differences and collaborating with the businessman, thus laying down a strong economic foundation for the East move. Moreover, Zheng Zhuang Gong had abandoned the traditional practice by using infantry to make up for the chariots shortage that led to victory in the Battle of Ruge is the turning point for the success of Zheng's hegemony. / The new order of the Spring and Autumn Period, which lasted for three hundred years, was established with Zheng Zhuang Gong's drawing the blueprint of hegemony, Guan Zhong's modification and implementation in Qi. / The Spring and Autumn Period is the turning point in Chinese history. In only three hundred years, the traditional cultural establishment and thoughts inherited from the ancient dynasties were totally reformed. Most of the scholars believe that the great changes of the Spring and Autumn Period began with the death of King You, and King Ping moved the court to eastern capital as they marked the downfall of monarchy and rapid rise of feudal Dukedoms. However, I believe that the rise of Zheng through the defeat King Huan in 715 BC in "The Battle of Ruge" is the crucial factor contributing to the great changes in the Spring and Autumn Period. / This thesis studies the rise of Zheng and its influence on the development of a new kind hegemony---"Ba" (Overlord) System. The first part of this thesis analyzes the historical background and factors of the rapid rise of Zheng. The second part focuses on how Guan Zhong (Qi's prime minister) reforms Qi on the Zheng model and helps Qi Huan Gong become the first "Ba" in the Spring and Autumn Period. / 張志勤. / 論文(哲學博士)--香港中文大學, 2005. / 參考文獻(p. 158-166). / Adviser: Lai Ming Chiu. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-07, Section: A, page: 2702. / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts also in English. / School code: 1307. / Lun wen (Zhe xue bo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2005. / Can kao wen xian (p. 158-166). / Zhang Zhiqin.

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At the tactical level of war the Germans are widely regarded as having had the most innovative and proficient army of World War I. Likewise, many historians would agree that the Germans suffered from serious, if not fatal, shortcomings at the strategic level of war. It is at the middle level of warfare, the operational level, that the Germans seem to be the most difficult to evaluate. Although the operational was only fully accepted in the 1980s by many Western militaries as a distinct level of warfare, German military thinking well before the start of World War I clearly recognized the Operativ, as a realm of warfighting activity between the tactical and the strategic. But the German concept of the operational art was flawed at best, and actually came closer to tactics on a grand scale. The flaws in their approach to operations cost the Germans dearly in both World Wars. Through a thorough review of the surviving original operational plans and orders, this study evaluates the German approach to the operational art by analyzing the Ludendorff Offensives of 1918. Taken as a whole, the five actually executed and two planned but never executed major attacks produced stunning tactical results, but ultimately left Germany in a far worse strategic position by August 1918. Among the most serious operational errors made by the German planners were their blindness to the power of sequential operations and cumulative effects, and their insistence in mounting force-on-force attacks. The Allies, and especially the British, were exceptionally vulnerable in certain elements of their warfighting system. By attacking those vulnerabilities the Germans might well have achieved far better results than by attacking directly into the Allied strength. Specifically, the British logistics system was extremely fragile, and their rail system had two key choke points, Amiens and Hazebrouck. During Operations MICHAEL and GEORGETTE, the Germans came close to capturing both rail centers, but never seemed to grasp fully their operational significance. The British and French certainly did. After the Germans attacked south to the Marne during Operation BLUCHER, they fell victims themselves to an inadequate rail network behind their newly acquired lines. At the operational level, then, the respective enemy and friendly rail networks had a decisive influence on the campaign of March-August 1918.

At the tactical level of war the Germans are widely regarded as having had the most innovative and proficient army of World War I. Likewise, many historians would agree that the Germans suffered from serious, if not fatal, shortcomings at the strategic level of war. It is at the middle level of warfare, the operational level, that the Germans seem to be the most difficult to evaluate. Although the operational was only fully accepted in the 1980s by many Western militaries as a distinct level of warfare, German military thinking well before the start of World War I clearly recognized the Operativ, as a realm of warfighting activity between the tactical and the strategic. But the German concept of the operational art was flawed at best, and actually came closer to tactics on a grand scale. The flaws in their approach to operations cost the Germans dearly in both World Wars. Through a thorough review of the surviving original operational plans and orders, this study evaluates the German approach to the operational art by analyzing the Ludendorff Offensives of 1918. Taken as a whole, the five actually executed and two planned but never executed major attacks produced stunning tactical results, but ultimately left Germany in a far worse strategic position by August 1918. Among the most serious operational errors made by the German planners were their blindness to the power of sequential operations and cumulative effects, and their insistence in mounting force-on-force attacks. The Allies, and especially the British, were exceptionally vulnerable in certain elements of their warfighting system. By attacking those vulnerabilities the Germans might well have achieved far better results than by attacking directly into the Allied strength. Specifically, the British logistics system was extremely fragile, and their rail system had two key choke points, Amiens and Hazebrouck. During Operations MICHAEL and GEORGETTE, the Germans came close to capturing both rail centers, but never seemed to grasp fully their operational significance. The British and French certainly did. After the Germans attacked south to the Marne during Operation BLUCHER, they fell victims themselves to an inadequate rail network behind their newly acquired lines. At the operational level, then, the respective enemy and friendly rail networks had a decisive influence on the campaign of March-August 1918.

No description available.