This thesis has investigated the underlying theory, and philosophy, which is presupposed by the method of structural analysis as it is often employed in the study of man. A distinction was drawn between two kinds of structuralism. The focus was on the brand of structuralism which appears to follow from a theory and a philosophy about man. It was argued that this more ambitious brand of structuralism is elevated to the level of scientific theory, based on a kind of materialistic determinism, and a theory of the unconscious.It was found that there is no reason to reject structuralism as a scientific theory on the basis that it does not conform to a conventional definition of science. The epistemological ramifications were considered. It was shown that there is a need for clarification and inter-disciplinary communication.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2003. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 327-353). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

This thesis involves an investigation of the value of traditional and self-generated fairy tales for children's educational and emotional development. The study draws on theories of analytical psychology and on models derived from structuralism. An analysis of two Icelandic traditional fairy tales, Golden Tooth and The Story of Princess Pussycat, is undertaken on a psychological and a narrative level. A comparison is made between the narrative structure of the tales and the structure of psychic processes identified in them. The study is taken further with an analysis of eleven fantasy tales generated during a field study by a group of ten to eleven year old Icelandic children. The mode of expression of the tales is also compared to the style, motifs, notion of time, setting, and characters, as they appear in traditional Indo-European fairy tales. The variants of the two traditional fairy tales analysed originate from Fljötshlic' a region in the south of Iceland. A study of the background, upbringing and personality of four women, who shared and brought further the story telling tradition in this area, is undertaken with the aim of throwing light on the nature of fairy tales and their transmission. The study suggests that patterns operating in the process of individuation, that is differentiation, transformation and integration, are embedded in the structure of traditional fairy tales. Furthermore it is proposed that this theory can be expanded to tales of fantasy generated by children of today. It is argued that the manifestation of these patterns in fairy tales embodies qualities that invite a creative operation in the interaction of children's conscious and unconscious psyche, thus simultaneously stimulating their directed and undirected modes of thinking, which is essential for the development of the creative, individual personality

M.A. (Psychology) / Please refer to full text to view abstract

published_or_final_version / English / Master / Master of Arts

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In his latest work, Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective, Bas van Fraassen has argued for a position he describes as empiricist structuralism. This position embraces a structuralist view of science which contrasts with increasingly popular structural realist accounts of science. Unlike structural realists about science, who argue that we can be realist about theoretical structure preserved across successive scientific paradigms, van Fraassen claims that this preserved structure is little more than the structure of our ordinary empirical observations. Those structural aspects of scientific theory which extend beyond this empiricist core can be regarded as purely theoretical postulates about which we are not entitled to be realist. In this way, van Fraassen maintains a common-sense realism about those observable objects and processes of everyday experience, while concurrently holding anti-realist views about those objects and processes which are unobservable. I argue, however, that on a more considered analysis, many of the most mundane objects and processes which van Fraassen wants to be realist about do not seem to meet his own criteria for observability. Once taken to its logical conclusions, empiricist structuralism leaves us in a far more anti-realist position than van Fraassen imagines and undermines many of the motivations for holding such a position at all. I offer alternative suggestions for a more plausible realist account of scientific practice.

In his latest work, Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective, Bas van Fraassen has argued for a position he describes as empiricist structuralism. This position embraces a structuralist view of science which contrasts with increasingly popular structural realist accounts of science. Unlike structural realists about science, who argue that we can be realist about theoretical structure preserved across successive scientific paradigms, van Fraassen claims that this preserved structure is little more than the structure of our ordinary empirical observations. Those structural aspects of scientific theory which extend beyond this empiricist core can be regarded as purely theoretical postulates about which we are not entitled to be realist. In this way, van Fraassen maintains a common-sense realism about those observable objects and processes of everyday experience, while concurrently holding anti-realist views about those objects and processes which are unobservable. I argue, however, that on a more considered analysis, many of the most mundane objects and processes which van Fraassen wants to be realist about do not seem to meet his own criteria for observability. Once taken to its logical conclusions, empiricist structuralism leaves us in a far more anti-realist position than van Fraassen imagines and undermines many of the motivations for holding such a position at all. I offer alternative suggestions for a more plausible realist account of scientific practice.

This thesis examines the connections between the motivations of ante rem structuralism and the problem of automorphism. Ante rem structuralists are led to the problem of automorphism because of their commitment to the thesis of structure-relative identity. Ladyman's and Button's solutions to the problem are both unsatisfactory. The problem can be solved only if ante rem structuralists drop the thesis of structure-relative identity. Besides blocking the problem of automorphism, there are further reasons why the thesis has to be dropped. (i) The purported metaphysical and epistemic purchase of adopting the thesis can be put into doubt. (ii) Primitive identity within a mathematical structure is more in line with ante rem structuralist's commitment to the faithfulness constraint and to the ontological priority of structure over positions. However, the cost of dropping the thesis is that ante rem structuralists cannot provide a satisfactory solution to Benacerraf's problem of multiple reductions of arithmetic.