<p>The position of the subsidiary CEO is characterized by its complexity in terms of the level of independence and control that s/he possesses. The subsidiary CEO is not only con-trolled by the parent company in certain aspects but in some cases also by the board of directors of the subsidiary. This raises questions about what the subsidiary CEO is left to decide by him/herself and if it is possible to infact categorize him/her as a middle manager? In order to gain more insight into these intriguing questions we formulated our purpose as follows: The purpose of this thesis is to examine how the subsidiary CEO controls the subsidiary consider-ing the dual role perspective. In addition, four research questions were formulated to support us in the search for answers to the amount of control that the subsidiary CEO has. The research questions were intended to the highlight the control aspect from different angles, and to discover what the parent company and board of directors controlled. In addition, we were also curious about whether it was possible for the subsidiary CEO to influence his/her superiors.</p><p>To enlighten us of the situation of the subsidiary CEO we made seven semi-structured interviews, whereof four with subsidiary CEOs. The three additional interviews were made with co-workers to the subsidiary CEOs. This was done to get a different perspective on the role of the subsidiary CEO. With the purpose and research questions as a base we asked questions on these topics and the answers were recorded and transcribed in order to give us a stable foundation to stand on before moving on to the analysis.</p><p>The findings confirmed our view that the CEOs in some cases, especially when it comes to larger financial decisions, are controlled by the parent company. Further, reports are sent regularly and the overall organizational vision has to be adopted by the subsidiary. On the other hand the subsidiary CEOs regards themselves as very independent when it comes to the management of the subsidiary. Indeed, we were able to see some general characteristics of the job of a subsidiary CEO, such as the freedom of formulating and implementing strategies for the subsidiary. In addition, they solely decide how to run the daily operations as well as deciding on questions concerning the personnel. Further, we conclude that the subsidiary CEOs can neither be categorized as merely a CEO or a middle manager, since our study shows that they are a combination of both. It is their level of independence which decides how to perceive their role and this varies from case to case. Finally, the level of control much depends on their relationship with the parent company as well as the sub-sidiary board of directors.</p>

The position of the subsidiary CEO is characterized by its complexity in terms of the level of independence and control that s/he possesses. The subsidiary CEO is not only con-trolled by the parent company in certain aspects but in some cases also by the board of directors of the subsidiary. This raises questions about what the subsidiary CEO is left to decide by him/herself and if it is possible to infact categorize him/her as a middle manager? In order to gain more insight into these intriguing questions we formulated our purpose as follows: The purpose of this thesis is to examine how the subsidiary CEO controls the subsidiary consider-ing the dual role perspective. In addition, four research questions were formulated to support us in the search for answers to the amount of control that the subsidiary CEO has. The research questions were intended to the highlight the control aspect from different angles, and to discover what the parent company and board of directors controlled. In addition, we were also curious about whether it was possible for the subsidiary CEO to influence his/her superiors. To enlighten us of the situation of the subsidiary CEO we made seven semi-structured interviews, whereof four with subsidiary CEOs. The three additional interviews were made with co-workers to the subsidiary CEOs. This was done to get a different perspective on the role of the subsidiary CEO. With the purpose and research questions as a base we asked questions on these topics and the answers were recorded and transcribed in order to give us a stable foundation to stand on before moving on to the analysis. The findings confirmed our view that the CEOs in some cases, especially when it comes to larger financial decisions, are controlled by the parent company. Further, reports are sent regularly and the overall organizational vision has to be adopted by the subsidiary. On the other hand the subsidiary CEOs regards themselves as very independent when it comes to the management of the subsidiary. Indeed, we were able to see some general characteristics of the job of a subsidiary CEO, such as the freedom of formulating and implementing strategies for the subsidiary. In addition, they solely decide how to run the daily operations as well as deciding on questions concerning the personnel. Further, we conclude that the subsidiary CEOs can neither be categorized as merely a CEO or a middle manager, since our study shows that they are a combination of both. It is their level of independence which decides how to perceive their role and this varies from case to case. Finally, the level of control much depends on their relationship with the parent company as well as the sub-sidiary board of directors.

This study of Taiwanese managers in overseas subsidiaries, the appointment of high thinking, because the layout of Taiwan businessmen in the world of enterprise, both in Europe and the United States or in mainland China and other places, almost all of its subsidiaries responsible for the nationals, rather than local nationals, and this practice with European and American foreign just the opposite. Taiwanese firms such practices, what reaction to what Taiwanese thinking. This study uses the case interview, a total of three Taiwanese high-end interview with a foreign manager, general manager for content analysis. The results showed that Taiwanese business culture heritage importance, that have a common intellectual culture can communicate seamlessly. Second, is the head of Taiwan to overseas subsidiaries as a reward for a job, people who have contributed to the company to get this position, the third, a complete financial system, local Taiwanese that if appointments to subsidiary responsible person, then the completeness of the financial system is essential, however, that this problem of foreign production, but also Taiwan's accounting system is the result of lack of transparency. Finally, Taiwan's Pan-Familism and views on human nature as "human nature is evil," the basic assumption that all is to allow Taiwan businessmen in overseas subsidiaries, the appointment of responsible persons, who take the nationality of the reasons for this appointment.