Ohio, Ohio State Univ., Diss.--Columbus, 2003. / Kopie, ersch. im Verl. UMI, Ann Arbor, Mich.

Sunk costs play a central role in antitrust economics, but are often misunderstood and mismeasured. I will try to clarify some of the conceptual and empirical issues related to sunk costs, and explain their implications for antitrust analysis. I will be particularly concerned with the role of uncertainty. When market conditions evolve unpredictably (as they almost always do), firms incur an opportunity cost when they invest in new capital, because they give up the option to wait for the arrival of new information about the likely returns from the investment. This option value is a sunk cost, and is just as relevant for antitrust analysis as the direct cost of a machine or a factory.

This dissertation reexamines the often cited conclusion in diplomatic crisis bargaining that sunk cost signals, such as military mobilization and arms races, are inefficient compared to tied hands signals. This conclusion ignores the the investment potential that the most frequent examples of sunk cost signaling have in terms of increasing preparedness for war. Through a novel game theoretic model, I demonstrate that signals with a sunk investment can be optimal in comparison to tied hands signals. The conclusion of the model suggests that signals with a sunk investment, such as mobilization, have value as a hedged bet against deterrence, increasing in value as the investment would make the state more powerful in war, the state is pessimistic about deterrence, and the state is risk averse. I contextualize these conclusions in historical case studies of the Berlin Crisis and NATO intervention in Kosovo.

No description available.

Universiẗat, Diss.--Köln, 2003.

Georg-August-Universiẗat, Habil.-Schr.--Göttingen, 2006.

No description available.

Infrastructure—communications, energy, transport, waste, and water networks—is critical for economic activity and social well-being. Practitioners, politicians, and economists advocate high levels of investment in infrastructure under the rubric of 'planning for growth' (or the 'push' paradigm). This paradigm relies on complex public-private arrangements in the name of public interest. These seemingly reasonable arrangements are, however, not delivering their promise. Evidence shows that the needs of infrastructure users in rich and poor countries are not being met, many private providers of infrastructure earn rich returns, assets are rarely built in time or on budget, and there is tremendous waste in the operation of many infrastructure industries. No other sector could survive the profligacy and slack common in infrastructure. I distil the following primary propositions of the accepted wisdom, which is inspired by mainstream economics: First, infrastructure assets necessarily entail high sunk costs and large economies of scale. Consequently, assets last for very long periods of time, and they cannot be readily moved. Second, infrastructure outputs are homogeneous. Third, one network fits all users (large and small). Fourth, infrastructure users, even large ones, are likely to have weak bargaining power in procurement of infrastructure outputs. I challenge these four propositions of the conventional wisdom by putting forward alternative hypotheses. First, instead of being monolithic and costly, infrastructures can be assembled (and disassembled) as flexible modules for specific users in specific places. Drawing on option pricing theory in quantitative finance, I recast infrastructures as 'portfolios of real options'. Second, infrastructure outputs are, in fact, heterogeneous and differentiated services. Third, one infrastructure network cannot fit all users, either today or in the future. Users are remarkably heterogeneous, not only in terms of unique user preferences but also in terms of spatial location. Infrastructure networks need to evolve in tandem with user needs or risk spatial, temporal, and relational obsolescence. Finally, users, large and small, are adept at exerting strong bargaining power in procuring infrastructure both prior to and after rendering durable and immobile investments. Users also strategically deploy intermediaries, e.g. futures and Over-the-Counter (OTC) exchanges, and real estate developers, to negotiate private contracts for infrastructure services. These findings are supported by two case studies. The first case study details the process by which ThyssenKrupp, a large steel company, bargained for its infrastructure by locating to a manufacturing site in the U.S. The second case study focuses on residents of Lavasa, one of the largest property developments in India. Here, small users of infrastructure exert strong bargaining power with the aid of intermediaries—the real estate developer and the property asset manager. New departures in infrastructure provision are urgently needed at a practical level. Poor investments rendered today—particularly if costly, inflexible, and durable—will suffocate tomorrow’s possibilities. The spatial, temporal, and relational approach proposed in this dissertation begins to offer an alternative account of how tomorrow can be modularly shaped.

Identificar los factores que influyen (o afectan) en el proceso de diseño de una política pública permite un análisis más certero de cómo es la política y cuáles serán sus tendencias en las siguientes fases del ciclo de política. Así encontramos que, en el caso peruano, los factores influyen de modo tal que las políticas públicas responden más a la posibilidad de acción de las instituciones del Estado que a la demanda de una acción pública. A través del análisis de la fase de diseño de la Política de Adaptación al Cambio Climático en el Perú podemos reconocer la naturaleza del proceso de toma de decisiones del Ministerio del Ambiente sobre la base de las alternativas propuestas (o impuestas) por actores dentro del sistema político peruano. Estos actores (sociales, institucionales e internacionales) configuran un espacio donde las prio- ridades (aparentemente estables) del ministerio se van restableciendo para hacerse viables a las demandas recibidas por el sistema a costa de la calidad de la propia política pública.