Orientador: Carlos Arthur Ribeiro do Nascimento / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-06T03:22:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Albertuni_CarlosAlberto_D.pdf: 1073887 bytes, checksum: 855e7c4c220904aa0e980ccfb0ff0de5 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006 / Resumo: Trata-se de uma investigação sobre a teoria dos primeiros princípios da razão prática na obra de Tomás de Aquino. No centro desta teoria está o termo 'sindérese¿, cujo conteúdo foi elaborado nas discussões da filosofia e da teologia medievais, a partir de sua menção na Glosa de Jerônimo a Ezequiel. Tal termo designa um conceito que apresenta um caráter inovador dentro da teoria da ação moral em comparação com a ética aristotélica, pois Tomás de Aquino o entende como o hábito dos primeiros princípios da moral, equivalente ao hábito dos primeiros princípios teóricos (intellectus principiorum) de Aristóteles. Dessa forma, o interesse é compreender como o conceito de sindérese é desenvolvido dentro da filosofia moral de Tomás de Aquino, visando detectar a estrutura conceitual na qual se localiza e se relaciona com outros conceitos importantes de sua filosofia moral, tais como, consciência, lei natural e prudência / Abstract: This work is an investigation of the theory concerning first principles of practical reason in the work of Thomas Aquinas. In the heart of this theory is the term 'synderesis¿, which content was built in the discussions of medieval philosophy and theology, from its mention in the Gloss of Jerome on Ezekiel. This term indicates a concept that presents a new character in the moral action theory in comparison with aristotelian ethics, since Thomas Aquinas understands it as the habit of moral first principles, equivalent to Aristotle¿s habit of theoretical first principles (intellectus principiorum). Thus, the purpose is to understand how the concept of synderesis is developed within moral philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, aiming to individuate the conceptual structure in which it is found and is related with other important terms of his moral philosophy as conscience, natural law and prudence / Doutorado / Doutor em Filosofia

This dissertation explores the development of the concept of synderesis between 1150 and 1450. In medieval moral psychology, synderesis referred to the innate capacity of the mind to know the first principles of natural law, or, alternatively, the will to follow these principles. But it was also interpreted as a mystical power of the soul, capable of uniting it to God. synderesis also appears in Late Medieval vernacular literature, as a character in moralising texts. By approaching synderesis from the point of view of conceptual history I synthesise these fields and explore how synderesis operated beyond the formal treatises of scholastic theology. Chapter two explores how synderesis developed in medieval scholasticism from Peter Lombard up to Thomas Aquinas. Chapters three and four explore how the mystical interpretation of synderesis first proposed by Thomas Gallus of Vercelli was incorporated into the mystical treatise Itinerarium mentis in Deum by Bonaventure of Balneoregio. Here, I analyse when, where and how Bonaventure integrated this mystical interpretation into his pre-existing moral-psychological interpretation of it and how his use of synderesis relates to the historical context in which the Itinerarium was written. I argue that synderesis should be seen as existing on a continuum of interpretations between moral psychology and mysticism. After Bonaventure and Aquinas, the concept undergoes a period of stagnation in academia, which is the subject of Chapter five. However, synderesis also appears in a number of non-academic texts in which the moral-psychological and mystical interpretations of the term coexist. Chapter six explores how Late Medieval vernacular authors drew on previous scholastic discussions of the concept. I focus here in particular on Guillaume de Deguileville's Le pèlerinage de l'âme, where synderesis appears not as the moral guide of the soul, but as the accuser of the soul before the court of heaven.