<div>Control-flow hijacking attacks allow adversaries to take over seemingly benign software, e.g., a web browser, and cause it to perform malicious actions, i.e., grant attackers a shell on</div><div>a system. Such control-flow hijacking attacks exploit a gap between high level language semantics and the machine language that they are compiled to. In particular, systems</div><div>software such as web browsers and servers are implemented in C/C++ which provide no runtime safety guarantees, leaving memory and type safety exclusively to programmers. Compilers are ideally situated to perform the required analysis and close the semantic gap between C/C++ and machine languages by adding instrumentation to enforce full or partial memory safety.</div><div><br></div><div><div>In unprotected C/C++, adversaries must be assumed to be able to control to the contents of any writeable memory location (arbitrary writes), and to read the contents of any readable memory location (arbitrary reads). Defenses against such attacks range from enforcing full memory safety to protecting only select information, normally code pointers to prevent control-flow hijacking attacks. We advance the state of the art for control-flow hijacking</div><div>defenses by improving the enforcement of full memory safety, as well as partial memory safety schemes for protecting code pointers.</div></div><div><br></div><div><div>We demonstrate a novel mechanism for enforcing full memory safety, which denies attackers both arbitrary reads and arbitrary writes at half the performance overhead of the</div><div>prior state of the art mechanism. Our mechanism relies on a novel metadata scheme for maintaining bounds information about memory objects. Further, we maintain the application</div><div>binary interface (ABI), support all C/C++ language features, and are mature enough to protect all of user space, and in particular libc.</div></div><div><br></div><div><div>Backwards control-flow transfers, i.e., returns, are a common target for attackers. In particular, return-oriented-programming (ROP) is a code-reuse attack technique built around corrupting return addresses. Shadow stacks prevent ROP attacks by providing partial memory safety for programs, namely integrity protecting the return address. We provide a full taxonomy of shadow stack designs, including two previously unexplored designs, and demonstrate that with compiler support shadow stacks can be deployed in practice. Further we examine the state of hardware support for integrity protected memory regions within a process’ address space. Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) is a popular technique for securing forward edges, e.g., indirect function calls, from being used for control-flow hijacking attacks. CFI is a form of partial memory safety that provides weak integrity for function pointers by restricting them to a statically determined set of values based on the program’s control-flow graph. We survey existing techniques, and quantify the protection they provide on a per callsite basis.</div><div>Building off this work, we propose a new security policy, Object Type Integrity, which provides full integrity protection for virtual table pointers on a per object basis for C++</div><div>polymorphic objects.</div></div>

Building Automation System (BAS) is a complex distributed control system that is widely deployed in commercial, residential, industrial buildings for monitoring and controlling mechanical/electrical equipment. Through increasing industrial and technological advances, the control components of BAS are becoming increasingly interconnected. Along with potential benefits, integration also introduces new attack vectors, which tremendous increases safety and security risks in the control system. Historically, BAS lacks security design and relies on physical isolation and "security through obscurity". These methods are unacceptable with the "smart building" technologies. The industry needs to reevaluate the safety and security of the current building automation system, and design a comprehensive solution to provide integrity, reliability, and confidentiality on both system and network levels. This dissertation focuses on the system level in the effort to provide a reliable computing foundation for the devices and controllers. Leveraged on the preferred security features such as, robust modular design, small privilege code, and formal verifiability of microkernel architecture, this work describes a security enhanced operating system with built-in mandatory access control and a proxy-based communication framework for building automation controllers. This solution ensures policy-enforced communication and isolation between critical applications and non-critical applications in a potentially hostile cyber environment.

Introduction Information technology security or computing system security is one of the most impor-tant issues that businesses all over the world strive to deal with. However, the world has now changed and in essential ways. The desk-top computer and workstation have appeared and proliferated widely. The net effect of all this has been to expose the computer-based information system, i.e. its hardware, its software, its software processes, its databases, its communications to an environment over which no one—not end user, not network admin-istrator or system owner, not even government—has control. Purpose Since IT security has a very broad spectrum and encompasses a lot of issues, we want to focus our research by taking a critical look at how business organizations manage IT secu-rity with specific emphasis on administrative and physical controls. Methods When the authors of this paper approached the topic to be studied it soon became evident that the most relevant and interesting task was not merely to investigate how business and non business organizations manage their IT security, but in fact try to understand what lies behind them. The purpose of this paper demands a deeper insight of how organizations address the issue of computer security; the authors wanted to gain a deeper understanding of how security issues have been addressed or being tackled by the organizations. Thus, the qualitative method was most suitable for this study. Conclusion Based on the chosen approach, the result of this study has shown that both business and non-business organizations located in Jönköping recognize the importance of IT security, and are willing to protect their systems from threats such as unauthorized access, theft, fire, power outage and other threats to ensure the smooth running of their systems at all times.

<p>Introduction</p><p>Information technology security or computing system security is one of the most impor-tant issues that businesses all over the world strive to deal with. However, the world has now changed and in essential ways. The desk-top computer and workstation have appeared and proliferated widely. The net effect of all this has been to expose the computer-based information system, i.e. its hardware, its software, its software processes, its databases, its communications to an environment over which no one—not end user, not network admin-istrator or system owner, not even government—has control.</p><p>Purpose</p><p>Since IT security has a very broad spectrum and encompasses a lot of issues, we want to focus our research by taking a critical look at how business organizations manage IT secu-rity with specific emphasis on administrative and physical controls.</p><p>Methods</p><p>When the authors of this paper approached the topic to be studied it soon became evident that the most relevant and interesting task was not merely to investigate how business and non business organizations manage their IT security, but in fact try to understand what lies behind them. The purpose of this paper demands a deeper insight of how organizations address the issue of computer security; the authors wanted to gain a deeper understanding of how security issues have been addressed or being tackled by the organizations. Thus, the qualitative method was most suitable for this study.</p><p>Conclusion</p><p>Based on the chosen approach, the result of this study has shown that both business and non-business organizations located in Jönköping recognize the importance of IT security, and are willing to protect their systems from threats such as unauthorized access, theft, fire, power outage and other threats to ensure the smooth running of their systems at all times.</p>

This thesis proposes two novel algorithms to analyze whether the power system loses synchronism subsequent to credible contingencies. The two algorithms are based on the concept of Lyapunov exponents (LEs) and the Prony analysis respectively. The concept of LEs is a theoretically sound technique to study the system stability of nonlinear dynamic systems. The LEs measure the exponential rates of divergence or convergence of trajectories in the state space. Considering the higher computational burden associated with the convergence of the true LEs, a modified algorithm is proposed to study the transient stability of the post-fault power system. It is shown that the finite-time LEs calculated by the modified algorithm accurately predicts the said stability. If the power system is transient stable, the rotor angle trajectories of the post-fault system exponentially decay with time. The damping ratios of the dominant oscillatory modes present in these power swings provide the indication on the oscillatory stability. The improved Prony algorithm presented in the thesis can be used to identify the oscillatory stability of the power system subsequent to a contingency. It is shown that that these new algorithms can be used in two applications in power systems, online dynamic security assessment and online oscillations monitoring. The proposed algorithm for rotor angle security assessment first uses the LEs-based algorithm to identify the transient stability. The stable cases are then processed by the improved Prony algorithm. The proposed online oscillations monitoring algorithm uses an event-detection logic and a parallel filter bank before applying the improved Prony algorithm on the measured response to extract the dominant oscillatory modes and to determine their frequencies and damping ratios. The suitability of the two algorithms for the aforementioned applications is investigated using different case studies. It is shown that the computational burdens of the two algorithms are acceptable for the online applications. Furthermore, the oscillations monitoring algorithm, extracts only the dominant modes present in the input signal, extracts both low-frequency inter-area modes and sub-synchronous modes, and performs well under noisy conditions. These features make it more appropriate for wide-area monitoring of power system oscillations using synchronized measurements. / February 2016

In todays heterogeneous network environment, there is a growing demand for distrusted parties to jointly execute distributed algorithms on private data whose secrecy needed to be safeguarded. Platforms that support such computation on image processing purposes are called secure image processing protocols. In this thesis, we propose a new security model, called quasi information theoretic (QIT) security. Under the proposed model efficient protocols on two basic image processing algorithms linear filtering and thresholding are developed. For both problems we consider two situations: 1) only two parties are involved where one holds the data and the other possesses the processing algorithm; 2) an additional non-colluding third party exists. Experiments show that our proposed protocols improved the computational time significantly compared with the classical cryptographical couterparts as well as providing reasonable amount of security as proved in the thesis

The proliferation of electronic devices supporting sensing, actuation, and wireless communication enables the monitoring and/or control of a variety of physical systems with digital communication. Such “cyber physical systems” blur the boundaries of the digital and physical worlds, where correct information about the physical world is needed for the correct operation of the digital system. Often in these systems the physical source or destination of information is as important as the information itself. However, the omni-directional and invisible nature of wireless communication makes it difficult to determine communication endpoints. This allows a malicious party to intercept wireless messages or pose as other entities in the system. As such, these systems require new protocols to associate the endpoints of digital communication with physical entities. Traditional security approaches that associate cryptographic keys with names can help verify endpoints in static systems where a string accurately describes the role of a device. In other systems, the role of a device depends on its physical properties, such as location, which change over time. This dynamic nature implies that identification of an endpoint based on a static name is insufficient. Instead, we can leverage devices’ sensing and actuation capabilities to verify the physical properties and determine the physical endpoints of communication. We investigate three different scenarios where the physical source and/or destination is important and propose endpoint verification techniques: verifying the physical endpoints during an exchange between two smartphones, verifying the receiver of information is in a physical space to enable location-based access control, and verifying the source of information to protect Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) applications. We evaluate our proposals in these systems and show that our solutions fulfill the security requirements while utilizing existing hardware. Exchanging Information Between Smartphones Shake on it (SHOT) allows users to verify the endpoints during an exchange of information between two smartphones. In our protocol, the phones use their vibrators and accelerometers to establish a human-observable communication channel. The users hold the phones together while the phones use this channel to bootstrap and verify the authenticity of an exchange that occurs over the higher-bandwidth wireless channel. Users can detect the injection of information from other devices as additional vibrations, and prevent such attacks. Our implementation of SHOT for the DROID smartphone is able to support sender and receiver verification during an exchange between two smartphones in 15 seconds on average. Location-Based Access Control We propose using location-based access control to protect sensitive files on laptops, without requiring any effort from the user to provide security. With a purely wireless electronic system, verifying that a given device is in a physical space is a challenge; either the definition of the physical space is vague (radio waves can travel beyond walls) or the solution requires expensive hardware to measure a message’s time of flight. Instead, we use infrared as a signal that walls can contain. We develop key derivation protocols that ensure only a receiver in the physical room with access to the signal can derive the key. We implement a system that uses the laptop’s webcam to record the infrared signal, derive a key, and decrypt sensitive files in less than 5 seconds. Source Verification for V2V Networks A number of V2V applications use information about nearby vehicles to prevent accidents or reduce fuel consumption. However, false information about the positioning of vehicles can cause erroneous behavior, including accidents that would not occur in the absence of V2V. As such, we need a way to verify which vehicle sent a message and that the message accurately describes the physical state of that vehicle. We propose using LED lights on vehicles to broadcast the certificate a vehicle is currently using. Receivers can use onboard cameras to film the encoding of the certificate and estimate the relative location of the vehicle. This visual channel allows a receiver to associate a physical vehicle at a known location with the cryptographic credentials used to sign a location claim. Our simulations indicate that even with a pessimistic visual channel, visual verification of V2V senders provides sufficient verification capabilities to support the relevant applications.

<p>As the need for large elections increases and computer networking becomes more widely used, e-voting has become a major topic of interest in the field of cryptography. However, lack of cryptography knowledge among the general public is one obstacle to widespread deployment. In this paper, we present an e-voting scheme based on an existing scheme. Our scheme features an efficient location anonymization technique built on homomorphic encryption. This technique does not require any participation from the voter other than receiving and summing location shares. Moreover, our scheme is simplified and offers more protection against misbehaving parties. We also give an in-depth security analysis, present performance results, compare our scheme with existing schemes, and describe how our research can be used to enhance cybersecurity education.</p>

Kernel-level malware is one of the most dangerous threats to the security of users on the Internet, so there is an urgent need for its detection. The most popular detection approach is misuse-based detection. However, it cannot catch up with today's advanced malware that increasingly apply polymorphism and obfuscation. In this thesis, we present our integrity-based detection for kernel-level malware, which does not rely on the specific features of malware. We have developed an integrity analysis system that can derive and monitor integrity properties for commodity operating systems kernels. In our system, we focus on two classes of integrity properties: data invariants and integrity of Kernel Queue (KQ) requests. We adopt static analysis for data invariant detection and overcome several technical challenges: field-sensitivity, array-sensitivity, and pointer analysis. We identify data invariants that are critical to system runtime integrity from Linux kernel 2.4.32 and Windows Research Kernel (WRK) with very low false positive rate and very low false negative rate. We then develop an Invariant Monitor to guard these data invariants against real-world malware. In our experiment, we are able to use Invariant Monitor to detect ten real-world Linux rootkits and nine real-world Windows malware and one synthetic Windows malware. We leverage static and dynamic analysis of kernel and device drivers to learn the legitimate KQ requests. Based on the learned KQ requests, we build KQguard to protect KQs. At runtime, KQguard rejects all the unknown KQ requests that cannot be validated. We apply KQguard on WRK and Linux kernel, and extensive experimental evaluation shows that KQguard is efficient (up to 5.6% overhead) and effective (capable of achieving zero false positives against representative benign workloads after appropriate training and very low false negatives against 125 real-world malware and nine synthetic attacks). In our system, Invariant Monitor and KQguard cooperate together to protect data invariants and KQs in the target kernel. By monitoring these integrity properties, we can detect malware by its violation of these integrity properties during execution.

<p>Ransomware, a form of malicious software, takes users’ files hostage via encryption and demands payment for their return. Since its inception, ransomware has branched into many different variants, some of which threaten users with scare tactics in order to evoke payment. For this study, four variants of ransomware were examined by presenting vignettes via an anonymous online survey. No actual malware was installed on any devices throughout this study. Their emotional responses were captured as well as their level of familiarity with information security. Responses to the survey after the simulated ransomware vignette were recorded to gauge how users would react to a ransomware attack. Data was analyzed to discover which types of ransomware evoked payment as well as if information security knowledge also had an effect on likelihood to pay. This data is intended to be used to develop better prevention methods and messaging, with an emphasis on promoting training on malware avoidance. The study found most individuals did not choose to pay, and this could be attributed to a distrust of the ransomware threat. Self-reported information security behavior appeared to decrease payment evocation, however, peer information security experience and prior exposure to malware appeared to increase payment evocation.</p>