Satellite navigation (such as GPS) has become widely successful and is used by billions of users daily. Accuratepositioning and timing has a wide range of applications and is increasingly being integrated in safety criticalsystems such as autonomous operations, traffic management, navigation for airplanes and other vehicles. Thesecurity and vulnerabilities of satellite navigation is however often not considered in the same way as for exampledata security, even though the high efficacy of spoofing with off-the-self software-defined radio (SDR) has beendemonstrated repeatedly. The lack of concern comes partially from the lack of options as satellite navigationauthentication has not previously existed in the civil domain.This work benchmarks the anti-spoofing and signal level measurements of commercial receivers in both simulatedand real-world scenarios and implements additional anti-spoofing measures. The additional anti-spoofingmeasures are implemented using no additional information than what the receiver should already have accessto in any modern commercial vehicle. Upcoming EU regulation 2021/1228 for vehicles used in internationaltransport will also mandate the use of these three anti-spoofing measures by August 2023. Here receiver time isverified by the means of Network Time Protocol (NTP) and real time clock (RTC); receiver motion is verifiedby the means of dead reckoning and inertial measurement unit (IMU); receiver navigation data is verified by themeans of asymmetric cryptography and Galileo Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OSNMA).The computational overhead is analyzed as well as cost and worldwide Market feasibility. We estimate thateven basic timing devices would only have to perform one NTP request every 17 days and a microcontrollerpowerful enough to do OSNMA costs less than $2. Finally, the benefits of multi-band receivers and futuredevelopments in both the user and space segments are discussed.