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This dissertation looks at the political behavior of three Taiwanese Buddhist organizations since 1989: the Buddhist Association of the Republic of China (BAROC), the Buddha Light Mountain monastic order (or Foguangshan) and the Buddhist Compassion Relief Tzu Chi Association (or Ciji). It concentrates on trying to understand the rationale behind the different strategies that each of them has adopted in its interaction with the government. The BAROC has adopted a strategy of lobbying in an attempt to remedy the steady decline of its status throughout the 1990s: it has tried to sway the government to adopt a law that would restore the authority over Buddhists the association held before 1989. Foguangshan has resorted to a strategy of remonstrance to advance its religious ideals between 1995 and 1997: its founder Xingyun supported the bid of his lay disciple Chen Lii'an for the presidency of the Republic of China (ROC) and launched large public demonstrations critical of the government that followed that election. During the same period of time, Ciji has steered away from the controversies over the law on religion and conspicuously avoided supporting Chen, while continuing to grow to become the largest organization of its kind in Taiwan. The theological views of the three organizations' leaders are examined as key factors explaining the rationale behind the political strategies these organizations have adopted. Other factors such as availability of material resources, lay support, congruence between leaders and their followers on the dimension of ethnicity and gender are explored as possible sources of constraints on the leaders.

This dissertation looks at the political behavior of three Taiwanese Buddhist organizations since 1989: the Buddhist Association of the Republic of China (BAROC), the Buddha Light Mountain monastic order (or Foguangshan) and the Buddhist Compassion Relief Tzu Chi Association (or Ciji). It concentrates on trying to understand the rationale behind the different strategies that each of them has adopted in its interaction with the government. The BAROC has adopted a strategy of lobbying in an attempt to remedy the steady decline of its status throughout the 1990s: it has tried to sway the government to adopt a law that would restore the authority over Buddhists the association held before 1989. Foguangshan has resorted to a strategy of remonstrance to advance its religious ideals between 1995 and 1997: its founder Xingyun supported the bid of his lay disciple Chen Lii'an for the presidency of the Republic of China (ROC) and launched large public demonstrations critical of the government that followed that election. During the same period of time, Ciji has steered away from the controversies over the law on religion and conspicuously avoided supporting Chen, while continuing to grow to become the largest organization of its kind in Taiwan. The theological views of the three organizations' leaders are examined as key factors explaining the rationale behind the political strategies these organizations have adopted. Other factors such as availability of material resources, lay support, congruence between leaders and their followers on the dimension of ethnicity and gender are explored as possible sources of constraints on the leaders. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

University of Macau / Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities / Department of Government and Public Administration

Labor market change in societies where an information economy is evolving, is a central area of concern for information society scholars today. While there has been considerable research conducted on cases of developed countries, research on labor market changes during a transition to an information economy outside of the advanced industrial economies is scarce. Thus, this dissertation proposes to examine the changes in wage, employment, and occupation structure that take place when an NIC, such as Taiwan, ushers in an information economy, and to explore the reasons behind these changes. This dissertation combined the historical, policy, and statistical analyses and concluded that the transformation from labor intensive manufacturing to an information intensive economy, as arranged by the Taiwanese government due to its own political and governing purposes, and also in the context of international political and economic circumstances, determined Taiwan’s economic resource arrangement, which resulted in an increasingly unbalanced labor market in terms of wage distribution, unemployment, and occupation structure. This transformation changed and shaped the structure of the labor market to benefit workers more skilled with information, more professional, having higher level knowledge and a higher level of education, while an increasing amount of white-collar and service workers began earning comparatively low wages. At the same time the demand for blue-collar and lower skill workers severely declined. Moreover, the total labor demand of information manufacturing and information intensive service is much less than that of traditional labor intensive manufacturing, resulting in Taiwan’s increasing unemployment problem. Among these processes, many different social, political, policy, and economic factors interacted and collectively determined this result. Among them, the role of the state in shaping Taiwan’s information economy in general and the labor market situation in particular did matter considerably. / text

Taiwan recently witnessed a sudden increase of opposition political activities among the Taiwanese. Given that the social, economic, political and cultural developments Taiwan experienced during the past four decades were expected to facilitate assimilation between the Mainlanders and the Taiwanese, the Taiwanese insurgence at this time was somewhat unexpected. To account for this development, this dissertation examines: (1) the causes and pattern of ethnic assimilation between the two groups; and (2) the connection of ethnic assimilation and the recent insurgence. The central thesis of this dissertation is that development of the opposition movement after 1986 was a result of a successful ethnic mobilization among the Taiwanese who rose to request for renegotiating the ethnic distribution of political power. The ethnic mobilization was facilitated by the change in the external environment of the movement, which included: (1) the increase of regime permissiveness, (2) the emerging opportunities of political competition, and (3) the emerging regional persistence of ethnic differences. Ironically, all three elements were caused by the pattern of ethnic assimilation. The main body consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 raises the question of the unexpected resurgence among the Taiwanese and proposes a framework of ethnic mobilization to its explanation. Chapter 2 provides a historical overview of the formation of the two ethnic groups, and patterns of intergroup relation during the past four decades. Chapter 3 examines two dimensions of cultural assimilation among the Taiwanese: language shift and identification with China. Using a survey data set collected by the Global Views Monthly in 1987, chapter 3 shows that the two major elements of ethnic differences were well preserved among the less-educated Taiwanese who reside outside the northern region of Taiwan. Chapter 4 investigates the alleged ethnic discrimination in the labor market by analyzing a data set coded from the Managers of the Creditable Enterprises in the R.O.C.. A pattern of ethnic assimilation similar to chapter 3 is found. Chapter 5 examines the various forms of participation in the opposition movement to test the ethnic mobilization argument. The development of the opposition after 1986 was found to begin in more assimilated areas and rapidly spread to the less assimilated areas through the tactic of ethnic mobilization. Chapter 6 draws a brief conclusion of what has been found.

This thesis is an investigation of the emergence of democracy and its localized culture in Taiwan during the Lee Teng-hui era and its legacy, from 1988 to 2004. From a Leninist authoritarian system, Taiwan experienced a peaceful transition to representative democracy. The establishment of the first opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), in 1986, and President Chiang Ching-kuo’s tolerance towards it, had signalled the commencement of Taiwan’s democratization. Various political opposition movements existed prior to 1986, especially between 1983 and 1986, indicating a gradual strengthening in the public’s political consciousness. The pivotal event to mark the democratization-localization movement in Taiwan was the emergence of a local Taiwanese, Lee Teng-hui, as President of the Republic of China and Chairman of the ruling party, the Chungkuo Kuomintang (KMT). This occurred when he succeeded Chiang Ching-kuo upon his death in 1988. Local politics henceforth emerged as a major force and KMT factional struggles had begun in earnest. During the democratic transformation that took place in Taiwan in the last quarter of the 20th century, the ruling power of the Waishengren political elite (that is, the Chinese who took over Taiwan in 1945) gradually transferred to local political leaders, and the suppressed issue of building an independent Taiwanese nation became politicized. Furthermore, the KMT itself was undergoing a far-reaching transformation, moving from liberalization, to democratization, to localization or Taiwanization. As a result, the issues of national recognition and the power redistribution of different national groups (from Chinese “Mainlanders” to local Taiwanese) had combined with democratization from the beginning. Democratization was assisted by institution-building through regular elections, an associated critical voice from opposition groups, a solid middle class, and the Taiwanization phenomenon itself. While the experience of colonial rule and an oppressive (rather than reformist) KMT may be said to be in the past, and hence less an impetus for action in the present, yet with the addition of a persistent military threat from People’s Republic of China seeking Taiwan’s “reunification” with the “motherland”, past, present and an anticipated future, combine contextually in the quest for Taiwan’s integrity – and hence the acquisition of an identity that is consciously Taiwanese rather than Chinese by default.

This thesis is an investigation of the emergence of democracy and its localized culture in Taiwan during the Lee Teng-hui era and its legacy, from 1988 to 2004. From a Leninist authoritarian system, Taiwan experienced a peaceful transition to representative democracy. The establishment of the first opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), in 1986, and President Chiang Ching-kuo’s tolerance towards it, had signalled the commencement of Taiwan’s democratization. Various political opposition movements existed prior to 1986, especially between 1983 and 1986, indicating a gradual strengthening in the public’s political consciousness. The pivotal event to mark the democratization-localization movement in Taiwan was the emergence of a local Taiwanese, Lee Teng-hui, as President of the Republic of China and Chairman of the ruling party, the Chungkuo Kuomintang (KMT). This occurred when he succeeded Chiang Ching-kuo upon his death in 1988. Local politics henceforth emerged as a major force and KMT factional struggles had begun in earnest. During the democratic transformation that took place in Taiwan in the last quarter of the 20th century, the ruling power of the Waishengren political elite (that is, the Chinese who took over Taiwan in 1945) gradually transferred to local political leaders, and the suppressed issue of building an independent Taiwanese nation became politicized. Furthermore, the KMT itself was undergoing a far-reaching transformation, moving from liberalization, to democratization, to localization or Taiwanization. As a result, the issues of national recognition and the power redistribution of different national groups (from Chinese “Mainlanders” to local Taiwanese) had combined with democratization from the beginning. Democratization was assisted by institution-building through regular elections, an associated critical voice from opposition groups, a solid middle class, and the Taiwanization phenomenon itself. While the experience of colonial rule and an oppressive (rather than reformist) KMT may be said to be in the past, and hence less an impetus for action in the present, yet with the addition of a persistent military threat from People’s Republic of China seeking Taiwan’s “reunification” with the “motherland”, past, present and an anticipated future, combine contextually in the quest for Taiwan’s integrity – and hence the acquisition of an identity that is consciously Taiwanese rather than Chinese by default.

The thesis looks at the question of political change in Taiwan. Specifically it examines the question of whether or not political liberalization has occurred simply as a result of economic development. The thesis also evaluates the extent of the political reform that has occurred. After examining a variety of information on the economic development and social changes, as well as the political history of the island, the thesis looks at specific political reforms. The conclusion is drawn that the process of political reform in Taiwan is not a carefully pre-determined plan on the part of the political elite. Rather, political reform is the response of the ruling Kuomintang to try and perpetuate their hold on power. Reforms occur only as they serve that particular goal. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

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