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The cyber domain poses great challenges to the existing international law framework, resulting in the international community's frustration in finding sustainable long-term solutions to the international regulation of cyberspace. This thesis reflects upon foundational concepts of the jus ad bellum framework, such as State sovereignty and the use of force. The principal issue discussed in this thesis is the emergence of a customary international norm prohibiting violations of sovereignty, essentially targeting lowintensity cyber attacks. Violations of sovereignty were classified as a primary rule in Rule 4 of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 (2017), which sparked a debate about the rule's true existence as a customary norm. This thesis assesses whether violations of sovereignty can currently be extrapolated as a primary rule of customary international law. It thereafter discusses the need for such a rule, as well as the risks of such a rule emerging as a customary norm.

This master thesis entitled Cybersecurity deals with cybersecuriy issue. The theoretical part defines basic concepts related to cybersecurity and cyber threats classification. The practical part deals with a case study regarding disputes between China and the US in cyberspace. The goal will be to test a hypothesis that China and the United States are at cyberwar with each other.

This study investigates the legal and ethical challenges posed by cyber warfare in the ongoing Russian-Ukraine war. Cyber warfare represents a transition from traditional conflict dynamics, impacting civilian populations and national security without direct physical confrontations. The significance of this research is the inadequacy of current legal norms that govern the rapidly evolving techniques of cyber-attacks which challenge established norms of International Humanitarian Law. Hence, the research question explores how cyber warfare challenges existing legal and ethical norms for civilian protection, and what the broader implications are for the regulation of modern conflicts. Through a qualitative case study approach, the thesis analyses three cases of Russian cyber-attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure: the 2015 attack on the Ukrainian power grid, the 2023 cyber-attack on Kyivstar, and the 2022 Asylum Ambuscade. In the simplified legal framework by Hoffman and Rumsey, these cases were analysed using the Tallinn Manual, and Mary Kaldor’s New Wars theory to highlight the challenges and violations of IHL. The findings conclude that the IHL framework is insufficient for the unique challenges of cyber warfare. Moreover, the study addresses for the revaluation and updating of international legal norms to keep up with the constant development of cyber warfare. In all, this thesis showcases the need for enhanced legal standards that can safeguard civilian populations and maintain international security, contributing to the fields of international law and conflict resolution.