In this thesis, a model of producer behavior for a regulated utility that fully takes into account the dynamic nature of the capital accumulation process of the firm is developed and empirically implemented using recent data on Bell Canada. On the basis of this model of producer behavior, loss formulae that approximate the value of foregone output due to imperfect regulation in a dynamic context are derived and estimates of the deadweight loss in the case of Bell are provided. The estimation results indicate the importance of dynamic elements, such as expectations and adjustment costs of investment, in modeling the behavior of Bell. They also suggest that rate of return regulation may have affected the investment decisions of the utility. / Arts, Faculty of / Vancouver School of Economics / Graduate

This thesis looks at the development of Canadian satellite policy between 1960 and 1980 through a study of the policy decisions relating to Telesat Canada, its specific corporate structure, and mandates and ownership patterns. The analysis draws upon a modified "interplay" model, which examines public policy as an amalgam of interacting ideas, interests and institutions. On the basis of available documents, supplemented by interviews, and supporting secondary analyses, the sometimes contradictory decisions made by the DOC and the CRTC with regards to Telesat's Agreement with the Trans Canada Telephone system during this period are argued to reflect a policy process driven by the interplay of competing views of Telesat's primary purpose and, by extension, competing visions of what constitutes the public interest.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

This dissertation addresses the issue of cost subadditivity of two Canadian telecommunications carriers, Bell Canada and Alberta Government Telephones (AGT). Multi-output, multi-input models of the production structure of Bell Canada and AGT are estimated under various alternative hypotheses. Subadditivity tests are conducted for both these companies in order to increase understanding of the issues concerning the deregulation of the Canadian telecommunications network and to assist policy makers in their decisions. / The hypothesis that both Bell Canada and AGT are natural monopolies cannot be rejected. Important cost savings are realized from having each of these firms alone in their respective markets producing the total of toll and local calls. Allowing competition in AGT's market would increase costs by approximately 20%, while costs in Bell Canada's market would increase by twice as much. It is found that Bell Canada's cost savings, though still quite important, are significantly reduced after 1983. Apparently, the high adjustment costs that Bell Canada incurs in installing new capital equipment, its organizational restructuring that followed the liberalization of customer premises equipment in 1982 as well as the recent technological changes may explain this turn-about in Bell Canada's cost structure. / We conclude that the 1985 Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission's (CRTC) decision not to deregulate Bell Canada's long distance public voice monopoly market (MTS and WATS) was socially optimal.