Using a panel data set on the local telecommunications companies reporting to the FCC for 1988-95, this paper investigates the subadditivity of the cost function, as well as technical and allocative inefficiency of the U.S. local telephone industry. The subadditivity test on the estimated translog cost function indicates that certain subdivisions of the monopolized regional markets between two hypothetical firms might lower total cost. However, the evidence is not as clear cut as in an earlier study by Shin and Ying (1992, RAND), with savings from a two-firm industry being negative on average over all possible two-firm output vector combinations. The results of the subadditivity test suggest that companies with a relatively high share of residential customers experience higher degrees of scale inefficiency. Specification of technical inefficiency as fixed company-specific effects results in a different efficiency ranking than the specification with random effects. The estimation results for the generalized (non-minimum) cost model suggest that capital is being under-employed relative to residual inputs. This finding does not support the theoretical prediction that an industry under rate of return regulation tends to over-employ capital relative to other inputs. The subadditivity test for the generalized cost function that accounts for technical and allocative inefficiency generated a much more favorable estimates of cost reductions from the subdivision of the monopolized markets than the test on the conventional specification of the cost function. The estimated losses from technical, allocative and scale inefficiency reflect potential gains from competition. / Graduation date: 1999

Thesis (M.S. in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy)--Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2007. / Title from title screen; viewed on July 9, 2007. "17 May 07." Electronic version of original print document. Includes bibliographical references (p. 78-83).

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Convergence has blurred the artificial limits that traditionally existed between separated sectors and services. In particular, technological convergence united cable and telephone networks as convenient platforms for the provision of numerous new telecommunications services. The advent of the Internet and the development of other services started a race for the acquisition of broadband transmission that has, in part, prompted a number of corporate mergers between the major telephone, cable, and Internet service providers. / This thesis analyzes the legal implications of the convergence of cable operators and telephone carriers in the United States of America (U.S.). The analysis was conducted in light of the 1996 Telecommunications Act's provisions, the Federal Communications Commission's reports and orders, and under the critical approaches of the cable and telephone industries. This thesis presents recommendations addressed to promote an equal regulatory treatment for all telecommunications competitors in the U.S.

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Using the tools of structural and network analysis developed by Ronald R. Burt and others, this study investigated the communication patterns among corporate officers of American Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (A.T. & T.) and United Telecommunications Corporation (Sprint). Data on contacts, efficiency, network density, and constraint indicate that opportunities for power and constraint have remained relatively stable at United Telecommunications between 1980 and 1990. A. A.T. & T., on the other hand, was more affected by the drastic changes in the telecommunication industry. The span of A.T. & T. has grown smaller and the potential for constraining relations among A. T. & T. and financial institutions has increased during the period 1980 and 1990.