Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2007. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 62-67).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago. / From Legal tender; a study in English and American monetary history (Decennial publications of the University of Chicago, 2d series, vol. VII).

Since its publication in 1914, readings of Tender Buttons have often found their interpretive anchor in the person of Gertrude Stein. Due in part to Stein’s enigmatic aura and self-created status as celebrity and genius, readings of the poem often conflate Stein with her work, using elements of her life to explain the inexplicable. My project examines this tendency by constructing a condensed critical history that focuses on the earliest responses to the work as well as recent and contemporary criticism. I question the efficacy of these readings, and in hopes of developing new approaches, I end my project by examining Stein’s own writings about writing and interacting with Tender Buttons. By suggesting new strategies and evaluating previous strategies, my project aims to encourage new ways of reading Tender Buttons that are less dependent on its authorial aura and can perhaps even lead to a more approachable, pleasurable reading experience.

Thesis (doctoral)--Christiani-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago. / From Legal tender; a study in English and American monetary history (Decennial publications of the University of Chicago, 2d series, vol. VII).

No description available.

Univ., Diss.--Groningen, 2005.

No description available.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Groningen, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 207-215) and index.

Auctions are a key economic mechanism for establishing the value of goods that have an uncertain price. In recent years, as a consequence of the ubiquitous emergence of technology, auctions can reach consumers, and as a result drive market prices, on a global scale. Collection of private information such as past trades exposes more information than desired by market participants. The leaked information can be statistically analyzed to provide auctioneers, or competitors, an advantage on future transactions. The need to preserve privacy has become a critical concern to reach an accepted level of fairness, and to provide market participants an environment in which they can bid a true valuation. This research is about possible mechanisms to carry out sealed-bid auctions in a distributed setting, and provides the reader with the challenges that currently persevere in the field. The first chapter offers an introduction to different kinds of auction, and to describe sealed-bid auction. The next chapter surveys the literature, and provides necessary theoretical background. Moving on to chapter 3, instead of solely focusing on theoretical aspects of sealed-bid auctions, this chapter dives into implementation details, and demonstrates through communication and computational analysis how different settings affect performance. / Includes bibliography. / Thesis (M.S.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2018. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection