This thesis looks at the Indonesian government’s strategy for managing the threat of terrorism between 2001 and 2006. Various socio-political factors such as the importance of Islam in Indonesian society and politics, ongoing democratization and important civil-military reform all contribute to an environment where counterterrorism efforts are both necessary and politically risky. In order to better address the many complexities of the Indonesian case study, this thesis uses a modified securitization theory framework which gives increased weight to the political and social context in which securitization decisions are made. The modified framework disaggregates the decision of an agent to rhetorically securitize an issue from the decisions behind subsequent policy actions, and considers separately the motivations behind each. When applied to the Indonesian case study this modified framework reveals that between 2002 and 2006, President Megawati Soekarnoputri and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono managed terrorism by employing a combination of securitizing and criminalizing strategies. It additionally reveals that for each president the non-discursive policy action was not solely result of the success or failure of discursive securitization, but was also dependent on the specific political environment each faced.

This thesis looks at the Indonesian government’s strategy for managing the threat of terrorism between 2001 and 2006. Various socio-political factors such as the importance of Islam in Indonesian society and politics, ongoing democratization and important civil-military reform all contribute to an environment where counterterrorism efforts are both necessary and politically risky. In order to better address the many complexities of the Indonesian case study, this thesis uses a modified securitization theory framework which gives increased weight to the political and social context in which securitization decisions are made. The modified framework disaggregates the decision of an agent to rhetorically securitize an issue from the decisions behind subsequent policy actions, and considers separately the motivations behind each. When applied to the Indonesian case study this modified framework reveals that between 2002 and 2006, President Megawati Soekarnoputri and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono managed terrorism by employing a combination of securitizing and criminalizing strategies. It additionally reveals that for each president the non-discursive policy action was not solely result of the success or failure of discursive securitization, but was also dependent on the specific political environment each faced.

This thesis looks at the Indonesian government’s strategy for managing the threat of terrorism between 2001 and 2006. Various socio-political factors such as the importance of Islam in Indonesian society and politics, ongoing democratization and important civil-military reform all contribute to an environment where counterterrorism efforts are both necessary and politically risky. In order to better address the many complexities of the Indonesian case study, this thesis uses a modified securitization theory framework which gives increased weight to the political and social context in which securitization decisions are made. The modified framework disaggregates the decision of an agent to rhetorically securitize an issue from the decisions behind subsequent policy actions, and considers separately the motivations behind each. When applied to the Indonesian case study this modified framework reveals that between 2002 and 2006, President Megawati Soekarnoputri and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono managed terrorism by employing a combination of securitizing and criminalizing strategies. It additionally reveals that for each president the non-discursive policy action was not solely result of the success or failure of discursive securitization, but was also dependent on the specific political environment each faced. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2002. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 199-206).

The study is based on the hypothesis that there are forces of influence that push a group from extremism to terrorism. While not all groups make the shift to terrorism, there are inherent forces within the radical group that influence the course of action undertaken by groups. The study examines 10 radical groups in Indonesia and explores the question: How do ideology, leadership and group dynamics play a significant role in the radical groups in Indonesia? The study explored groups within a broad cross-section of terrorist and extremist groups that have either been in operation or are currently in operation in Indonesia The groups examined were Lashkar Jihad (LJ), Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Darul Islam (DI), Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Negara Islam Indonesia (NII), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HT), Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia (MMI), Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), Al Qaeda Indonesia (AI) and Mujahideen Indonesia Timur (MIT). The study highlights that groups are able to sustain themselves on the path of terrorism if there is a unique confluence of a politicised ideology, presence of influential leadership and group dynamics. Based on 124 interviews and questionnaires of terrorist and extremist leadership and cadre, the study sheds light on unique dynamics within these groups in Indonesia. In an examination of the 10 radical groups, this study shows that the very factors that often influences the radicalisation of individuals on the pathway of terrorism – ideology, charismatic leadership and community affiliation through group dynamics also in turn influence the course of action of groups as a whole.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2002. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 199-206).