Il est assez difficile pour la jeune génération d’électeurs démocrates qui ont contribué à porter Barack Obama au pouvoir en 2008 et 2012 d’imaginer l’état de déroute dans lequel se trouvait le parti démocrate après les victoires électorales de Ronald Reagan en 1980 et 1984. Obama doit sa double élection à la fois à l’efficacité de ses campagnes et aux changements qui ont affecté le parti démocrate depuis les années 1980. Certes, les élus démocrates n'avaient pas attendu l'échec humiliant de Jimmy Carter en 1980 pour engager un travail de réflexion mais c'est pendant les années Reagan que certains démocrates influents commencèrent à se mettre concrètement au travail. Le Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) fut la pièce maîtresse d'une sorte d'aggiornamento politique et idéologique qui permit au parti démocrate de reconstituer ses forces en moins de dix ans et de reconquérir la présidence en 1992 avec l’élection de Bill Clinton. Depuis le début des années 1980 jusqu’à sa disparition en 2011, le DLC se consacra à la modernisation idéologique du parti démocrate. / It is quite difficult for the young generation of Democratic voters who contributed to bring Barack Obama into power in 2008 and 2012 to imagine the electoral losing streak the Democratic Party endured after Ronald Reagan’s electoral victories in 1980 and 1984. Obama owes credit to both his efficient campaigns and the changes which have affected the Democratic Party since the 1980s for winning the executive office twice. The Democratic elected officials certainly had not waited for Jimmy Carter’s humiliating defeat in 1980 to reflect upon the situation but it is during the Reagan years that some Democratic influential members started taking action. The Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) became a key part of a sort of political and ideological aggiornamento which allowed the Democratic Party to rebuild its forces in less than ten years and to win back the executive office in 1992 with Bill Clinton’s election. From the early 1980s to its dissolution in 2011, the DLC devoted itself to the ideological modernization of the Democratic Party.

This dissertation uses Critical Discourse Analysis to study debates among elite members and affiliates of the Democratic Party from 1988-2008 on class issues and their relevance to the party's environmental agenda. This research builds off of several related historical and theoretical accounts (both primary and secondary) of new social and economic divisions between college-educated and non-college educated workers that have shaped American politics since the 1970s. I focus on how Democratic interest in environmentalism changed as a 'professional-managerial-class' or 'new class' supplanted unionized, industrial workers as the primary social base of the Democratic party. I trace how related people and groups associated with the party understood the relevance of these different classes to consolidating enduring electoral power, and how these informed specific arguments for what ideological views or policy proposals the party should publicly embrace. Furthermore, I identify 'green' narratives related to environmental protection, as an emerging thematic framework that some Democrats felt could help them build a coalition based primarily around support from educated, white-collar workers. I contend that the ideological character of the party's environmental rhetoric, as articulated in this debate, has been influenced mostly by attempts to tailor the party's agenda to the perceived sensibilities of the college-educated, rather than the older working-class base. My analysis proposes three overarching core concepts most often ascribed to the professional class and its members' ideological disposition. I use the discursive method described above to explore their relationship to the framing of the climate issue and its connection to broader ideological values. These are (A) Meritocracy (B) Technocratic Rationality, and (C) Individualism. I argue these professional-oriented climate narratives can be understood as adapting the conceptual reasoning of an older liberal tradition to the structural conditions of the post-70s, globalized economy. Specifically, that the frequent emphasis on these three concepts implicit to the PMC-centric discourse is consistent with a liberal view of freedom as 'non-interference', and a related hostility to democratic interventions into the market. This ideological analysis is significant to the dissertation's focus on framings of climate change because an account this conceptual logic reveals the potential limits of the Democrats' efforts to create majoritarian, political support for environmental protection. / Doctor of Philosophy / This dissertation provides an analysis of debates among elite members and affiliates of the Democratic Party from 1988-2008 on class issues and their relevance to the party's environmental agenda. This investigation is informed by existing accounts of the social and economic divisions between college-educated and non-college educated workers that have shaped American politics since the 1970s. I focus on how Democratic interest in environmentalism developed as a 'professional-managerial-class' or 'new class' supplanted unionized, industrial workers as the primary social base of the Democratic party. I trace how related people and groups associated with the party understood the relevance of these different classes to winning future elections, and how these informed specific arguments for what ideological views or policy proposals the party should publicly embrace. Furthermore, I identify 'green' narratives related to environmental protection, as an emerging thematic framework that some Democrats felt could help them build a coalition based primarily around support from educated, white-collar workers. There are two narratives about class and its relevance to the party that recur frequently in these sources. The first advocates for a coalition made up primarily by the working-class, conceived of as wage-earning, high-school educated voters working in domestically bound, blue collar industries. The second argues the party should build a coalition made up of a professional-managerial class—referred to as the "symbolic analysts", "the rising learning class", "ideapolis dwellers", or "wired workers"— conceived of as affluent, well-educated professionals working in globally integrated sectors of a high-tech "new economy". Each of these views are based on identifying specific ideological sensibilities with the respective classes, which then justify arguments for particular framings of the party's identity and policy agenda. I contend that the ideological character of the party's public philosophy, as articulated in this debate, has been influenced mostly by attempts to tailor the party's agenda (or rhetoric) to the perceived sensibilities of the college-educated, rather than the older working-class base. I show that this was motivated by a belief that a coalition built around votes from the PMC would serve as a more reliable electoral base in a political environment where it was difficult to build support through redistributive, New Deal-style policies as the party had done since the 1930s. Some members perceived the professionals' investment in a post-material "New Politics" or "progressive centrism" as an alternative. The college-educated, they argued, could be motivated to support the Democrats on cultural grounds, allowing the party to embrace more free-market policies. In addition, several figures, including Chuck Schumer, Bill Clinton, and Al Gore argued that environmentalism could or should serve as the foundation of this progressive centrist version of the party, because of green issues' supposed compatibility with a 'pro-business', market-based agenda.