Thesis (M.A.)--University of Texas at El Paso, 2008. / Title from title screen. Vita. CD-ROM. Includes bibliographical references. Also available online.

Thesis (M.S.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1967. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Inaug. Diss.--Bonn. / Bibliography: p. 221-232.

No description available.

The end of the Cold-War has seen a change in the global security situation with the emergence of transnational non-state security threats. Developing the idea that states disconnected from the process of globalization pose a security threat to the US (Barnett, 2004), I contend that transnational non-state threats to global security thrive in such disconnected societies. I propose the idea of humanitarian preemption whereby preventive humanitarian action is taken under the aegis of the United Nations to alleviate the problem of disconnectedness among states. I explore the issues of UN capacity, state sovereignty and prescribe a blueprint for UN action against terrorism.

This thesis examines compliance with international human rights law in United Nations (UN) operations. It focuses on the provision of emergency humanitarian assistance, and on the assumption of administrative powers by the UN both de Jure (international administrations of territory) and de facto (refugee camps). It is argued that in these operations the UN has the functional capacity to have a direct impact on individuals and on the enjoyment of their fundamental rights. In part using case studies (the provision of humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, the UN administrations in Kosovo and East Timor, and refugee camps in Kenya), it is shown that acts in violation of human rights have indeed been committed in the course of these operations. Although the UN is not itself a party to human rights treaties, various arguments are made to justify the applicability of international human rights law to the UN, and to its specialised programmes and agencies. Mechanisms - political, administrative, judicial and semi-judicial - for ensuring the accountability of the UN for violations of human rights are examined. However, existing mechanisms are largely inadequate. They neither offer remedies to the victims of the violations, nor impose sanctions on the perpetrators; their ability to modify future institutional conduct is also limited.

This thesis examines the impact of security sector reform in peacebuilding operations on the process of democratisation, with reference to the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) between the signing of the peace agreement in November 1995 and the parliamentary elections of November 2000. A hard realist model has been applied in BiH but has not significantly helped democratisation, leaving the nationalist power structure largely untouched because of two factors: the structure of the agreement itself, tom between its separatist and re-integrationist provisions, and the incoherence of the international community with regard to security sector reform in BiH. The Bosnian predicament demonstrates the potential of a hard realist/liberal model of peacebuilding. It is argued here that it is less the nature of the model itself, which combines a hard realist approach to SSR with efforts at democratisation, that determines the success of the democratisation effort than the place of SSR within the overall peacebuilding process, as well as the roles played by third parties and the extent of their commitment in pushing democratisation forward.

Thesis (Ph. D., Political Science)--University of Idaho, May 2007. / Major professor: Jack E. Vincent. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 249-257). Also available online (PDF file) by subscription or by purchasing the individual file.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Fribourg. / Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (p. [210]-223).

Thesis (M.A.) in Liberal Studies--University of Maine, 2005. / Includes vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 68-71).