Thesis (Ph.D.)--Ohio University, March, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 313-330)

Thesis (M.S. in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy)--Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2007. / "5 April 2007." "National Defense Univ Norfolk VA"--DTIC cover. AD-A468 782. Includes bibliographical references (p. 97-101). Also available via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (M.A.)--Baylor University, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 134-139).

Dissertation (Ph.D.) -- The Institute for Clinical Social Work, 1994. / A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the Institute of Clinical Social Work in partial fulfillment for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 134-137).

English Studies / (M.A. (English))

In 1898 the Philippines became a colony of the United States, the result of American economic expansion throughout the nineteenth century. Having been granted independence in 1946, the nominally sovereign Republic of the Philippines remained inextricably linked to the US through restrictive legislation, military bases, and decades of political and socio-economic patronage. In America’s closest developing world ally, and showcase of democratic values, Filipino President Ferdinand Marcos installed a brutal dictatorship in 1972, dramatically marking the end of democracy there. US foreign policy, from the inception of the US-Philippine partnership, failed to substantially resolve endemic poverty and elite political domination. During the Cold War, the discourse through which State Department policy was conceived helped perpetuate these unequal conditions, whilst also at times explicitly encouraging authoritarian solutions to domestic problems. As the Cold War escalated through the 1960s, especially in Vietnam, US officials insisted the Philippines provide military and ideological solidarity with US Cold War objectives at the expense of effectively addressing the roots of domestic instability. The Philippine example serves as the clearest case of the outcomes and impact of US foreign policy across the developing world, and thus must be considered an essential starting point when considering the United States’ Cold War experience. Based on extensive primary research from across the United Kingdom and the United States, this thesis re-examines and re-connects the historiography of colonialism, neo-colonialism, Southeast Asia, and Cold War studies. Nowhere did the US have such a long and intimate history of influence and partnerships than in the Philippines, and yet Marcos’s regime emerged there; this dissertation presents an analytical lens through which to measure the role of US foreign policy in creating a dictatorship.

Vietnam War literature is a reflection of a sustained tension between politics and history on the one hand and morality and the effect of the war on human nature on the other hand. Although the authors under discussion urge the reader to forget the political, moral and historical milieu of the Vietnam War, it is impossible to separate the war from those three factors and by extension, the literature that stems from it. I have chosen Philip Caputo’s A Rumor of War (1977) and Robert Mason’s Chickenhawk (1983) because I think they represent, perhaps in the simplest and least obtrusive way, the voices of 55 000 men whose names appear on a black, granite wall in Washington. The authors chose to write their respective memoirs for the Everyman who died in, or lived through, the aberration that was Vietnam. Through their reconstruction of the war and their experiences, they keep the demand for recognition of those who fought (whether morally sanctioned or not) in Vietnam for their country. While American society tried to force the war from its psyche because so many of them thought it was unjust, immoral and unnecessary, authors like Caputo and Mason demanded that the nation examine itself on the whole and reconsider its political endeavours. But perhaps one of the starkest revelations is their portrayal of the corruption of innocence, loyalty and idealism of those soldiers who represented their country abroad.

The United States was throughout the history engaged in several conflicts which had a character of counterinsurgency. These are - among others- War in Vietnam and second War in Iraq. These two conflicts are examined in this diploma thesis. Author poses a question how did counterinsurgency tactics evolved in both conflicts. The second question is whether the United States implemented counterinsurgency experiences from Vietnam War in Iraq War and if so, how they were implemented. The United States developed several counterinsurgency programs and the most of them were successful - they prevented Vietcong from spreading its influence in South Vietnam. However these programs were often poorly financed, or they did not gain enough support from The US Army, because the Army prefered conventional approach in fighting against communists. The United States fought a conventional warfare in the first few years of Iraq War and it had not succeeded in garnering popularity among civilians. The change came with a new commander- general David Petraeus. Petraeus was inspired by the experiences from the Vietnam War (and other conflicts) and he concentrated his effort on providing safety to Iraqi population. This strategy paid off and the Army had much less losses during his command then during the pre - 2007 period....

Robert S. McNamara served as U.S. Secretary of Defense (SOD) for Presidents John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. McNamara participated in the Cuban Missile Crisis negotiations in 1961 and became a key formulator of Vietnam policy. This thesis challenges scholarship that characterizes McNamara as a fierce hawk who relentlessly executed military escalation in Vietnam. By drawing parallels between McNamara’s role in the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Vietnam War, and by exploring how McNamara’s concept of loyalty to the presidency influenced his decisions, this thesis argues that the SOD was willing to escalate the situation militarily as a form of political communication with the adversary. To McNamara, military pressure was a means to create avenues for diplomacy. McNamara became increasingly uncomfortable – and ultimately resigned in 1968 - when the Johnson administration pursued military escalation without an organized campaign towards negotiations. He was therefore not as hawkish as other scholars have claimed. / Includes bibliography. / Thesis (M.A.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2020. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection

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