<p>Between 1964 and 1975, approximately 7,500 to 11,000 American military women served in the Vietnam War. They served in many roles – they worked as air traffic controllers, dieticians, physiotherapists, clerks, and cryptographers – but the bulk of American women who went to Vietnam served as military nurses with the Army, Navy, and Air Force Nurse Corps. This dissertation explores the wartime and homecoming experiences of female nurse veterans whose Vietnam experiences have been largely ignored or minimized by historical accounts of the war. By refashioning the narrative of the war to include women, this study challenges cultural constructions of war as an exclusively male sphere, and in doing so offers a more sophisticated understanding of both men’s and women’s Vietnam service.</p> <p>In Vietnam, American women risked their lives for their country. Motivated by a blend of patriotism, humanitarianism, professional advancement, and educational opportunity, female nurses volunteered for war at a time when many young men sought to evade military service. Yet the women who served have been consistently denied the rewards of their sacrifice. After the war, sexist attitudes about who is eligible for the privileges which accompany military service led the VA to routinely deny veterans entitlements including health care and disability pensions to female military nurses. Efforts to memorialize the war, through their focus on male veterans’ experience, relegated women’s service in Vietnam to the periphery of public memory. Based primarily on oral history interviews with 29 female military nurses who served in the war, this dissertation reveals women’s agency through an exploration of their responses to these and other gendered challenges associated with their military service, and exposes the connection between public memory and women’s access to the benefits bestowed upon martial citizens.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

This dissertation examines the early U.S.-D.R.V. relationship by analyzing related myths and exploring Viet Minh policies. I go beyond the previous literature to examine the Viet Minh government's modernization and anti-imperialist projects, both of which proved critical to D.R.V. policy evolution and the evolution of a new national identity. During the French era, as Vietnamese thinkers rethought the meaning of "being Vietnamese," groups like the Viet Minh determined that modernization was the essential to Vietnam's independence and that imperialist states like the U.S. posed a serious threat to their revolution and their independence. I argue that D.R.V. officials dismissed all possibility of a real alliance with the U.S. long before 1950. Soviet and Chinese mentors later provided development aid to Hanoi, while the D.R.V. maintained its autonomy and avoided becoming a client state by seeking alliances with other decolonizing countries. In doing so, Vietnamese leaders gained their own chances to mentor others and improve their status on the world stage. After Geneva, Hanoi continued to advance modernization in the North using a variety of methods, but its officials also heightened their complaints against the U.S. In particular, the D.R.V. denounced America's invasion of South Vietnam and its "puppet" government in Saigon as evidence of an imperialist plot. In advocating an anti-imperialist line and modernized future, D.R.V. leaders elaborated a new national identity, tying modernization and anti-imperialism inextricably to "being Vietnamese." Yet modernization presented serious challenges and Hanoi's faith in anti-imperialism had its drawbacks, limiting their ability to critique and evaluate the U.S. threat fully. / History

This paper represents original research in the UNICEF archives and illuminates the case study of this particular intergovernmental organization (IGO) during the period of the Korean War through the Vietnam War (1948-1975). It investigates the complex issues raised by the intersection of power politics and humanitarian impartiality. It argues that historians must take intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) seriously in their attempt to accurately interpret the historical record. The story of UNICEF during the Korean War charts a familiar narrative where superpower rivalries served to derail the good intentions of this purportedly impartial intergovernmental organization. However, the case study of UNICEF in Vietnam is a surprising example of the rising influence and impact of IGOs and INGOs on the international scene. By balancing its associations across the East-West divide and riding a wave of increasingly international sentiment worldwide, UNICEF navigated a treacherous political arena and realized new heights of its goal of impartiality even before the cessation of war in Vietnam. In a dramatic show of their expanding influence, UNICEF played a pivotal role in improving relations between the United Nations and North Vietnam. / History

This dissertation examines the relationship between intelligence analysis and policy formation during the Vietnam War from 1962 to 1968. Rooted in a multidisciplinary approach that draws from history and international relations theory, it argues that Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, along with most of their top advisors, used intelligence analysis to confirm their preconceived notions about the U.S. war effort in Vietnam. Both presidents and the majority of their advisors all agreed that while victory in Vietnam would be difficult, allowing the Republic of (South) Vietnam (RVN) to fall to Communism was unthinkable. They filtered out intelligence analyses that suggested the U.S. could not win or that its geopolitical position could withstand the RVN’s loss. JFK and LBJ’s national security decision-making system enabled this dysfunctional use of intelligence. Both presidents relied on an ad hoc system of policy formation in which major policy decisions took place in informal meetings staffed only by their most trusted advisors. Doing so allowed either president or their advisors latitude to expel intelligence officers from critical meetings for any reason. Analysts who became bearers of bad news on the war effort or developed negative personal relationships with any influential member of the administration risked banishment to the policy wilderness. On the other hand, analysts who reinforced their customers’ preconceptions received more access to policy circles. Top Kennedy and Johnson administration officials abused intelligence in several different ways. Ignoring or disregarding analyses that cast doubt on the war effort’s prospects was most common. In such cases, officials favored more optimistic reporting or used their own reasoning. In doing the latter, most policymakers and military officials based decisions on personal insecurity, rigid anti-Communism, previous personal experiences during World War II, and interpretations of history that justified American involvement in Vietnam. They also “cherry-picked” or pulled language from analyses that justified their positions while ignoring language elsewhere in the same reports that did not. And when the war became more controversial within the Johnson administration in 1967, some pro-war officials began openly politicizing intelligence, or pressuring analysts to advance a particular conclusion regardless of evidence. Finally, gaps in intelligence collection and analytic tradecraft worsened the intelligence community’s standing during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Throughout the war, American intelligence collectors were unable to break the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam’s high-level communication codes or recruit any defectors or spies within the Hanoi government. Analysts thus used less reliable evidence, which weakened the reliability of their conclusions. Many analysts did not even cite sources at all. Analysts also used vague language that made their findings appear untrustworthy. All of these factors made Vietnam-era intelligence analyses easier for their readers to ignore. The result was flawed policy and strategy in Vietnam. / History

A delayed type of combat-related disorder among Vietnam veterans has resulted in increasing numbers of such veterans seeking mental health assistance and the inclusion of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a new classification in the DSM III. With symptoms of re-experiencing, emotional numbing, hyper-alertness, sleep disturbance, survival guilt and avoidance, PTSD can be extremely disruptive of social, intellectual, and occupational functioning. While imaginal flooding of combat scenes has been shown to dramatically reduce PTSD symptomatology, the only supporting evidence published to date has been case studies. This is the first controlled study of the treatment using a clinical sample of the population. Subjects were sixteen male Vietnam combat—exposed veterans who sought out patient treatment at the VAMC in Salem, Virginia. Aged 33 to 40, they all suffered from PTSD. A yoked design was utilized in which one group (£;8) received a supplemental flooding treatment and the other (ns=8) did not. All subjects received standard hospital out patient treatment which generally consisted of both Vietnam Veteran group and individual therapy. / Ph. D. / incomplete_metadata

This master's thesis deals with the development and implementation of counterinsurgency warfare by the military and government of the United States during the Vietnam War. The main point of this work revolves around the fact that the United States did not develop a successful and comprehensive counterinsurgency doctrine during this period. However, certain counterinsurgency units and programs were developed that did achieve success in deterring the guerrilla war waged by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army. The Phoenix Program and especially the Civilian Irregular Defense Group Program, which was developed and operated by the U.S. Army Special Forces, proved that counterinsurgency warfare could be waged successfully against an elusive foe. As the Vietnam War escalated, the United States relied upon the technology, the mobility, and the firepower of America's conventional military to try and destroy an unconventional enemy. This reliance upon conventional military strategies and tactics eventually led to the withdrawal of American troops and the defeat of the Republic of Vietnam by the communist forces of North Vietnam. I believe that the United States and the Republic of Vietnam could have prevented a communist victory through the proper development of counterinsurgency warfare doctrine. This doctrine would include a combination of counterinsurgency tactics and strategies I social reform, economic assistance, military training, and political stability. The United States learned many valuable lessons in Vietnam, including the importance of maintaining specialized units that could be used to fight a limited war against a dedicated enemy with a political agenda. Warfare has never been an exact science, and a nation must be prepared to deal with any contingency. / Master of Arts

This study examines how three liberal publications (Washington Post, Newsweek, and New Republic) and three conservative publications (Wall Street Journal, U.S. News & World Report, and National Review) reported six different events of the Vietnam War. Chapter one will examine the publications’ coverage of the Tonkin Gulf incidents of August 1964 and the November 1965 Pleiku attack. The 1968 Tet offensive will be the concern of chapter two. Chapter three looks at how the six publications covered the My Lai incident, the Christmas bombing of 1972 (Linebacker II), and the release of American prisoners of war (Operation Homecoming). / Master of Arts

This thesis examines the communist insurgencies in Malaya (1948-1960) and Vietnam(1961-1963). A British Colonial Service Officer, Robert Thompson, helped develop the successful counterinsurgency doctrine during the Malayan Emergency. Later he carried this knowledge to Vietnam to help in the anti-Viet Cong struggle. U.S. leaders welcomed lessons of the Malayan Emergency and their application in parts to the Vietnamese situation in the form of the Strategic Hamlet Program. Thompson’s transfer of knowledge from Malaya to Vietnam shows a historical analogy taken out of context by U.S. leadership. I begin my study by looking at British evolution of counterinsurgency doctrine and practices, specifically the New Villages in Malaya, and Robert Thompson’s role in the process. The second chapter examines Thompson’s transferal of Malayan knowledge to Vietnam and the U.S. acceptance of and support for his efforts. I also compare these insurgencies in chapter two to show the differences between them and prove my thesis. Finally, the third chapter shows some reasons why the Strategic Hamlet Program failed and whether Thompson’s program was doomed to fail or not. By examining the Strategic Hamlet Program, an understanding of how the U.S. evolved policy in the Vietnam War becomes possible. / Master of Arts

As American involvement in Vietnam escalated in the 1960s, the military's need for medical personnel rose as well. A shortage of qualified nurses in the United States coupled with the requirements of providing adequate troops abroad meant increased opportunity for male nurses. To meet the needs of Army personnel, the Army Nurse Corps actively recruited men, a segment of the nursing population that had previously faced daunting restrictions in the Army Nurse Corps (ANC). Amidst mounting tension, the Army Student Nurse Program began accepting men and provided educational funding and support. Additionally, Congress extended commissions in the Regular Army to previously excluded male nurses. Men answered the call and actively took advantage of the new opportunities afforded them by the demands of war. They entered the educational programs and committed to serve their country through the ANC. Once admitted to the corps, a large percentage of male nurses served in Vietnam. Their tours of duty proved invaluable for training in trauma medicine. Further, these men experienced personal and professional growth that they never would have received in the civilian world. They gained confidence in their skills and worked with wounds and diseases seldom seen at home. For many, the opportunities created by the war led to a career in military medicine and meant the chance to seek additional training after nursing school, often specialized training. Relying heavily on oral histories and the archives of the Army Nurse Corps, this study examined the role these nurses played in entrenching men as a vital part of the ANC.

Between 1960 and 1968 the United States conducted intensive psychological operations (PSYOP) in Vietnam. To date, no comprehensive study of the psychological war there has been conducted. This dissertation fills that void, describing the development of American PSYOP forces and their employment in Vietnam. By looking at the complex interplay of American, North Vietnamese, National Liberation Front (NLF) and South Vietnamese propaganda programs, a deeper understanding of these activities and the larger war emerges. The time period covered is important because it comprises the initial introduction of American PSYOP advisory forces and the transition to active participation in the war. It also allows enough time to determine the long-term effects of both the North Vietnamese/NLF and American/South Vietnamese programs. Ending with the 1968 Tet Offensive is fitting because it marks both a major change in the war and the establishment of the 4th Psychological Operations Group to manage the American PSYOP effort. This dissertation challenges the argument that the Northern/Viet Cong program was much more effective that the opposing one. Contrary to common perceptions, the North Vietnamese propaganda increasingly fell on deaf ears in the south by 1968. This study also provides support for understanding the Tet Offensive as a desperate gamble born out of knowledge the tide of war favored the Allies by mid-1967. The trend was solidly towards the government and the NLF increasingly depended on violence to maintain control. The American PSYOP forces went to Vietnam with little knowledge of the history and culture of Vietnam or experience conducting psychological operations in a counterinsurgency. As this dissertation demonstrates, despite these drawbacks, they had considerable success in the period covered. Although facing an experienced enemy in the psychological war, the U.S. forces made great strides in advising, innovating techniques, and developing equipment. I rely extensively on untapped sources such as the Foreign Broadcast Information Service transcripts, Captured Document Exploitation Center files, and access to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command Archives. Additionally, I have digitized databases such as the Hamlet Evaluation System and Terrorist Incident Reporting System for Geographic Information System software analysis. The maps provide examples of the possibilities available to the historian using these datasets.