Thesis (M.A. in International Security and Civil-Military Relations)--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2003. / Thesis advisor(s): Harold Trinkunas, Jeanne Giraldo. Includes bibliographical references. Also available online.

Thesis (M. A.)--University of Canterbury, 2009. / Typescript (photocopy). Includes bibliographical references (leaves 212-239). Also available via the World Wide Web.

It is the contention of this thesis that the Tripartite Alliance came at the end of a period during which Britain and Turkey attempted to reconcile their often conflicting interests in order to ensure common security in the Near East. Between 1934-1939, contrary to the usual belief, the dynamics of Anglo-Turkish relations most often led Turkey to seek a formal relationship, which Britain, for reasons of its own, was reluctant to grant. Once conceded, in May 1939, with the proclamation of the Joint Guarantee, the fledgling Anglo-Turkish condominium promptly began to sicken, and by June 1940, had failed altogether. The primary reasons for this collapse were four. Firstly, the political under-pinnings of the alliance never seemed sufficient to permit either partner to consider advantageous the activation of the alliance once made. Secondly, the Alliance was afflicted by certain powerful dilemmas within Britain's global strategy which prevented British planners from coming to any lasting consensus regarding Turkey's role in imperial defence. Thirdly, if the alliance were to be made effective, sufficient and timely assistance--chiefly, material and economic assistance--would have to be provided the Turkish partner. During this early period, both Britain and France remained unable or unwilling to provide anything like the level of assistance required. Finally, the numerous inter-allied Staff conversations, which were a principle feature of the Alliance's early years, failed to produce a single viable option for the fruitful deployment of common forces against any possible enemy. Without such a plan, the entry of Turkey to the war would have been worse than ill-advised; it would have been pointless. / Once the Alliance had definitely foundered on these rocks, in the infinitely more menacing conditions existing after June 1940, it was entirely unlikely that Turkey would permit the activation of an alliance no longer consistent, by any reading, with its essential interests. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

No description available.

This thesis attempts to challenge the way military historiography deals with the state of the Ottoman army between 1683 and 1792 and the military reform attempts prior to the Nizam-i Cedid army. Western military historians have ascribed to the inferiority of the Ottoman military technology the waning of the Ottoman military power in the post-1683 period. Any attempt at reform was allegedly obstructed by religious reaction against borrowing European methods and technology. This thesis argues that technology was not the decisive factor in the Ottoman failure against the Austrians and Russians since those two were not too far ahead of the Ottomans with regards to the level of military technology to justify such a conclusion. The comparison with the Russian army, the archenemy of the Ottomans in the period under question, reveals that the Russian success in such departments as conscription, logistics, military leadership and continuous tactical adjustments made to accommodate the needs of steppe warfare, rather than outright application of Western methods of warfare, resulted in victories against the Ottomans. The Ottomans in the meantime were bothered by instability at the Porte, which could neither provide the necessary leadership on the battlefield nor carry out the military reforms. As a result, the vestiges of the Ottoman military organization in its classical form continued to take up economic resources and block any attempts at reform. Religion in this process served as nothing more than a rallying cry for a certain group who vied for power in Istanbul at a time of state formation.

This research set out to determine whether computer-aided engineering tools could be used to validate land-vehicle material during the Defence acquisition cycle. / Thesis (MEngineering)--University of South Australia, 2008.

Throughout history, Australia and New Zealand have developed a special relationship due to their close geographic proximity and their similar cultural and colonial backgrounds. Ever since 1986, when New Zealand was suspended from the trilateral Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America (ANZUS), Australia has been New Zealand's closest ally. As a result, the thesis specifically focuses on trans-Tasman defence relations after 1986, with a particular emphasis on attitude trends towards the bilateral defence relationship. Overall, the thesis aims to find out whether there has been a drift in the bilateral defence relationship between Australia and New Zealand since 1986. In this regard, it examines two main questions: first, is the Australian-New Zealand defence relationship is less close today than it was in 1986? The thesis findings show that there has indeed been a visible drift in trans-Tasman defence relations. In both countries, the relationship is much less talked about today than it was in 1986. Second, do Australians and New Zealanders view the bilateral defence relationship any more negatively today than they did in 1986? As the results show, the disagreement over defence spending, New Zealand's decision to restructure the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) as well as the ANZUS split were the main factors that have brought about some distance between both countries' defence policies and priorities. However, beside the downs in the bilateral defence relationship, there have also been ups embodied by the sometimes rather elusive Anzac spirit, the optimism that surrounded the creation of Closer Defence Relations (CDR) in the 1990s and, most notably, enhanced trans-Tasman cooperation in peacekeeping, primarily in the immediate regional neighbourhood. Importantly, Australians and New Zealanders do not see the defence relationship any more negatively today than they did in 1986. Indeed, opinion trends at all societal levels have been remarkably constant over the last two decades. Based on these findings, the thesis concludes that the bilateral defence relationship may well become closer again in the future, especially if both countries continue their close cooperation in regional peacekeeping. This appears to be the most promising way ahead for the Anzac defence relationship in the 21st century.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Tufts University, 2004. / Adviser: Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Submitted to the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 421-445). Access restricted to members of the Tufts University community. Also available via the World Wide Web;

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Tufts University, 2003. / Submitted to the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Adviser: Richard H. Shultz. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 454-481). Access restricted to members of the Tufts University community. Also available via the World Wide Web;

Thesis (M.S. in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy)--Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2007. / Vita. "April 2007." "National Defense Univ Norfolk VA"--DTIC cover. Includes bibliographical references (p. 77-82). Also available via the Internet.