Any adequate interpretation of the concept of the will to power, given the radical break with the history of philosophy it presupposes, requires a preceding analysis of Nietzsche’s critique of the history of philosophy as a critique of metaphysics. Only once Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics is properly understood as a critique of, in the broadest sense, any correspondence conception of truth, can the philosophical concept of the will to power, as a product of that critique, be understood as well. Each of the three typical types of interpretative approaches to the will to power (i.e. as a metaphysical concept, as an empirical concept, as an object of interpretive play) will provide a critically constructive opportunity to narrow an acceptable definition of Nietzsche’s positive conception of philosophy as a distinctive and unorthodox type of history, according to which any interpretation rests, not on truths, but on its author’s prejudices or fundamental values. Moreover, using Gilles Deleuze’s largely ignored or otherwise grossly misunderstood Nietzsche et la philosophie, a non-normative, post-metaphysical justification consistent with that critique can then be provided for Nietzsche’s radical reform to the philosophical method. According to Nietzsche, philosophy as a will to power is preferable to philosophy as a will to truth because it is consistent with his profound and unjustified love of life. In fact, the will to power it is the philosophical expression of that love.

Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen, in Truth, Fiction, and Literature: A Philosophical Perspective (1994), advance a "no-truth" theory of literature, which has become highly influential in the analytic tradition of the philosophy of art. However, considering the historical precursors that have influenced them, their work has been defined largely without considering certain strands of Continental philosophy. In particular, they do not seriously consider the tradition of Heideggerian phenomenology. In this thesis, by relying on the philosophy of Heideggerian thinker Hans-Georg Gadamer, I argue that Lamarque and Olsen advance their no-truth theory of literature because they consider the concept of truth too narrowly. However, there are key elements of Lamarque and Olsen's theory that come very close to a Gadamerian view of art but cannot be satisfactorily explained by appealing only to the fundamental tenets of their strand of analytic philosophy. I conclude by opposing their theory insofar as it is a no-truth theory of literature, but by supporting their theory insofar as it reiterates certain insights that are provided by Gadamer. / Graduate / 0422 / adellazazzera@gmail.com

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1981. / Bibliography: leaves [230]-234. / Microfiche. / iv, 234 leaves, bound 29 cm

Thesis (M.A.)--Catholic Theological Union at Chicago, 1989. / Vita. Bibliography: leaves 81-100.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2005. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 307-308).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, 1931. / "Private edition, distributed by the University of Chicago libraries." "List of works referred to": p. [53]-55.

Thesis (M.C.S.)--Regent College, Vancouver, B.C., 1997. / Includes bibliographical references (leaf 111).

Thesis (D.Phil.)--University of Oxford, 2008. / Supervisors: Professor D.M. Edgington, Professor John Hawthorne. Bibliography: leaves 222-226.

Thesis (Th. D.)--Grace Theological Seminary, 1967. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves [199]-202).

Thesis (M. Div.)--Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary, South Hamilton, MA, 2002. / Abstract and vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [84]-86).