Any adequate interpretation of the concept of the will to power, given the radical break with the history of philosophy it presupposes, requires a preceding analysis of Nietzsche’s critique of the history of philosophy as a critique of metaphysics. Only once Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics is properly understood as a critique of, in the broadest sense, any correspondence conception of truth, can the philosophical concept of the will to power, as a product of that critique, be understood as well. Each of the three typical types of interpretative approaches to the will to power (i.e. as a metaphysical concept, as an empirical concept, as an object of interpretive play) will provide a critically constructive opportunity to narrow an acceptable definition of Nietzsche’s positive conception of philosophy as a distinctive and unorthodox type of history, according to which any interpretation rests, not on truths, but on its author’s prejudices or fundamental values. Moreover, using Gilles Deleuze’s largely ignored or otherwise grossly misunderstood Nietzsche et la philosophie, a non-normative, post-metaphysical justification consistent with that critique can then be provided for Nietzsche’s radical reform to the philosophical method. According to Nietzsche, philosophy as a will to power is preferable to philosophy as a will to truth because it is consistent with his profound and unjustified love of life. In fact, the will to power it is the philosophical expression of that love.

Any adequate interpretation of the concept of the will to power, given the radical break with the history of philosophy it presupposes, requires a preceding analysis of Nietzsche’s critique of the history of philosophy as a critique of metaphysics. Only once Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics is properly understood as a critique of, in the broadest sense, any correspondence conception of truth, can the philosophical concept of the will to power, as a product of that critique, be understood as well. Each of the three typical types of interpretative approaches to the will to power (i.e. as a metaphysical concept, as an empirical concept, as an object of interpretive play) will provide a critically constructive opportunity to narrow an acceptable definition of Nietzsche’s positive conception of philosophy as a distinctive and unorthodox type of history, according to which any interpretation rests, not on truths, but on its author’s prejudices or fundamental values. Moreover, using Gilles Deleuze’s largely ignored or otherwise grossly misunderstood Nietzsche et la philosophie, a non-normative, post-metaphysical justification consistent with that critique can then be provided for Nietzsche’s radical reform to the philosophical method. According to Nietzsche, philosophy as a will to power is preferable to philosophy as a will to truth because it is consistent with his profound and unjustified love of life. In fact, the will to power it is the philosophical expression of that love.

Thesis (Ph.D.) - Simon Fraser University, 2006. / Theses (Dept. of Sociology/Anthropology) / Simon Fraser University. Also issued in digital format and available on the World Wide Web.

Thesis (M. Div.)--Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary, South Hamilton, MA, 2002. / Abstract and vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [84]-86).

My dissertation has two main parts. In the first half, I draw out an underlying presupposition of Descartes' philosophy: what I term "atomism of thought." Descartes employs a radical procedure of doubt in order to show that the first principle of his philosophy, the cogito, is an unshakeable foundation of knowledge. In the dialogue that follows his dissemination of the Meditations, Descartes reveals that a whole set of concepts and rational principles innate in our minds are never doubted. These fundamental units of thought are indivisible, distinct, and isolated, and enable the possibility of any rational demonstration. Atoms of thought are perfectly individuated because God has created them as such. Likewise, our minds have been fashioned such that we necessarily have a clear and distinct perception every time we alight upon these simple notions. In the second part of the dissertation, I take up critiques of Descartes' view given by Nietzsche and Heidegger. In the chapter on Nietzsche, I attempt to fill a lacuna in scholarship about Nietzsche's commentary on Descartes. More specifically, I argue that once the foundation of God is displaced, the basis for accepting atomism of thought dissolves. In the final chapter, I analyze Heidegger's critique of Cartesian atomism. I first look at Heidegger's critique of classical truth as correspondence from Being and Time, and show how it is relevant to a critique of atomism. Then I show how the early Heidegger's holistic philosophical framework can provide an alternative that avoids the pitfalls of atomism. While I limit the scope of my analysis to Descartes' particular formulation, atomism of thought was an influential doctrine throughout modern philosophy. This aspect of Cartesianism has persisted and continues to be a significant theoretical underpinning of many contemporary views. It is my contention that Nietzsche and Heidegger have important contributions to make to this area of thought, and the relative neglect of their work in recent scholarship is a detrimental oversight.

This work is dedicated to the development of a unified account of both theoretical and practical rationality. I adopt a particular view of evaluative properties, according to which entities are evaluated as good or bad according to how well they fulfill the constitutive functions of their kinds. I argue that the function of belief is to accurately represent reality, while the function of action is to satisfy the agent’s desires. These functions fix the goodness- or success-conditions of belief and action. With these functions in place, I adopt a reliabilist conception of reasoning which evaluates reasoning processes by how well they allow us to achieve the constitutive aims of belief and action. Moreover, I argue that the process of determining which action will best satisfy our desires is a cognitive matter – non-cognitive states like desire do not actually provide the agent with reasons.

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<p><font face="Times New Roman"> <p align="left">This work is a meditation on the shaping of time and its impact on living with and understanding atrocity in South Africa in the wake of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).</p> </font></p>

This thesis examines the role of New Zealand Truth within interwar society. It seeks to identify the audience, market niche, and style of the paper. Its essential concern is with using theoretical models to inform a discussion on the ideas and values expressed in the paper, especially those of moderation, exploitation, excess, and immorality. What it attempts to show is that, although, Truth was a newspaper which depended on deviance for much of its news, it was deeply concerned, and alarmed, at the extent of breeches of mores and laws. However, the thesis will also show that Truth was more than a "scandal rag": it was very much a sports paper as well.

This thesis defends the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument for mathematical realism and introduces a new indispensability argument for a substantial conception of truth. Chapters 1 and 2 formulate the main components of the Quine-Putnam argument, namely that virtually all scientific laws quantify over mathematical entities and thus logically presuppose the existence thereof. Chapter 2 contains a detailed discussion of the logical structure of some scientific theories that incorporate or apply mathematics. Chapter 3 then reconstructs the central assumptions of Quine's argument, concluding (provocatively) that "science entails platonism". Chapter 4 contains a brief discussion of some major theories of truth, including deflationary views (redundancy, disquotation). Chapter 5 introduces a new argument against such deflationary views, based on certain logical properties of truth theories. Chapter 6 contains a further discussion of mathematical truth. In particular, non-standard conceptions of mathematical truth such as "if-thenism" and "hermeneuticism". Chapter 7 introduces the programmes of reconstrual and reconstruction proposed by recent nominalism. Chapters 8 discusses modal nominalism, concluding that modalism is implausible as an interpretation of mathematics (if taken seriously, it suffers from exactly those epistemological problems allegedly suffered by realism). Chapter 9 discusses Field's deflationism, whose central motivating idea is that mathematics is (pace Quine and Putnam) dispensable in applications. This turns on a conservativeness claim which, as Shapiro pointed out in 1983, must be incorrect (using Godel's Theorems). I conclude in Chapter 10 that nominalistic views of mathematics and deflationist views of truth are both inadequate to the overall explanatory needs of science.