It is the purpose of this work to give a critical assessment of the lifelong struggle about the problem of truth and reality by a man who has nearly been forgotten, Eberhard GRISEBACH. Particularly in our time, however, a time ruled by "isms" and ideologies, that are passed off on gullible man as the truth, and that are hung before his eyes like veils preventing him from ever experiencing the "real" and coming face to face with it, Grisebach's teaching deserves the closest attention. This work is thus meant to pave the way for a further study of his philosophy, which may help man to adopt an attitude towards life which is more suited than the present one is to coping with the problem and the difficulties of the actual situation. The first lesson we learn when studying Grisebach is from his refusal to placate any doctrine, ideology, creed, etc. from the courage with which he puts in question man's sacrosanct truths, values and beliefs, and from the inexorable and uncompromising honesty and sober reflection exhibited by him in his search for the real. This undoubtedly great thinker, whose search for truth and the real was inspired by a genuine need, and in his later years by a great disstress, passed his formative years at a period, when a young generation in a young striving German Empire was hopefully and confidently searching for new values that corresponded with reality more than the idealistic past of an a priori metaphysics did. In all walks of life - the sciences, the arts, technology, and economy - unheard of possibilities seemed to present themselves.

No description available.

Philosophical enquiry on the notion of truth has traditionally involved the identification of a class of objects to which truth is ascribed. At the same time, formal investigations are often required when the notion of truth is at issue: semantic paradoxes force in fact philosophers to shape their arguments in a precise way. Objects of truth, in formal context, are always reduced to other, more manageable objects that mimic their structural properties such as numbers or sets. This form of reduction renders the distinction between linguistic or syntactic objects, to which truth is usually applied, and their mathematical counterparts opaque, at least from the point of view of the theory of truth. In informal metatheoretic discussion, in fact, they are clearly different entities. In this thesis we focus on an alternative way of constructing axiomatic theories of truth in which syntactic objects and mathematical objects belong to different universes. A brief introduction tries to situate the proposed theories in the context of different investigations on axiomatic truth. Chapter 2 is devoted to the discussion of historical and more theoretical motivations behind the proposed alternative. Chapter 3 will present the syntactic koinè spoken by our theories. Morphological categories of the object language and logical concepts concerning the object theory will be formalised in a recent axiomatisation of hereditarily finite sets. In Chapter 4 we finally introduce theories of truth with a built-in syntactic theory and examine some of their consequences. We briefly focus on disquotational truth, then consider compositional axioms for truth. Chapter 5 investigates a possible application of the setting just introduced: a realisation of the all-present interaction, in metamathematical practice, between informal metatheoretic claims and their (suitably chosen) coded counterparts. In the final chapter, after a brief characterisation of the key doctrines of the delflationary conception of truth, we evaluate the impact that the theories of truth studied in this work can have on the debate on the so-called conservativeness argument, which tries to match the alleged insubstantiality of the notion of truth, advocated by deflationists, with the deductive power of deflationary acceptable theories of truth.

In this project, I develop Nietzsche's account of truth based on the two perspectives of nihilism and health and conclude that his varied analyses and comments from the early and late periods of his writing are compatible. Nietzsche's discussions of truth are divided into two parts. First, the discussion of the concept of truth. Second, he analyzes modern culture that considers the highest type the one that seeks truth. His discussion of the concept of truth involves a critique of the thing-in-itself and Correspondence Theory. The subtle point to get is that Nietzsche never denies the existence of a real world in which we live. However, his critique is of human's ability to arrive at this truth. I argue that his attack on the concept of the thing-in-itself in the late notebooks is aimed at showing the metaphysical incoherence of the concepts of thinghood and self-identity and not on the concept of an unknown grounding existence. As for the second discussion, I argue that Nietzsche condemns truth-seeking insofar as it is held as the highest ideal in a culture. When this occurs, the will to truth in cultures and individuals becomes tyrannical and stems the growth of the person as a complete self, with varied drives and impulses. Finally, I conclude that Nietzsche hopes to overcome nihilism by breaking the tyranny that has taken over society which is governed by a will to nothingness, which depreciates the value of life. He understands the immensity of the task of overcoming this will, and understands that he can only be part of a larger context of combating nihilism. Accordingly, he sees his role as reintroducing man to his body and his physiology and to bring back the experimentation and playful seriousness in the art of living life as opposed to the life-sacrificing and life-denying type that thinks of the pursuit of truth as a relinquishment of life.

In this project, I develop Nietzsche’s account of truth based on the two perspectives of nihilism and health and conclude that his varied analyses and comments from the early and late periods of his writing are compatible. Nietzsche’s discussions of truth are divided into two parts. First, the discussion of the concept of truth. Second, he analyzes modern culture that considers the highest type the one that seeks truth. His discussion of the concept of truth involves a critique of the thing-in-itself and Correspondence Theory. The subtle point to get is that Nietzsche never denies the existence of a real world in which we live. However, his critique is of human’s ability to arrive at this truth. I argue that his attack on the concept of the thing-in-itself in the late notebooks is aimed at showing the metaphysical incoherence of the concepts of thinghood and self-identity and not on the concept of an unknown grounding existence. As for the second discussion, I argue that Nietzsche condemns truth-seeking insofar as it is held as the highest ideal in a culture. When this occurs, the will to truth in cultures and individuals becomes tyrannical and stems the growth of the person as a complete self, with varied drives and impulses. Finally, I conclude that Nietzsche hopes to overcome nihilism by breaking the tyranny that has taken over society which is governed by a will to nothingness, which depreciates the value of life. He understands the immensity of the task of overcoming this will, and understands that he can only be part of a larger context of combating nihilism. Accordingly, he sees his role as reintroducing man to his body and his physiology and to bring back the experimentation and playful seriousness in the art of living life as opposed to the life-sacrificing and life-denying type that thinks of the pursuit of truth as a relinquishment of life.

In this project, I develop Nietzsche’s account of truth based on the two perspectives of nihilism and health and conclude that his varied analyses and comments from the early and late periods of his writing are compatible. Nietzsche’s discussions of truth are divided into two parts. First, the discussion of the concept of truth. Second, he analyzes modern culture that considers the highest type the one that seeks truth. His discussion of the concept of truth involves a critique of the thing-in-itself and Correspondence Theory. The subtle point to get is that Nietzsche never denies the existence of a real world in which we live. However, his critique is of human’s ability to arrive at this truth. I argue that his attack on the concept of the thing-in-itself in the late notebooks is aimed at showing the metaphysical incoherence of the concepts of thinghood and self-identity and not on the concept of an unknown grounding existence. As for the second discussion, I argue that Nietzsche condemns truth-seeking insofar as it is held as the highest ideal in a culture. When this occurs, the will to truth in cultures and individuals becomes tyrannical and stems the growth of the person as a complete self, with varied drives and impulses. Finally, I conclude that Nietzsche hopes to overcome nihilism by breaking the tyranny that has taken over society which is governed by a will to nothingness, which depreciates the value of life. He understands the immensity of the task of overcoming this will, and understands that he can only be part of a larger context of combating nihilism. Accordingly, he sees his role as reintroducing man to his body and his physiology and to bring back the experimentation and playful seriousness in the art of living life as opposed to the life-sacrificing and life-denying type that thinks of the pursuit of truth as a relinquishment of life.

In this project, I develop Nietzsche's account of truth based on the two perspectives of nihilism and health and conclude that his varied analyses and comments from the early and late periods of his writing are compatible. Nietzsche's discussions of truth are divided into two parts. First, the discussion of the concept of truth. Second, he analyzes modern culture that considers the highest type the one that seeks truth. His discussion of the concept of truth involves a critique of the thing-in-itself and Correspondence Theory. The subtle point to get is that Nietzsche never denies the existence of a real world in which we live. However, his critique is of human's ability to arrive at this truth. I argue that his attack on the concept of the thing-in-itself in the late notebooks is aimed at showing the metaphysical incoherence of the concepts of thinghood and self-identity and not on the concept of an unknown grounding existence. As for the second discussion, I argue that Nietzsche condemns truth-seeking insofar as it is held as the highest ideal in a culture. When this occurs, the will to truth in cultures and individuals becomes tyrannical and stems the growth of the person as a complete self, with varied drives and impulses. Finally, I conclude that Nietzsche hopes to overcome nihilism by breaking the tyranny that has taken over society which is governed by a will to nothingness, which depreciates the value of life. He understands the immensity of the task of overcoming this will, and understands that he can only be part of a larger context of combating nihilism. Accordingly, he sees his role as reintroducing man to his body and his physiology and to bring back the experimentation and playful seriousness in the art of living life as opposed to the life-sacrificing and life-denying type that thinks of the pursuit of truth as a relinquishment of life.

Thesis (B.A.)--Haverford College, Dept. of Political Science, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references.

This thesis addresses a topic which to date has not received any sustained attention within the field of health and social care. The thesis explores the understanding that lecturers in health and social care have of the nature of truth and how their conceptions of truth impact on their teaching and on their relationship with students. The study was conducted through interviews with nine lecturers, from five universities and several disciplines within health and social care, which allowed them to explore their understanding of truth in relation to their teaching. A phenomenological approach was employed, as this enabled the participants to describe the phenomenon of truth as it presented itself to them through their own lived experience and as it was imbricated in their teaching. In order to analyse the lived experience of the lecturers I used an interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) approach because it is concerned with the interpretation of particular experiences of a phenomenon. One of the key findings that emerged from the analysis was that none of the lecturers believed that there was one version of truth but rather multiple truths or realities, often based on uncertainty rather than a certainty. The suggestion was that what was being taught in class was a theory of provisional validity rather than an absolute truth and this heavily influenced the way these lecturers saw their role within their students’ journeys towards their own versions of truth and authenticity. The study participants held that if students could become comfortable with questioning truth and accepting that more than one version of the truth exists, then they were enabled to deploy the art of critical evaluation and analysis within their own learning. Underpinning my analysis of my findings regarding the lecturers’ perceptions of their role in encouraging critical thinking and authenticity is the work of Barnet and Kreber. Barnet (2007) claimed that in order to become authentic, an element of critical thinking is required and Kreber (2013) builds on this when she suggests that authenticity is associated with being true to self in a critical social theory sense. Further key findings are very much related to the unique dimension of my study being placed within health and social care and include the connections between the nature of truth and matters such as: the participant’s identity as a health and social care professional and the influence this has on their teaching; how conceptions of truth impact on the health and social care knowledge base within the disciplines of the participants and how this discipline knowledge underpins their teaching; the relationship between the participants’ conceptions of the nature of truth and the professional attributes that feature in the participants’ teaching; and how the understanding of the nature of truth links into the health and social care curricula. The thesis concludes by discussing implications for theory and practice that appear to flow from the findings of this study.

During the mid to late 1900s many Latin American countries found themselves under the rule of violent military regimes and in civil war. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the atrocities committed in the late 20th century throughout Latin America and to discuss the ways in which these societies, affected by state violence, were able to overcome the past. In this paper, I will look at the purpose of truth and reconciliation commissions and their outcomes in Chile, Argentina, and Guatemala in order to find some similarities and compare and contrast the successes and failures of the different commissions in their respective settings.