This article addresses the issue of the pre-legal nature of the Juridical and its stratification in the social and legal level. Also, it contrasts the theory of the will and the theory of the declaration, and refers to the controversy between Emilio Betti and Giuseppe Stolfi about the dispute over the language. The idea of monism is developed in the theory of the Juridical Act quoting Santi Romano and Hans Kelsen, as well as its tensions with dualism. Finally, it takes Juridical Act as historiographical category, and its relationship to the problems of technological society and closes with the gap between private autonomy and Juridical Act. / El presente artículo aborda la cuestión de la naturaleza prejurídica del negocio jurídico, así como su estratificación en el plano social y jurídico. Asimismo, se contrapone la teoría de la voluntad y la teoría de la declaración, y se remite a la polémica entre Emilio Betti y Giuseppe Stolfi como disputa sobre el lenguaje. Se desarrolla la idea del monismo en la teoría del negocio jurídico citando a Santi Romano y Hans Kelsen, así como sus tensiones con el dualismo. Finalmente, se trata al negocio jurídico como categoría historiográfica, y su relación con los problemas de la sociedad tecnológica para cerrar con la separación entre autonomía privada y negocio jurídico.

There is a conceptual knot at the intersection of moral responsibility and action theory. This knot can be expressed as the following question: What is the relationship between an agent's openness to moral responsibility and the intentional status of her behaviour? My answer to this question is developed in three steps. I first develop a control-backed account of intentional agency, one that borrows vital insights from the cognitive sciences – in the form of Dual Process Theory – in understanding the control condition central to the account, and demonstrate that this account fares at least as well as its rivals in the field. Secondly, I investigate the dominant positions in the discussion surrounding the role of control in moral responsibility. After consideration of some shortcomings of these positions – especially the inability to properly account for so-called ambivalence cases – I defend an alternative pluralist account of moral responsibility, in which there are two co-extant variants of such responsibility: attributability and accountability. The latter of these will be shown to have a necessary control condition, also best understood in terms of a requirement for oversight (rather than conscious or online control), and in terms of the workings of the dual system mechanism. I then demonstrate how these two accounts are necessarily related through the shared role of this kind of control, leading to my answer to the original question: if an agent is open to moral accountability based on some activity or outcome, this activity or outcome must necessarily have positive intentional status. I then apply this answer in a consideration of certain cases of the use of the Doctrine of Double Effect.