Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2006. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 130-135).

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Através da teoria de mercados de matchings de dois lados, este trabalho analisa o Sistema de Matrículas Escolares do Município de São Paulo. Em um primeiro momento, descrevemos detalhadamente o mercado de escolha escolar, um caso particular do \"College Admission Problem\", demonstrando seus principais resultados. Em seguida, passamos ao estudo dos principais mecanismos de alocação existentes e o atualmente utilizado em São Paulo. Simulações são realizadas para corroborar os resultados teóricos. Finalmente, apresentamos sugestões de melhoria para o atual processo de matrículas, propondo, inclusive, a substituição do mecanismo existente. / Through the Theory of Two-Sided Matching Markets, this work is aimed at assessing the São Paulo Municipality Basic School Enrollment System. As a first effort, we describe the school choice problem, a special case of the \"College Admission Problem\", demonstrating its main results. Next, we follow to the study of the main existing mechanisms of allocation as well as the one currently used in Sao Paulo. Simulations are used to corroborate the theoretical results. Finally, we present suggestions for the improvement of the current enrollment system, including the substitution of the existing mechanism.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2007. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 79-83).

We study maximum entropy correlated equilibria in (multi-player)games and provide two gradient-based algorithms that are guaranteedto converge to such equilibria. Although we do not provideconvergence rates for these algorithms, they do have strong connectionsto other algorithms (such as iterative scaling) which are effectiveheuristics for tasks such as statistical estimation.

Através da teoria de mercados de matchings de dois lados, este trabalho analisa o Sistema de Matrículas Escolares do Município de São Paulo. Em um primeiro momento, descrevemos detalhadamente o mercado de escolha escolar, um caso particular do \"College Admission Problem\", demonstrando seus principais resultados. Em seguida, passamos ao estudo dos principais mecanismos de alocação existentes e o atualmente utilizado em São Paulo. Simulações são realizadas para corroborar os resultados teóricos. Finalmente, apresentamos sugestões de melhoria para o atual processo de matrículas, propondo, inclusive, a substituição do mecanismo existente. / Through the Theory of Two-Sided Matching Markets, this work is aimed at assessing the São Paulo Municipality Basic School Enrollment System. As a first effort, we describe the school choice problem, a special case of the \"College Admission Problem\", demonstrating its main results. Next, we follow to the study of the main existing mechanisms of allocation as well as the one currently used in Sao Paulo. Simulations are used to corroborate the theoretical results. Finally, we present suggestions for the improvement of the current enrollment system, including the substitution of the existing mechanism.

In this essay I analyze the ways in which gender and space are shaped and made sense of through digital gameplay. Specifically in the turn based strategy game XCOM: Enemy Within for the MacBook Air with a computer mouse as the primary input device. Using a mixed methods approach consisting of gameplay sessions of XCOM and qualitative interviews with two players regarding their gameplay I argue that earlier research on space within game studies has overlooked the ways in which the shaping of space in gameplay is also gendered. Developing a theoretical framework influenced by gender studies, critical theory, affect theory, assemblage theories of space, and game theory, I argue for how the shaping of space and gender in game-play is interdependent. This in that the shaping of space and gender in digital gameplay is in constant relation and tension with societal norms and the affective capacities of bodies and digital games. In conclusion, I reflect on the possibilities to develop more empirical research based on the the theoretical framework explored in the essay.

The concern of this thesis is to discuss different multicriteria games solution concepts. Multicriteria game is a special case from the game theory if the payoff function of at least one player is a vector and the player wants to maximize all the criteria at the same time. The thesis is divided into four chapters. In the first instance a few motivation examples are introduced. Subsequently the history of the multicriteria games is mentioned. The theoretical chapter follows. It contains five sections - introduction of new definitions; the structure of the set of equilibria for two person multicriteria games; searching equilibria points by the help of scalarization of the vector-valued function; introduction of ideal equilibria points and ways how to find them; the comparison of used methods. The last solution concept is demonstrated by the real example. Finally a theoretical chapter with new results is included. 1

O presente trabalho apresenta uma breve revisão sobre a origem e evolução do vestibular no Brasil, apontando as principais questões e as grandes mudanças ocorridas no decorrer do século XX. Aborda o mercado de alocação de alunos às universidades brasileiras sob dois pontos de vista distintos: (i) estuda a eficiência do mecanismo utilizado e (ii) analisa, os incentivos dos candidatos ao se decidirem por quais instituições de ensino se candidatar. No primeiro enfoque modela o vestibular, mercado ainda não explorado na literatura, procurando adaptar a teoria às especificidades do mercado em questão. Para a utilização de todo o arcabouço da teoria dos jogos modela o mercado relacionado ao vestibular como um mercado de matching de dois lados. Identifica possíveis ineficiências do processo atual, e estende alguns resultados ao novo mercado. Ao relaxar a hipótese de informação completa, apresenta um modelo de equilíbrio que determina a alocação de candidatos ao ensino superior. Por meio da teoria microeconômica clássica, busca-se entender como o esforço e a opção de escola do individuo devem mudar em função de suas habilidades, da faculdade e do nível de seus concorrentes. O equilíbrio determina um vetor de esforços dos agentes e as notas de corte das faculdades. Por fim, são realizadas simulações computacionais do modelo teórico para algumas formas funcionais e paramétricas. A possibilidade de distintas preferências pelas faculdades por partes dos candidatos contempla situações novas na teoria, mas recorrentes no mundo real. Dessa forma, bons candidatos que não avaliam bem as melhores faculdades, acabam se esforçando menos e perdendo as vagas para candidatos não tão bem conceituados. Espera-se que o modelo possa ser estendido e usado para avaliar algumas questões relevantes de políticas educacionais, tal como políticas de ação afirmativas; efeitos de complementaridade entre características de alunos na alocação final, dentre outros. / The present work briefly describes the origin and evolution of the vestibular in Brazil, pointing out the main issues and changes that occurred throughout the 20th century. The student-university assignment market in Brazil is analyzed under two different approaches: (i) the efficiency of the allocation mechanism, and (ii) the incentives faced by candidates when choosing which institution to apply. The first approach defines vestibular, a new market in the literature, and an attempt to adapt the theory to the specificities of the relevant market is done. Defines the market related to vestibular as a two-sided matching market which can be modeled under a game theory framework. Some possible inefficiencies on the current process are identified, and some extensions of results to the new market are done. Relaxing the complete information hypothesis, it presents an equilibrium model which determines the allocation of candidates to higher education institutions. A classical microeconomics theory framework sheds light on how effort and individual school choice change as a function of abilities, type of school and quality of the competing candidates. The equilibrium determines a vector of effort levels of the candidates and minimum score requirements of the institutions. Finally, some computational simulations are performed with different functional and parametric forms. The possibility of different preference magnitudes for institutions among candidates contemplates new situations in theory, but recurrent in the real world. Very-good type candidates who do not value the best schools end up making little effort and losing places to average type candidates. This model can help to evaluate some relevant issues of education policy such as affirmative action policies, complementarily effects between candidates characteristics in the final allocation and others.

The entire thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file; a non-technical public abstract appears in the public.pdf file. Title from PDF of title page (University of Missouri--Columbia, viewed on March 23, 2010). Thesis advisors: Dr. X. H. Wang and Dr. Allanus Tsoi. Includes bibliographical references.