This thesis provides an analysis of changes apparent in the ideology and style of the Inkatha Freedom Party'si politics since April 1994. The IFP's first three years in power under the new dispensation, as a member of the Government of National Unity and the majority party in KwaZulu-Natal, have witnessed a significant shift away from the militant Zulu nationalism and confrontational tactics that characterised the party from the mid-1980s. Zulu nationalism has been abandoned in favour of a broader appeal, while the brinkmanship employed during negotiations in the early 1990s, the walkouts and threats of violent resistance, have been largely absent in the post-election period. Confrontation since 1994, and especially since 1996, has gradually given way to more accommodatory and cooperative relations with the political opposition, on both the national and provincial levels of government. To understand why this shift has occurred, it is necessary to examine the nature of Zulu nationalism as espoused by Inkatha. It is my assertion that Inkatha employed Zulu nationalism in an attempt to preserve its institutionalised power base in the KwaZulu-Natal region and exercise a voice on the national level. Nationalist rhetoric became increasingly prevalent as violence escalated in the late 1980s, and peaked in the uncertainty of the political transition as the IFP faced marginalisation on South Africa's emerging politicalstage. Zulu nationalism acted as the rallying call for party faithful to resist the challenge of the United Democratic Front!African National Congress in the 1980s, and provided justification for Inkatha's confrontational approach and demands for Zulu self-determination in the early 1990s. Indeed, Inkatha's brand of Zulu nationalism has always been about 1 advancing the party interest, rather than defending the integrity of the divided and warring ,J Zulu people. It is in this light that the post-1994 shift in ideological emphasis must be understood. The April 1994 general election ushered in a new era in South African politics, in which the IFP found its role radically altered. From playing the part of spoiler on the outskirts of formal political structures it now had to adjust to its status as the majority party in the provincial legislature, with Buthelezi in a prominent role in the national cabinet. Under these conditions, the party's interests were advanced by the establishment of a smootWy run provincial administration, under which its regional power could be consolidated. Thus, the new political order created a space for the IFP within the democratic system in which its credibility rested on its ability to govern the province effectively. Further, under these conditions, confrontation was not only less attractive as a means of achieving party objectives, it was also less effective and feasible. This the IFP learnt the hard way, in terms of its disastrous constitution-making experience. Its boycott of negotiations at the national level merely served to deprive the IFP of a role in drawing up the country's final constitution, while a belligerent approach at the provincial level prevented the realisation of a compromise agreement. The IFP was forced to accept that its majority in the provincial legislature was insufficient to allow it to rule unilaterally in the province. The loss of therKing's political allegiance, coupled with election results which revealed strong support for the ANC among urban Zulus while the IFP's support was largely confined to traditionalist rural communities, undermined the party's claims to represent the Zulu nation. Furthermore, the gradual return of law and order in the province diminished the IFP's capacity to resort to militarism, thus taking some of the bite out of a confrontational strategy. In brief, the IFP was both pulled and pushed into the new order, and hence to some extent, a new ideology and political style. By 1996 the Zulu nationalism and belligerence that had characterised the party since the mid-1980s had been replaced with a liberal-conservative platform that sought resonance with the urban electorate, coupled with efforts to improve cooperative relations with the political opposition in the interests of provincial stability. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1998.

This thesis attempts to define the role of tribal authorities in the structures of the democratic government in the South African province of KwaZulu-Natal. However, the major difficulty lies in the nature of the institution of tribal authorities itself. In African tradition, leadership is hereditary. It is not subject to any electoral process. Besides this, the hereditary process is fundamentally male primogeniture and by nature excludes women. This contradicts the principles of democracy and the bill of rights which the democratic government of South Africa has adopted. Nevertheless, the institution of tribal authorities is not new in South Africa. It has existed and worked hand in hand with previous governments in South Africa since the period of the British colonial rule in the early 19th century. During the apartheid era, tribal authorities served as the local government in the rural areas of the KwaZulu Bantustan. Chiefs only lost this status after the formation of the Government of National Unity in 1994. However, most chiefs still have great influence and respect among the traditional people who live in rural areas. Besides this, among the Zulus, the institution of tribal authorities symbolizes Zulu nationalism and culture. Because of their closeness to the people at the grassroots, chiefs have good relationships with different political parties, particularly the Inkatha Freedom Party and the African National Congress. Probably they are seen by these political parties as potential allies and agents for political mobilization and recruitment in rural tribal areas. Consequently, abandoning the institution of tribal authorities in the democratic dispensation is unrealistic and irresponsible. To meet the political realities of KwaZulu-Natal, a certain form of representation in the structures of democratic government at both the provincial and local levels needs to be given to the institution of tribal authorities as part of the democratization process, and also as a means of expanding the scope of democracy in rural areas. This also fulfils one of the precepts of democracy which entails including all the concerned groups of people in a society, irrespective of colour, creed, sex, race, tradition and culture. Nevertheless, to achieve this, some adjustment is necessary to make possible the incorporation of the institution of tribal authorities in the structures of the democratic government. How can this institution be accommodated? What will the status and position of chiefs be in these structures? What will be their new role? How well can democratically elected structures work with non-elected ones? Is the inclusion of tribal authorities in the democratic government not going to conceptualize ethnicity? In other words, does ethnicity have any room in South Africa's democratic dispensation? To address these questions, this thesis assesses a number of aspects, which include examining the role chiefs played in the previous government, their relationships with the people, the Bantustan government and Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe, and other political parties especially in the democratic dispensation. The thesis also examines legislation passed by the Government of National Unity, as well as the constitutional proposals of the Inkatha Freedom Party, the African National Congress and other political parties in the provincial government of KwaZulu-Natal concerning the role of tribal authorities. / Thesis (M.Soc.Sci.)-University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1996.

No abstract available. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of Durban-Westville, 1991.

A fundamental driving factor to contemporary international terrorism is the role of religion. Since the 1980s, there have been not only a rise in the number of Islamist terrorist incidents but also of a more globalized and intense dimension. The casualties have risen to unprecedented levels. Africa, and the Horn of Africa, in particular, has experienced its fair share of terrorist activities. For instance, in December 1980 terrorists sympathetic to the PLO bombed the Norfolk Hotel, owned by an Israeli, in Nairobi, Kenya, killing sixteen people and injuring over a hundred. The 7 August 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, were more deadly: 240 Kenyans, 11 Tanzanians and 12 Americans died, with over 5,000 Kenyans and 86 Tanzanians injured. There was yet another terrorist attack on another Israeli-owned hotel in Mombassa and an attempt on a passenger plane on the runway at the Mombassa International Airport, Kenya. Both incidents happened in November 2002. Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the 1998 and 2002 attacks. With rising terrorism in the Horn of Africa and the reality of the Somali state failure, there is a growing concern that the Somali environment is supporting terrorist activities in the region. The activities of the al-Itihad al-Islamiya (AIAI) and later the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), the Somali Islamist fundamentalist organizations, with their feared international connections and the security implications, are of concern not only to the region but also to global security monitors. There is not much debate regarding the level of collapse of the Somali state and the possible security implications of the territory as a congenial terrorist safe haven. Most experts have presented Somalia as a clear example of a completely failed state. Rotberg (2002:131) describes Somalia as “the model of a collapsed state: a geographical expression only, with borders but with no effective way to exert authority within those borders". Jhazbhay (2003: 77) quoted Ali Mazrui as saying that "the situation in Somalia now is a culture of rules without rulers, a stateless society‟. Menkhaus (2003: 27) has singled out protracted and complete state collapse, protracted armed conflict and lawlessness as aptly representing the Somali situation. “Somalia‟s inability to pull together even the most minimalist fig-leaf of a central administration over the course of twelve years places the country in a class by itself. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2008.

Abstract not available. / Thesis (M.Soc.Sc.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, [2008].

Set against the background of public life and political practice in late capitalist mass democracies, this study presents information and communication structures as central to the formation of discursive opinion and the negotiation of social identities. Discussion and processes of exchange, that is, are conceived to be crucial to politics in the full democratic sense (as the pursuit and realization of human emancipation) . Taking the mass media to be the central institutions and a primary locus of power in the contemporary public sphere, this study seeks to explore both their semiotic, discursive natures, and the material, institutional context in which they are embedded. The concern to theorize the impact of the mass media on the public sphere 's internal processes of social, cultural and political discourse and therefore on individual and social orientation and action - is essentially a concern to come to terms with the operations of ideology and power in industrial capitalist democracies . The overall context of social communication is changing, and with it the ideological codes of power. It is therefore imperative to arrive at some understanding of the dynamics of signifying processes, the ways in which the culturally specific rhetorical lenses of the media filter and alter the wider framework of social understandings, and the possibilities for generating new social, cultural and political discourses critical of the mystifications of power. Chapter One discusses Habermas's analytical and historical account of the development of bourgeois forms of social criticism in England, France and Germany during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and their effacement in the nineteeth and twentieth centuries by the forces of mass culture and industrial capitalism . Chapter Two then proceeds to address several theoretical problems and methodological flaws in Habermas formulation. Of particular concern are his understanding of the role of the media in shaping cultural criticism, and his conceptualization of the process of communication, in which the audience is cast as passive. A critical interrogation and reconstruction of Habermas category of the public sphere to suit the changing environment of public communication is therefore called for. Chapter Three engages the pessimistic, cynical and apolitical epistemological stance of postmodernism, and rejects its unwillingness to engage in a critical hermeneutics of the structure and dynamics of ideology and power in contemporary society. Chapter Four presents Gramsci's and Althusser's reformulations of Marx's notion of ideology, points out some theoretical deficiencies in their arguments, and suggests why a semiotic understanding of the relation between meaning and reality would be of value to a theory of ideology. Chapter Five focuses on structuralist and semiotic approaches to language and society, and their understandings of the process of signification. Here the work of Saussure, Levi-Strauss and Barthes are seminal, though they are presented as not being entirely satisfactory. Voloshinov 's alternative "social semiotics" is introduced as a more appropriate conceptual framework , taking cognizance as it does of both the dynamic and (necessarily) contested nature of ideology, and the importance of the material and social elements in the signifying process. Chapter Three engages the pessimistic, cynical and apolitical epistemological stance of postmodernism, and rejects its unwillingness to engage in a critical hermeneutics of the structure and dynamics of ideology and power in contemporary society. Chapter Four presents Gramsci's and Althusser's reformulations of Marx's notion of ideology, points out some theoretical deficiencies in their arguments, and suggests why a semiotic understanding of the relation between meaning and reality would be of value to a theory of ideology. Chapter Five focuses on structuralist and semiotic approaches to language and society, and their understandings of the process of signification. Here the work of Saussure, Levi-Strauss and Barthes are seminal, though they are presented as not being entirely satisfactory. Voloshinov 's alternative "social semiotics" is introduced as a more appropriate conceptual framework , taking cognizance as it does of both the dynamic and (necessarily) contested nature of ideology, and the importance of the material and social elements in the signifying process.Chapter Six explores the political economy of late capitalism and demonstrates the need to balance semiology's textualist approach to meaning construction with an understanding of the relevance of the wider institutional context. Notwithstanding the inherent polysemy of media texts and the active role of audiences in the construction of sense and identity, this chapter argues that the character and quality of the discursive relations of advanced capitalist societies are profoundly shaped by the dynamics and principles of industrialization, commercialization, commodification and profit realization . This mediating institutional context of social communication must be taken into account by those concerned to demystify the discourses of power and their implicit agendas. Chapter Six then proceeds to address the democratic potential of new information and communication technologies. The background for this cautionary discussion is the technologization of human culture , as well as certain depoliticizing trends within the infrastructure of so-called "Information Society ", such as the growing prevalence of market principles and the increasing demands of "corporate imperatives". The chapter ends with a brief discussion of Tim Luke's argument that the participatory nature of new technologies can be exploited by counter-hegemonic groups seeking to broaden the scope of public communication in order to build a firebreak against the further colonization of the lifeworld by capital and the State. The study concludes by arguing that despite observable tendencies towards the privatization of information and the centralization of meaning, ideology remains everpresent in modern industrialized countries, and is always open to contestation. It further suggests that the ability of audiences to actively decode ideological cultural forms according to their own interests and lived experiences, together with the potential of new technologies to circulate these alternative and often counter-hegemonic meanings augurs well for democratic practice. For not only is it possible to expose and challenge the dynamics of power, but it is also increasingly possible for audiences to contribute to the agenda of political discussion, and thereby lend substance and credibility to the discursive formations of the (much maligned) contemporary public sphere. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of Natal, Durban, 1997.

The end of the cold war resulted in much optimism in Africa that political and economic problems would be minimised. In line with this optimism a number of countries undertook political and economic reforms. These developments are the reason why I chose the topic of democratic consolidation. There has been a growing interest in the democratisation prospects of these 'fragile states'. The question is, would they succeed in establishing necessary institutions to support democratic norms? In the literature there are diverse opinions, some point to political elites as the main stumbling block to democratic consolidation. They argue that there are no incentives to pursue a democratic path. Modernisation theory has placed more emphasis on economic development as a prerequisite to political stability. As a result some people argue that poor countries have limited chances to consolidate their democracy. This paper focuses upon the prospects of democratic consolidation in South Africa. The study has two main themes that are closely interlinked. The relationship between economic development and political development will be examined as will the positioning and ability of ruling elite to facilitate or impede democratic consolidation. What is argued is that institutions are in place to guarantee democratic consolidation. What is required now is a robust civil and political society to safeguard this democracy. This dissertation concludes by arguing that citizens are the key to democratic consolidation, they can guard their won freedom if they feel that it is threatened. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of Natal, Durban, 1999.

Abstract not available. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of Durban-Westville, 1996.

At face value, foreign aid is generally extended either to contain crises situations or promote development. In Africa, it appears that foreign aid has failed on both counts. One crucial question being asked by experts is, why has there been so little development in sub-Saharan Africa despite so much aid? Indeed, even the World Bank has admitted grudgingly that assistance programs have been either ineffectual or had very small development impact on recipient countries. This study seeks to examine foreign aid effectiveness and management. Focusing on the nature of the relationships between donors and recipients, the study argues that to foster economic development in Africa, a need exists for a transformation in aid relations away from fragmented donor-driven projects and programs to a predictable long-term support to African owned programs. The work addresses these challenges by reviewing current debates and analysis of new forms, instruments, promises, and direction of development cooperation. Donor discourses, which are on ownership, partnership, less conditionalities, and more empowerment, are not always followed in practice. In fact, the objective reality is that foreign aid donors usually target an assortment of aid instruments at diverse objectives. That notwithstanding, foreign aid (generally) can only be effective in achieving the objectives set by donors when it is planned, structured, and implemented in partnership with aid recipients. Clearly, the nature of the relationships between donors and recipients has a critical influence on the effectiveness of development aid. So far, the current aid experience is that the relationship between African governments and their aid donors is characterized by a vast inequality. As such, this study takes the position that there is no viable alternative to Africans taking effective charge of their destiny and deliberately creating conditions that are essential for effecting desirable change in the region's fortunes. It also takes the position that Africa's development partners such as the international financial institutions should actively seek to create and nurture the space needed by Africans for the realization of their developmental goals. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2003.

Given the destabilizing effect which conflicts have had on Africa's socio-economic and political development, attempts have been (and are still being) made by a combination of state and non-state actors towards ensuring the prevention of conflicts before they occur, including the setting up of the required capacity to deal with them. Epitomizing this tradition is Nigeria, which courtesy of its regional hegemonic status and geographic location as well as its military and economic strength has been one of the leading nations in conflict resolution, peace building and peacekeeping in Africa. In view of the foregoing, this study revisits Nigeria's conflict resolution mechanisms in Africa, through an analysis of its role within Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)-sponsored projects; such as the Nigerian-led military intervention in Liberia between 1990 and 1997. Using the realist approach as its framework of analysis and content analysis as its research methodology, the study interrogates the connection between Nigeria's interventionist role in Africa and the possible nexus or otherwise with its foreign policy dictates. The study further examines the gains or otherwise that have been achieved courtesy of the Africanization of Nigeria's foreign policy objectives from 1960 to 2010; and the probable factors responsible for the much 'politicized' shift to citizen diplomacy. The study reveals that what is presently at play is a continuation of Nigeria's traditional Afro-centric posture and advocates the need for Nigeria to put an end to its seemingly 'charity inclined foreign policy orientation'. It recommends a re-definition of Nigeria's foreign policy focus to accommodate a 'People first' approach towards conflict resolution in Africa both in theory and in practice. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2012.