Despite the growing prominence of ‘international contact groups’ in the field of peacemaking, there is little academic attention for such ad hoc informal negotiating groups of third-party states. This study seeks to contribute to this understudied topic by investigating under what conditions contact groups are most likely to achieve negotiation success. Based on the framework of ‘recognition theory’, I argue that respect for each member as equal partner of the negotiating group helps to prevent obstructive behaviour. It is therefore hypothesised that ‘recognition for all members of the contact group enhances the likelihood of reaching agreement on a peacemaking strategy’. This is tested by means of a structured focused comparison in a most-similar cases design, studying two contact groups that operated during the 1999 conflict in Kosovo. I subsequently probe the generalisability of my findings by extending the analysis with a third case of contact group negotiations on Syria in 2012. The empirical findings provide support for the hypothesis and hint at the theory’s relevance in today’s context of increasingly dispersed power and mediation leverage. Nevertheless, further research is needed to establish with greater validity and reliability the effect of recognition and how it relates to other conditions for success.

Abstract This thesis discusses how the impact and effectiveness of sanctions has shifted to be less significant in parallel with the shift to global multipolarity from a previously bipolar world. This topic is analysed by conducting a comprehensive case study of how Russia, despite being the most sanctioned state in the world, is able to maintain its economic stability and even growth due to the new multipolar landscape of global power relations. The case of Russia’s avoidance of sanctions is analysed by conducting a mixed method case study which uses both qualitative and quantitative data through the theoretical framework of Realism and Realist conceptualisations of power. This thesis contributes to the academic discussion regarding sanctions by building upon Early’s (2009) triadic model to describe more accurately the methods by which third party states assist in the avoidance of sanctions. Through this case study, Russia’s success at sanction avoidance is attributed to the involvement of third-party states in circumventing sanctions’ restrictions.