本文考察佛教瑜伽中觀派系統內之刹那滅。此考察主要以寂護（Śāntarakita）之《攝真實》(Tattvasagraha)第八章「恆常的存在物之考察」（sthirabhāva-parikā）為文本根據，並以花戒（Kamalaśīla）之《疏》(Tattvasagraha-pañjikā)為輔助。刹那滅主張存在物只在一刹那中存在，能持續存在至下刹那。實在者（realist）如正派（Nyāya）、勝派（Vaiśeika）等以共相、本體等恆常的存在物，視為其他事物存在背後的基礎。他們認為本體能持續存在至下刹那，能關係於下刹那的存在物，把其產生或滅。按此，存在物必須透過被原因「產生」的形式生起，其滅也必須由其自身以外的原因造成，否則它能一直存在。如取實在者對存在物的解，刹那滅被推翻。筆者認為刹那滅之所以成有三點（1）被產生的存在物皆以「滅」為本性、（2）存在物是以即時產生結果的形式存在、（3）前刹那與後刹那的存在物以必然伴隨的（necessary concomitant）關係互相依待，後刹那的果並非由前刹那的因「生出」。本文旨在分析及探討上述的證。筆者以支持寂護的場闡釋，嘗試以回應反對者的批評，證存在者只有「被產生的」和「刹那的」存在物，所謂能持續存在的存在物，實際上並存在。筆者並進一步澄清，瑜伽中觀派系統內的刹那的存在物並非獨存在，其必然伴隨的關係也違反佛教的緣起觀。此以因果關係為概建構的主張，也能與中觀的世俗諦同時成。 / The present study is an examination of the Buddhist Yogācāra-Madhyamaka argument for momentariness in the sthirabhāvaparīkā chapter of Śāntarakita’s Tattvasagraha with reference to Kamalaśīla’s Tattvasagraha-pañjikā. The theory of momentariness holds that produced things only exist within one moment; they do not exist before or after. Realists such as Nyāya and Vaiśeika, on the other hand, regard universal, substance, and permanent existents alike as the basis of the existence of things. Since these existents can persist in the next moment, things in the next moment are considered to be produced or destroyed by them through the means of relation. For this reason, the realists hold that things must exist through production. The destruction of these things must also be produced. As the cause of destruction exists apart from these things, the latter will persist if the former is not present. The theory of momentariness will be refuted if this realist conception of existence is accepted. / The present study seeks to argue for the theory of momentariness with the following: (1) whatever is produced takes “destruction as its nature; (2) whatever exists produces its effect immediately in the same moment; (3) existents in the former moment and those in the latter moment are related to each other through a relation of necessary concomitance; they are not related through a causal relation in which the effect is produced out from the cause. The conclusion of the argument of this study is that whatever exists must be produced and momentary; the non-produced or the non-momentary things, which are considered to be persistent by the opponents, in fact have no existence. This study also points out that momentary existents under the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka system do not exist independently. Their necessary concomitant relation does not violate the Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination. And as the theory of momentariness considers causal relation conceptually constructed, this theory is also compatible with Madhyamika’s conventional truth. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / 方麗欣. / "2012年10月". / "2012 nian 10 yue". / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2013. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 94-99). / Abstract in Chinese and English. / Fang Lixin. / Chapter 第一章 --- 引言 --- p.7 / Chapter 第一部份 --- 基本問題 --- p.7 / Chapter 第二部份 --- 存在物與刹那 --- p.9 / Chapter 第三部份 --- 本文重點 --- p.13 / Chapter 第四部份 --- 研究方法 --- p.17 / Chapter 第二章 --- 「被產生的」存在物以「滅」為本性 --- p.18 / Chapter 第一部份 --- 正理派對「滅」的理解 --- p.19 / Chapter 第二部份 --- 以「滅」為本性 --- p.21 / Chapter 第三部份 --- 「被產生的」存在物之必然滅 --- p.23 / Chapter 第四部份 --- 「他因」不能產生「被產生的」存在物之滅 --- p.25 / Chapter 第一節 --- 滅為「非實非不實」 / Chapter 第二節 --- 滅的時間性 / Chapter 第三章 --- 「存在」即有「即時的因果效力」 --- p.39 / Chapter 第一部份 --- 反對者之存在的標準及其理論困難 --- p.41 / Chapter 第二部份 --- 以因果效力作為存在的標準 --- p.46 / Chapter 第一節 --- 因果效力之雙重意義 / Chapter 第二節 --- 因果效力與現量的關係 / Chapter 第三部份 --- 「不是被產生的」存在物沒有因果效力 --- p.55 / Chapter 第四章 --- 存在物間的關係 --- p.64 / Chapter 第一部份 --- 刹那的存在物與「變化」 --- p.66 / Chapter 第二部份 --- Yogasena的批評從中觀立場出發 --- p.70 / Chapter 第一節 --- 《中論》對刹那滅學說的批評 / Chapter 第二節 --- Yogasena的批評 / Chapter 第三節 --- Yogasena之批評的影響 / Chapter 第三部份 --- 回應 --- p.78 / Chapter 第一節 --- Yogasena對《攝》中刹那滅理論的誤解 / Chapter 第二節 --- 中觀並不否定存在物為刹那滅 / Chapter 第五章 --- 結論 --- p.89 / 略號及參考書目 --- p.94

The research explores the interplay between causality and the notion of time in Yogācāra Buddhism. There has been a long debate over whether time is an objective reality with independent ontological status or, in contrast, a subjective experience that is dependent on mind. Until now, the two sides have failed to provide a clear and complete explanation of our temporal conception of things. A similar situation can be identified in the development of the notion of time in Indian philosophy. The concept of time (kāla) in the Indian tradition has evolved from cosmological speculations and the notion of divine power as developed in the Upanisads, where time is identified with Brahman (God), which is postulated as the ultimate ground of existence. On the other hand, in Buddhist philosophy our temporal conception of things is explained with our psychological experience. The limited investigation into the teachings of Yogācāra Buddhism has created a vacuum in our knowledge of the concept of time as understood by this particular Buddhist tradition. The thesis argues that concepts of time in Yogācāra are closely linked with its spiritual practice and its explanation for temporal experience as it occurs in the internal mind. It is the Vijñānavāda theory of causality that mediates between mind and spiritual practice. Here, time is defined as a nominal designation for an uninterrupted series of causal activities. When causality links with the flowing stream of time in the past, present and future, it creates the impression of a linear relation between the cause and the arising of the effect. In this thesis, primary sources in Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese are presented in order to show that there are doctrinal materials to support that it is around this central theme on which Yogācāra discussion on time hinger. The thesis demonstrates that the study of time in Yogācāra is divided into three strata: staring from the soteriological investigation by Maitreya and Asanga then developed into phenomenological inquiry in Vasubandhu’s idealistic position, and completed in the epistemological system of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. This research is intended to fill a gap in the study of the Buddhist concept of time and to provide a possible resolution to the contemporary debate over the nature of temporal notions by examining it from the religious and philosophical perspectives found in Yogācāra Buddhism. / published_or_final_version / Buddhist Studies / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy