Two central issues in literature discussing legal authority seems to the the questions of what the law has when it has authority and under what conditions the law can be said to have authority. This thesis analyses an answer to these two questions as it has been developed by legal philosopher Joseph Raz. The analysis is conducted through scrutinizing the relation within and between three central concepts in Raz´s theory on legal authority; authority as normative power, the service conception and the obligation to obey. As for the concept of normative power, Raz seems to alternate between defining normative power as the ability to change protected reasons for action and as being a protected reason for action. The question the thesis aims to answer is whether normative power is best understood as the ability to change protected reasons for action or as being a protected reason for action? Raz does not seem to make a distinction between the two and thus, he regards both definitions as plausible. However, the analysis suggests that while it might be plausible to use both definitions as a definition of normative power, they are not interchangeable, but rather seems to represent two different levels of normative power. The analysis of the second concept, the service conception, examines Raz´s statement that justified exclusionary reasons entail a moral obligation to obey the law. Here the thesis asks if a moral obligation to obey is a plausible consequence of justified exclusionary reasons, given Raz´s own definition of obedience. The analysis suggests that a moral obligation to obey is not a plausible consequence of exclusionary reasons being justified and thus, that there seems to be incoherence between the two. Lastly, the thesis asks about the coherence between Raz´s two statements A. that justified exclusionary reasons entail a moral obligation to obey and B. that there is no moral obligation to obey the law. This last question had to be somewhat revised as the first statement (A) had already been suggested to be incoherent by the previous analysis. As such, this last question was revised into asking how the law can have legitimate authority when its legitimacy is tied to a moral obligation to obey, which is denied by Raz? The analysis suggests that these two statements are incoherent and that, as such, it is implausible that the law has the possibility to have legitimate authority at the same time as there exists no moral obligation to obey, as the former is dependent on the latter. The thesis ends in a number of concluding reflections.

This diploma thesis deals with the relationship between the perceived legitimacy of the courts, the obligation to obey the law and courts and the willingness to cooperate with the criminal justice system in Central Europe. Using structural equation modeling method, I analyzed the fifth wave of the European Social Survey and created and compared models for Czechia, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary. Legitimacy, according to Tankebe, is conceptualized as a confidence in procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and legality. The obligation to obey the law is then a potential effect of perceived legitimacy. The first research question asks about the universal applicability of the procedural justice theory across criminal system institutions and across different countries. As in the previous research on police, procedural justice plays a pivotal role for the willingness to cooperate with the police and the courts. In Czechia and Hungary, procedural justice is out of all fo the dimensiions of legitimacy the strongest predictor of the willingness to cooperate. In Poland, procedural justice does not affect cooperation, however, it leads to obligation to obey the law and courts. In Slovakia, instrumental factors play a more important role than procedural justice, which can be explained either by...

Joseph Raz has developed a concept of authority based on the special relationship between reasons and action. While the view is very complex and subtle, it can be summed up by saying that authorities are authorities insofar as they can mediate between the reasons that happen to bind their subjects and the subjects’ actions. Authorities do this by providing special reasons via directives to their subjects. These special reasons are what Raz calls “protected reasons.” Protected reasons are both first-order reasons for action and second-order “exclusionary reasons” that exclude the subject from considering some reasons in the balance of reasons for or against any action. I first make clear what Raz’s view of authority is, and I then defend this view from some contemporary critics.

In the sphere of labour and employment, "prerogative" is usually taken to refer to the "right to manage" an organisation. The right can be divided into those decisions which relate to the utilisation of the human resources of the organisation and decisions of an "economic" or "business" nature. This thesis focuses on the first category of decisionmaking. It is generally accepted by employers and trade unions that employers have the right to manage employees. The legal basis for this right is to be found in the contract of employment which has as one of its elements the subordination of the employee to the authority of the employer. This element affords the employer the legal right to give instructions and creates the legal duty for the employee to obey these instructions. Employers' right to manage is, however, neither fixed nor static. The main purpose of this thesis is to determine the extent of employers' right to manage employees. This is done by examining the restrictions imposed by the law {ie common law and legislation) and collective bargaining. The examination is accordingly focussed on what is Jett of employer prerogative. A number of conclusions are drawn from the examination. One of the most important conclusions reached is that, although most of an employer's common law decisionmaking powers have been statutorily regulated, none have been rescinded. The employer has accordingly retained its decision-making power, albeit in a more restricted or limited form. This makes further restriction of its decision-making power through contractual or statutory provisions or collective bargaining possible. It, however, also makes the lessening or even the total removal of these restrictions through future statutory provisions or collective bargaining possible. / Law / LL.D.

In the sphere of labour and employment, "prerogative" is usually taken to refer to the "right to manage" an organisation. The right can be divided into those decisions which relate to the utilisation of the human resources of the organisation and decisions of an "economic" or "business" nature. This thesis focuses on the first category of decisionmaking. It is generally accepted by employers and trade unions that employers have the right to manage employees. The legal basis for this right is to be found in the contract of employment which has as one of its elements the subordination of the employee to the authority of the employer. This element affords the employer the legal right to give instructions and creates the legal duty for the employee to obey these instructions. Employers' right to manage is, however, neither fixed nor static. The main purpose of this thesis is to determine the extent of employers' right to manage employees. This is done by examining the restrictions imposed by the law {ie common law and legislation) and collective bargaining. The examination is accordingly focussed on what is Jett of employer prerogative. A number of conclusions are drawn from the examination. One of the most important conclusions reached is that, although most of an employer's common law decisionmaking powers have been statutorily regulated, none have been rescinded. The employer has accordingly retained its decision-making power, albeit in a more restricted or limited form. This makes further restriction of its decision-making power through contractual or statutory provisions or collective bargaining possible. It, however, also makes the lessening or even the total removal of these restrictions through future statutory provisions or collective bargaining possible. / Law / LL.D.

Preliminary References in Civil and European procedural law JUDr. Štangová Eva 1 Abstract (EN) The main purpose of this doctoral thesis was to provide an comprehensive analysis of the Preliminary questions under Slovak and Czech national legislations and to provide the same analysis of Preliminary questions under Treaties and Legislation of European Union Law (hereinafter referred to as "Union law"). This analysis shall cover both, Slovak and Czech code of judicial procedure which have the same numerical designation as Act No. 99/1963 Coll. and are known as Code of civil procedure (hereinafter referred to as OSP) in Slovakia and Code of civil procedure (hereinafter referred to as OSŘ) in the Czech Republic as well. The research in this thesis is structurally divided into 5 independent chapters. Using bellow stated research methods and science procedures; each part focuses on different context of preliminary questions. The first two chapters focus the historical context, concept, importance and scope of the preliminary questions under legislation of Czech and Slovak Republic. This chapter also outlines the normative legal regulations of these issues in the "de lege lata" status. At the same time, the author pays more attention to the eligibility of preliminary questions to be considered as preliminary ones,...