India, China and Indonesia are among the six largest and fastest growing economies in the world (BRIICS). Rich countries are still reluctant to accept the fact that developing countries are becoming stronger and that the balance of economic power is shifting. The international community therefore seeks to find the way how to deal with this situation and the answer is to involve developing countries in the international trade. The main objective of the WTO is to involve developing countries in world trade and to create better conditions for them. Therefore, in 2001, the Doha Development Agenda has commenced and its aim is to achieve the goals of the WTO. The main objective of this paper is to evaluate the success of the Doha round and its prospects with the focus on the attitudes and interests of the major Asian economies, namely China, India and Indonesia.

Magister Commercii - MCom / Regionalism has become a prominent feature of the current international landscape. During the last decade and a half there has been an increasing number of countries that opted to form regional blocs. 1 Developing countries fear of marginalisation and their need to be part of a larger economic entity has been an important motivation in signing regional trade agreements (RTA's).

Investigates how the SADC achieves trade liberalisation and ensure human rights protection in SADC at the same time. Discusses how the right–based approach on trade can successfully be used as a tool for the advancement of human rights in the SADC context. / A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Law University of Pretoria, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree Masters of Law (LLM in Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa). Prepared under the supervision of Prof Fredrick Jjuuko, Faculty of Law, Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda. / LLM Dissertation (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa -- University of Pretoria, 2009. / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/ / Centre for Human Rights / LLM

Through empirical research the researcher gained an in-depth knowledge regarding the growth trends in the South African manufactured export industry as well as the factors determining the patterns of growth and champion industries. Finally, recommendations that may be used by relevant authorities and scholars were made. To researchers, a study at disaggregated level into the growth trends of each manufactured export sub-sector should be central to future research. / Dissertation (MA (Economics))--University of Pretoria, 2005. / Economics / unrestricted

Magister Philosophiae - MPhil / The Great Lakes Region has long been viewed as a land of untapped economic potential due to, amongst other factors, the failures of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (ECGLC)1 and the Rwandan genocide. The region has many opportunities and common initiatives despite tensions among its core countries. Cross-borders trade, common infrastructures and common border security zones operations have shown that regional integration is possible within the region. From the Dar-Es-Salaam Conference and Declaration2 in November 2004, and thereafter, the signing of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) Pact3 in Nairobi, in 2006 the Group of Friends (GoFs) and the member states plus international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) took a stance to build for the future of the region. They created this new regional integration initiative in order to achieve peace. Peace has multiple dimensions and implications among which poverty alleviation and building of common future in the region are crucial and conducive to increase of population resources.4 Poverty alleviation, sustainable management of common infrastructures, trade and security can be effectively achieved by integrating economically the region.

In recent years, the use of the mode of regional trade liberalisation has proliferated, while the multilateral talks through the WTO have proceeded slowly, resulting in a debate on the role of bilateral and multilateral trade liberalisation. This thesis aims to provide new insights to this debate by studying the welfare effects of different types of trade agreements and the equilibrium outcome(s) of trade negotiation. We apply the three-country and three-good “competing-exporters model" developed by Bagwell and Staiger (1999) as our basic trade framework. By comparing the equilibrium welfare of each country under different structures of trading blocs, we clarify the welfare impacts of each trade agreement. Then we model the process of trade negotiation as a trade negotiation game, in which each country endogenously decides whether to negotiate through multilateral or bilateral trade liberalisation. By solving the equilibrium of the game, the stable structure of trading blocs and the path(s) to reach it can be found. We start with a framework in which all countries are welfare maximising. We find that at the early stage of trade negotiation, a free trade agreement (FTA) is Pareto welfare improving, despite the fact that member countries benefit more than any non-member. Although being the hub is the best position, a spoke is in a worse position than being outside a single FTA. Thus, a “hub-and-spoke" structure cannot be achieved and the unique equilibrium outcome of trade negotiation is given by multilateral free trade (MFT) through a multilateral trade agreement (MTA). The welfare-maximising analysis is followed by the examination of cases in which each government is politically motivated. The political structure we use is similar to Ornelas (2005), which follows the basic framework developed by Grossman and Helpman (1995), emphasising the interaction between lobby groups representing the special interest of one industry and the government in their home country. We first consider a circumstance where the political pressures are only from the import- competing sector. It is then generalised to a case in which all sectors are allowed to lobby the local government. Furthermore, the analysis is extended into an asymmetric world that includes two big countries and one small country. Our results show that political economy forces usually reduce the likelihood of forming trade agreements and that when the political concerns are sufficiently large, all trade agreements can be prevented by political pressures. Also, our findings suggest that the option of bilateral FTAs does not cause an initially infeasible MFT to become feasible, while a previously feasible MFT is likely to be blocked by the option of FTAs. Thus, our thesis provides some evidence to support the argument that the formation of FTAs can be a “stumbling block" for global trade liberalisation. / Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of Adelaide, School of Economics, 2009

In recent years, the use of the mode of regional trade liberalisation has proliferated, while the multilateral talks through the WTO have proceeded slowly, resulting in a debate on the role of bilateral and multilateral trade liberalisation. This thesis aims to provide new insights to this debate by studying the welfare effects of different types of trade agreements and the equilibrium outcome(s) of trade negotiation. We apply the three-country and three-good “competing-exporters model" developed by Bagwell and Staiger (1999) as our basic trade framework. By comparing the equilibrium welfare of each country under different structures of trading blocs, we clarify the welfare impacts of each trade agreement. Then we model the process of trade negotiation as a trade negotiation game, in which each country endogenously decides whether to negotiate through multilateral or bilateral trade liberalisation. By solving the equilibrium of the game, the stable structure of trading blocs and the path(s) to reach it can be found. We start with a framework in which all countries are welfare maximising. We find that at the early stage of trade negotiation, a free trade agreement (FTA) is Pareto welfare improving, despite the fact that member countries benefit more than any non-member. Although being the hub is the best position, a spoke is in a worse position than being outside a single FTA. Thus, a “hub-and-spoke" structure cannot be achieved and the unique equilibrium outcome of trade negotiation is given by multilateral free trade (MFT) through a multilateral trade agreement (MTA). The welfare-maximising analysis is followed by the examination of cases in which each government is politically motivated. The political structure we use is similar to Ornelas (2005), which follows the basic framework developed by Grossman and Helpman (1995), emphasising the interaction between lobby groups representing the special interest of one industry and the government in their home country. We first consider a circumstance where the political pressures are only from the import- competing sector. It is then generalised to a case in which all sectors are allowed to lobby the local government. Furthermore, the analysis is extended into an asymmetric world that includes two big countries and one small country. Our results show that political economy forces usually reduce the likelihood of forming trade agreements and that when the political concerns are sufficiently large, all trade agreements can be prevented by political pressures. Also, our findings suggest that the option of bilateral FTAs does not cause an initially infeasible MFT to become feasible, while a previously feasible MFT is likely to be blocked by the option of FTAs. Thus, our thesis provides some evidence to support the argument that the formation of FTAs can be a “stumbling block" for global trade liberalisation. / Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of Adelaide, School of Economics, 2009

In recent years, the use of the mode of regional trade liberalisation has proliferated, while the multilateral talks through the WTO have proceeded slowly, resulting in a debate on the role of bilateral and multilateral trade liberalisation. This thesis aims to provide new insights to this debate by studying the welfare effects of different types of trade agreements and the equilibrium outcome(s) of trade negotiation. We apply the three-country and three-good “competing-exporters model" developed by Bagwell and Staiger (1999) as our basic trade framework. By comparing the equilibrium welfare of each country under different structures of trading blocs, we clarify the welfare impacts of each trade agreement. Then we model the process of trade negotiation as a trade negotiation game, in which each country endogenously decides whether to negotiate through multilateral or bilateral trade liberalisation. By solving the equilibrium of the game, the stable structure of trading blocs and the path(s) to reach it can be found. We start with a framework in which all countries are welfare maximising. We find that at the early stage of trade negotiation, a free trade agreement (FTA) is Pareto welfare improving, despite the fact that member countries benefit more than any non-member. Although being the hub is the best position, a spoke is in a worse position than being outside a single FTA. Thus, a “hub-and-spoke" structure cannot be achieved and the unique equilibrium outcome of trade negotiation is given by multilateral free trade (MFT) through a multilateral trade agreement (MTA). The welfare-maximising analysis is followed by the examination of cases in which each government is politically motivated. The political structure we use is similar to Ornelas (2005), which follows the basic framework developed by Grossman and Helpman (1995), emphasising the interaction between lobby groups representing the special interest of one industry and the government in their home country. We first consider a circumstance where the political pressures are only from the import- competing sector. It is then generalised to a case in which all sectors are allowed to lobby the local government. Furthermore, the analysis is extended into an asymmetric world that includes two big countries and one small country. Our results show that political economy forces usually reduce the likelihood of forming trade agreements and that when the political concerns are sufficiently large, all trade agreements can be prevented by political pressures. Also, our findings suggest that the option of bilateral FTAs does not cause an initially infeasible MFT to become feasible, while a previously feasible MFT is likely to be blocked by the option of FTAs. Thus, our thesis provides some evidence to support the argument that the formation of FTAs can be a “stumbling block" for global trade liberalisation. / Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of Adelaide, School of Economics, 2009

Purpose of this diploma thesis is to analyze foreign aid as a stabile part of nations expenditures of all developed countries since 60's. But at the same time foreign aid not being important enough for developed countries to manage it more effectively. This diploma thesis analyses among others development of different economic approaches on this topic, financial flows of this sort since the beginning and also an analysis of foreign aid as whole as well as some of its parts. I`m also trying to find reasons why developed nations provide foreign aid and also motives for accepting it by developing nations. Also trade liberalisation is described as the only way of solving foreign aid poor effeciency.

This paper focuses on the the interplay between Free Trade Zones (FTZs) and labour rights. It seeks to determine the effects of FTZs on the full realization of labour rights in Mozambique and Namibia. / Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa)) -- University of Pretoria, 2007. / A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Law University of Pretoria, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree Masters of Law (LLM in Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa). Prepared under the supervision of Dr Paulo Comoane of the Unicersidade Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo, Mozambique. / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/ / Centre for Human Rights / LLM