This study examines German-U.S. relations during the George W. Bush administration. It utilizes Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane's theoretical framework of anti-Americanism to examine German perceptions of U.S. foreign policy. Katzenstein and Keohane distinguish four distinctive types of anti-Americanism. Liberal anti-Americanism is a reaction to unpopular U.S. foreign policies. Social anti-Americanism occurs in response to U.S. style capitalism and U.S. society. Sovereign-nationalist anti-American is a nationalistic response to the superpower's perceived intrusion on state sovereignty. Radical anti-Americanism is a Leninist or radical Islamic response to U.S. power. I hypothesize that anti-Americanism in German is primarily a political reaction to the policies of the Bush administration. However the negative attitudes towards U.S. foreign policy also manifest themselves in the form of the social and sovereign types of anti-Americanism. / Master of Arts

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / The purpose of this study is to determine how post-Cold War NATO allies have contributed to transatlantic relations, both in times of crisis and in times of harmony. Their contribution, although less significant when compared to long-time members' military capabilities, takes various forms. Their support in times of disagreement among allies over the Iraq 2002-2003 issue proved to be more valuable than was anticipated. Therefore, my research is an introspective look at the events that marked NATO's evolution during the last fifteen years and their implications for NATO members as units and for traditional transatlantic relations as a whole. Successive NATO enlargements proved that each decision to add new members reflected NATO's priorities at that particular moment. Whether it was a pre-Cold War enlargement or a post-Cold War enlargement, the decision reflected NATO's interests. Some of the decisions were predominantly military; some were in accordance with the international order established after World War II. The post-Cold War enhancements had two major characteristics: the first enlargement was more symbolic than the second because it erased the artificial lines set by Yalta, whereas the second one was much more practical. The geo-strategic position of the NATO candidates and their willingness to join, prior to their formal invitation, were favorable factors, and the decisions made regarding membership proved to have long-term, positive consequences. New NATO members, particularly Romania, appreciated their new status and participated actively in both NATO operations and in "coalition of the willing". Their equal participation in NATO-led operations and coalitions made a palpable contribution to both NATO and to the transatlantic relations. / International Civilian, Romanian Ministry of National Defense

Do the transatlantic relations have a future after the Iraq crisis and what will they look like? This question will be discussed in this and the next issue of WeltTrends.<br> For this debate, Thomas Risse, Chair of International Relation at the Freie Universität Berlin, provides the initial input. Risse focuses on controversial issues inside of Europe, the outcome of which will be decisive for the future of the transatlantic relationship. Will the European consensus once constituted by the commitment to international law and multilateralism persist? What is the European position regarding democracy and human rights in the Middle East? Will Europe develop a strategy to cope with the new kind of threats posed by weapons of mass destruction in the hands of dictators or terrorists? Risse´s article has provoked a debate inside the German academic community, whose contributions will be published in the next issue of WeltTrends.

For centuries, statesmen have engaged in personal encounters and correspondences with their political counterparts abroad and thereby exercised what can be called ‘personal diplomacy’ with the aim of influencing the other’s foreign policy. By tracing the use of this strategy in the history of the transatlantic relations between Germany and the United States of America from WWII to the present day, this research aims to analyze the applicability of the concept in this particular bilateral relationship and highlight the successes and failures of different statesmen’s attempts at exerting several types of power. To do so, Raven and French’s so-called ‘Power/Interaction Model of Interpersonal Influence’ is applied to the five case studies, which are the personal relationships between American presidents or secretaries of state and German chancellors or foreign ministers, namely Adenauer and Dulles, Ford and Kissinger, Kohl, Reagan and Bush Senior, Schröder and Bush Junior and Merkel and Obama. What transpires from the examination of their friendships or enmities is that personal relationships do indeed have an impact on statesmen’s political decisions in the German-American relationship, though, whether this influence has been essential or minor differs from case to case. Be that as it may, by presenting the numerous historical instances in which personal diplomacy can be said to have taken place and thereby demonstrating that there exists a trend, this thesis arrives at the verdict that personal diplomacy is a considerable factor in the two countries’ relations and one that demands attention if the scholarly discourse seeks to gain a full understanding of international political processes.

The purpose of this thesis is to provide a critical evaluation of the neorealist theory of international relations and its soft balancing variant through the use of case studies referring to transatlantic relations in the post-Cold War era. Each case study indicates a specific category of power. These are: i) Military - the European attempt to create a common military arm from 1991 to 2003. ii) Diplomatic - the EU's involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from 1991 to 2003. iii) Economic the EU-USA steel dispute in 2002/03. In particular, the thesis undertakes to analyse whether the EU balanced the USA in the post-Cold War period either as a result of the altered structural distribution of capabilities within the international system (unipolarity) or of a set of deliberate plans to do so. After introducing the concepts of unipolarity, hard and soft balancing, the thesis outlines three comprehensive answers that neorealist scholars have generated as to whether the USA can or cannot be balanced in the post-Cold War international system, namely the structural, the soft balancing, and the alternative structural options. Then, drawing on a defensive realist perspective, this research goes on to consider the creation of the EU as a great power in the post-Cold War era. In light of this, the thesis aims to find out whether the rise of the EU as a great power has had an impact upon unipolarity either because of structural incentives or because of a predetermination to frustrate the aggressive policies of the unipolar state. The thesis then proceeds to investigate whether throughout the case studies series the EU has balanced the USA. The case studies highlight that the EU, freed from the rigid bipolar stalemate it had been locked into during the Cold War, undertook to exert greater influence on the world stage in the post-Cold War period. To some extent the EU has accomplished this in all of the power dimensions analysed in this thesis. Nevertheless, the EU's efforts to hold sway within the international system were not aimed at addressing the relative power imbalance created by unipolarity, and there were no deliberate plans harboured by the EU to frustrate the influence of any aggressive unipolar state. Overall, this thesis found the causal logic outlined by neorealism to be convincing to the extent that the EU emerged as a great power in the post-Cold War era and had greater freedom of action under unipolarity. However, with the partial exception of the economic dimension of power, there was no persuasive evidence uncovered to support the anticipated outcome of the neorealist theoretical slant, namely that great powers tend to balance each other. Moreover, while the soft balancing claim is considered to have promise as an attempt to understand how the EU can respond to US power under unipolarity, this study did not find sufficient evidence of the EU's deliberate intentions of doing so.

The thesis focuses on changes in economic policy in the United States and on their external economic relations, with emphasis on transatlantic relations in the end of 20th and early 21st century. Against the backdrop of the most important domestic policy and foreign affairs in last two decades, it monitors and compares the economic and political realities of U.S. society while trying to capture significant changes in U.S. economic policy. It does so not only with basic macroeconomic indicators, fiscal and monetary policies, but also in conjunction with the traditionally problematic systems of social and health care. Internal developments are then put into the context of changes in the external relations of the United States with an emphasis on the economic side. On this count, the thesis focuses on transatlantic relations and the emerging strategic partnership between the U.S. and China. Hand, it does not leave even the processes of globalization, the economic crisis of 2007 - 2009, or the position of the U.S. dollar in the global economy.

In this issue, we continue and complete the debate on the future of the transatlantic relationship and of world order after the Iraq war. The debate was initiated by an article by Thomas Risse (Freie Universität Berlin) in WeltTrends 39, which has provoked a remarkable reaction within the German academic community, as documented in WeltTrends 40. This issue features additional comments and the rebuttal by Thomas Risse. <br>Most authors believe that the transatlantic partnership is in a serious crisis, but claim that it remains without an alternative for both sides of the Atlantic.

In this issue, we continue and complete the debate on the future of the transatlantic relationship and of world order after the Iraq war. The debate was initiated by an article by Thomas Risse (Freie Universität Berlin) in WeltTrends 39, which has provoked a remarkable reaction within the German academic community, as documented in WeltTrends 40. This issue features additional comments and the rebuttal by Thomas Risse. <br>Most authors believe that the transatlantic partnership is in a serious crisis, but claim that it remains without an alternative for both sides of the Atlantic.

The state system cannot renounce to the US superpower as a guarantor for international security. This Polish author describes the US strategy after 9-11 to fight the „war against terrorism“: The United States of America is willing to cooperate, but if it seems to be necessary, they act independently. The author points out that the European Union is too weak to emancipate from the US. But even if the hegemonic US does not respect international law and state sovereignty, unilateral engagement is less dangerous for the world’s security than US isolationism.

The September 11 terrorist attacks brought a discourse on the transatlantic rift to the agenda of international community. In fact, at the end of the CW, the emergence of the US as the leading hegemonic power gave way to transatlantic divergences concerning security perceptions and strategies of the post-CW era. Also, NATO has been challenged with these drastic changes in the international system. Yet, owing to the initiatives taken for the transformation of the Atlantic alliance during the 1990s, NATO maintained its relevance for the new world order. However, the divergences of the US and Europeans on their strategies to deal with the post-September 11 security threats led to another discussions about the future of NATO. Indeed, as the US&rsquo / post-September 11 unilateral policies deepened the transatlantic rift already underway since the end of the CW, on the way to Iraq war, NATO turned out to be the place where the divisions between the allies were reflected the most. Hence, the US&rsquo / preferences for ad hoc coalitions of the willing understanding damaged the longduring multilateral alliance by leading to a secondary role for NATO during the US&rsquo / Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns. That is why, time is needed to see whether the old allies facing new threats can reconcile their differences in the name of a renewed transatlantic security cooperation through the initiatives taken within NATO?