Les questions liées à l’applicabilité temporelle du droit de l’Union européenne se posent dès qu’un acte nouveau est adopté par l’Union. Il est systématiquement nécessaire de déterminer l’instant à compter duquel cet acte produit ses effets et les faits alors concernés. L’exigence d’uniformité du droit de l’Union européenne implique, de surcroît, que les réponses à ces questions soient apportées par le droit de l’Union européenne lui-même. En dépit de leur importance, ces questions ont été largement délaissées par la doctrine communautariste. La jurisprudence de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne et les actes adoptés par l’Union européenne (droit primaire, droit dérivé et accords internationaux) sont pourtant riches d’enseignements. En effet, la Cour de justice a consacré des principes constituant le cadre général de l’applicabilité temporelle du droit de l’Union européenne. Bien que pertinent, ce cadre doit être enrichi par des règles écrites adoptées au cas par cas : les dispositions transitoires. Ces dernières, de prime abord particulièrement critiquables faute d’être aisément identifiables et interprétables, se révèlent être un instrument indispensable à l’applicabilité temporelle du droit de l’Union européenne. / The temporal applicability of the European Union lawThe questions relating to the temporal applicability of the European Union law arise as soon as the European Union adopts a new act. It is systematically necessary to determine the instant from which the act products its effects and the facts to which it applies. Furthermore, the principle of uniformity of the European Union law means that these questions must be answered by the European Union law itself. In spite of their importance these questions have been neglected by the European Union legal literature. Yet the case-law of the European Union Court of Justice and the acts adopted by the European Union (primary law, secondary legislation and international agreements) provide a wealth of information. Indeed, the Court of Justice has established principles which constitute the general framework of the temporal applicability of the European Union law. However relevant, this general framework must be completed by transitionnal provisions, a set of written subsidiary rules adopted on a case-by-case basis). These transitional provisions, at first deeply questionable due to being hard to identify and interpret, turn out to be a critical tool for the temporal applicability of the European Union law.

The dissertation consists of an analysis of the Constitutional Court decision S v Mhlungu 1995(7) BCLR 793 CC. The analysis focuses on the significance of the different interpretative approaches adopted by the members of the Court in analysing section 241(8) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Afii.ca Act 200 of 1993. The theoretical approaches to constitutional interpretation are first briefly discussed. This is followed by a description of the four respective judgments in the decision. The case is then analysed in respect of section 3 5, Chapter 3 and the Constitution itself in order to determine the significance. The jurisprudence of the Court (developed in its first eight decisions) is evaluated to assess the approach of the Constitutional Court to Chapter 3 and the remainder of the Constitution respectively. The conclusion is reached that the Court has endorsed a generous/purposive approach to constitutional interpretation and that this extends to the entire text of the Constitution. / Law / LL.M.

The dissertation consists of an analysis of the Constitutional Court decision S v Mhlungu 1995(7) BCLR 793 CC. The analysis focuses on the significance of the different interpretative approaches adopted by the members of the Court in analysing section 241(8) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Afii.ca Act 200 of 1993. The theoretical approaches to constitutional interpretation are first briefly discussed. This is followed by a description of the four respective judgments in the decision. The case is then analysed in respect of section 3 5, Chapter 3 and the Constitution itself in order to determine the significance. The jurisprudence of the Court (developed in its first eight decisions) is evaluated to assess the approach of the Constitutional Court to Chapter 3 and the remainder of the Constitution respectively. The conclusion is reached that the Court has endorsed a generous/purposive approach to constitutional interpretation and that this extends to the entire text of the Constitution. / Law / LL.M.