Historians today continue to explore the maintenance of the U.S. Empire in the Third World. Some argue that coercion was the driving force. Others suggest that consent played a role. Settling this debate is difficult given the unbalanced state of the historiography, which is overloaded with analyses of interventions. Analyzing U.S.-Ecuadorian relations offers an instructive addition to the literature. Negotiation and compromise, not coercion, were central to these interactions. The Ecuadorians who shaped these relations the most typically shared some core assumptions with their U.S. counterparts. Policymakers in Washington therefore developed educational exchange programs to expand this pool of pro-U.S. Latin Americans. Using documents from archives in the United States and Ecuador, this study explores how policymakers used diplomacy and education to maintain the U.S. Empire in the Third World from 1933 to 1963. This process began with the Roosevelt Administration’s Good Neighbor Policy. Ecuadorian threats to nationalize U.S. businesses operating in Ecuador, however, challenged the rhetoric of cooperation championed by Roosevelt. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor halted these challenges. Two days after the attack, policymakers in Washington accepted Ecuadorian offers to establish bases in Ecuador. This marked the solidification of hemispheric solidarity, and a more robust U.S. hegemony in Latin America. A growing number of Ecuadorian students and intellectuals studying in the United States under scholarships awarded by their government strengthened this solidarity. The U.S. government soon began funding both these exchanges as well as American Schools throughout Latin America in the hopes of maintaining this unity in the future. Beginning in 1950, disputes over fisheries threatened the wartime cohesion. Ecuador attempted to force Washington to accept a 200-mile limit on territorial waters. Negotiations failed to resolve the issue. The discontent evident throughout Latin America continued to build, until, in 1962, President John F. Kennedy discovered that the government of Ecuador would not support his administration’s plan to exclude Cuba from the Organization of American States. Despite these setbacks, policymakers continued to promote educational exchange through the Foreign Leader Program and the Fulbright Program. They hoped above all else to expand consent to U.S. hegemony. / text

This dissertation provides a detailed examination of the influence of Thomas Clifton Mann on the Latin American policy of the United States of America. A Foreign Service Officer from 1942, Mann eventually rose to the position of Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, and was President Lyndon Johnson’s most valued adviser on inter-American policy until his retirement from government service in May 1966. Commonly portrayed as highly conservative, insensitive to Latin American needs, and opposed to U.S. aid programs, Mann was a far more complex character than his critics have allowed. During the Eisenhower administration Mann’s influence was vital in reorienting policy priorities in Washington, emphasising the need for price stabilisation measures and limited development aid. During the Kennedy administration he opposed the Bay of Pigs invasion, before serving as Ambassador to Mexico where he successfully resolved the nation’s longest running border dispute. Most influential under Lyndon Johnson, Mann sought to place U.S. policy on a stable and sustainable path, reining in unrealistic expectations while fending off attacks from fiscal conservatives opposed to aid measures of any kind. In studying Mann’s career, much is revealed regarding the nature of U.S.-Latin American relations during a crucial period of history. While U.S. goals remained largely consistent, the nature of the challenges faced and the tactics used to counter them did not. Mann’s career saw the Cold War come to Latin America, and was met with both aid and military intervention, often in the form of counterinsurgency training and operations. Mann’s role in developing those polices reveals the contrasts and, more often, consistencies between the administrations he served, and undermines claims that the transition from Kennedy to Johnson witnessed a radical policy overhaul. Studying Mann’s career also illuminates divisive internal debates over the nature and meaning of inter-American relations, and the role and influence of an individual within Washington’s policymaking bureaucracy.